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Introduction to the essays 
 
The increasing concerns over the environmental sustainability of current 
development trajectories have brought numerous countries to adopt “greener 
growth strategies”.  However, given the numerous failures that hinder the well-
functioning of market mechanisms in relation to the environment, 
environmental regulations are considered as necessary to align private and 
public marginal benefit (and cost) curves. This dissertation aims at contributing 
to the on-going debate in literature on the impact of environmental policies on 
economic growth.  
 
To this end, the first essay of this thesis reviews the literature on the link 
between economic performance and environmental policy. The assessment 
underlines the different views on the effects of environmental regulations on 
firms’ productivity proposed by the neoclassical economic theory and by the so-
called Porter’s hypothesis. The former considers environmental regulations as 
necessary to cope with market failures related to environmental externalities but 
as detrimental to firms’ productivity. Michael Porter challenged this 
interpretation almost 25 years ago by arguing that “well-designed” policies do 
not necessarily hinder the competitiveness of firms but might actually increase 
it. Within this context, the essay first reviews the wide empirical literature on the 
Porter’s hypothesis and highlights the often contrasting results. In fact, the 
number of studies estimating a negative effect of tighter environmental norms 
on firms’ competitiveness appears to be almost equal to those finding a positive 
impact. Then, the multifaceted nature of environmental regulation is discussed 
as a potential explanation for the non-homogeneous results across studies. In 
fact, notwithstanding Porter and van de Linde (1995) underline how “well-
designed” regulations may lead to higher competitiveness for firms, the vast 
majority of studies mainly focus on the stringency of enforced norms. Instead, a 
number of other aspects of regulations are likely to play a key role in 
determining their overall impact on economic performance. Building on the 
literature examining what features a “well-designed” environmental regulation 
should exhibit, the essay finally discusses the role that elements such as 
stringency, flexibility or policy-induced uncertainty may have in shaping the 
economic outcomes of environmental policies. The proceedings of this work 
constitute the backbone of an article published in the journal “Energia” (edited 
by Stefano Clò, published in Italian) in September 2016 
 
The review of the first chapter underlines the presence of several gaps in the 
literature in relation to the impact of environmental regulation on innovation. In 
fact, while market-based instruments are often highlighted by scholars as 
providing higher dynamic incentives than non-market-based regulation, few 
papers have been able to empirically test such claims within the same study  also 
given the difficulties of comparing environmental policy norms across countries. 
Secondly, in a resources-constrained world, environmental policy is more likely 
to steer the direction of technological change toward rather than increase green 
innovation. Nonetheless, studies on the Porter’s hypothesis have often omitted to 
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consider the impact of environmental policies on the technologies not explicitly 
targeted by the introduced regulation. To this end, the second essay focuses on 
the consequences of increasingly stringent regulation on the technologies the 
environmental policy aims to promote and on other innovation. Building on the 
discussion of what a well-designed regulation entails, the paper distinguishes 
between market- and non-market-based policies. In order to capture the full 
extent of induced innovation, we adopt a cross-sectoral approach. This is due to 
the assumption that innovations designed in order to comply with 
environmental regulation are not necessary developed in the regulated industry. 
In line with theoretical results, market-based instruments are shown to be the 
main driver of increased innovation in the technological field that environmental 
policy wishes to promote. At the same time, the estimations suggest that non-
market-based regulations mainly decrease inventive efforts directed towards 
non-environmental technologies, possibly because of a negative impact on  
“polluting technologies”.  In addition, the results show the presence of path-
dependency in innovation.  This work has been presented at the 2016 AIEAR 
Annual Conference in February 2016 and at the University College of London 
within the seminar series “Innovation and Technological Change Research” in 
April 2016. 
 
The third essay adopts an experimental approach and focuses on a second 
feature often highlighted as characterizing well-designed regulation in the 
literature, namely (limited) uncertainty. More precisely, the paper assesses how 
policy-induced risk may affect investment decisions in renewable power plants. 
To this end, the paper first reviews the main characteristics of auction 
frameworks across Europe since these are being increasingly adopted by OECD 
and Non-OECD countries to support renewable energy deployment but are 
limitedly studied in the literature.  The review underlines how auction designs 
can vary along a number of dimensions, including how planning, winner 
selection, construction and operation stages are regulated. Since the policy 
features connected to the winner selection stage are the most novel and most 
unique to renewable energy technologies (RET) support through auction, these 
are discussed in more detail. Then, a stated preference approach is leveraged to 
investigate how auction design and the uncertainty regarding the future 
arrangements between the UK and the EU contribute to determine the cost of 
equity for renewable energy projects. The results show that improved design can 
lead to a moderate decrease in the cost of equity.  The largest decrease is 
provided by the introduction of moderate financial bid-bonds but the analysis 
also underlines how long-term auction programs strengthen the cost reduction 
effects typical of tendering competition.  The adoption of “technology-specific” 
auctions seems also to decrease business risks. The evidence on Brexit is rather 
weak and, if anything, suggests the higher relevance of these negotiations for 
English-based investors rather than for those based in EU27. 
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Abstract 
Neoclassical economic theory considers environmental regulation as necessary to 
address the market failures related to environmental externalities but as 
detrimental to firms’ productivity. This interpretation has been challenged almost 
25 years ago by Michael Porter by arguing that well-designed environmental 
policies do not necessarily hinder the competitiveness of firms but might actually 
increase it. In this article, we will review the main – often contrasting - results of 
the studies on what has become simply known as the «Porter’s hypothesis». The 
analysis highlights how the vast majority of the literature focuses on the stringency 
of enforced norms omitting other aspects of environmental policy design. Building 
on the literature examining what should characterise a “well-designed” regulation, 
the role that features other than stringency may have in determining the economic 
outcomes of environmental regulation is discussed and potential new venues of 
research are highlighted.  
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1. A review of the literature on environmental policy: moving beyond policy 
stringency 
1.1. Introduction  
Environmental policy is introduced with main objective of protecting the quality 
of the environment in order to guarantee the well-being of our societies. At the 
same time, however, its impact on the economic growth is highly debated and, 
over time, several hypotheses have been formulated. Initially, the thesis of a 
mere compatibility between the two societal objectives of economic growth and 
environment protection was developed. This idea lays at the core of the concept 
of “sustainable development” that chiefly underlines how these two objectives 
can be contemporaneously pursued. A second - and more recent interpretation – 
has been put forward with the idea of green growth. This distinguishes itself 
from sustainable development for two main reasons. First, this underlines more 
clearly the crucial role that the environment plays not only for our well-being but 
also for the functioning of our economies since it provides the numerous 
ecosystem services that underpin businesses’ activities (e.g. the production of 
fresh water, waste disposal, etc.).  Therefore, the environment is not considered 
as simply “compatible” with economic growth but also necessary (Jacobs, 2012). 
Secondly, the supporters of green growth strategies underline how well-
designed environmental policies can also spur economic growth by opening-up 
new markets. In this regard, the policies designed to support the deployment of 
renewable energy technologies are often cited. In fact, these have often been 
introduced with the joint objective of reducing CO2 emissions and building a 
domestic industry specialized in clean electricity generation (even if the results 
remarkably vary from State to State).  
 
The economic theory mainly discusses the relation between economic 
development and environmental protection through the concept of 
environmental externalities. More precisely, economists agree that it is 
necessary to align agents’ marginal benefits and cost of production (and 
consumption) in order to avoid that actions undertaken by individuals generate 
an aggregated catastrophic effect for the society as, for instance, in the case of 
the ozone hole or climate change. At the same time, however, neoclassic 
economic theories often consider environmental protection as a hindrance to 
economic growth. In fact, moving from the assumption that firms are fully 
rational agents that operate on the efficiency frontier, environmental regulations 
can only be considered a factor depressing productivity since they impose an 
additional cost on companies.  
 
This “traditional” interpretation of the link between environmental policies and 
economic outputs has been challenged by Michael Porter almost 25 years ago in 
an article published on the Journal of Economic Perspective. This theory, which 
became famous as the Porter’s hypothesis due to its high theoretical 
attractiveness and lack of robust empirical evidence, underlines that there may 
be margins to improve economic performance without compromising the 
environment. This paper provides an overview of the key theoretical and 
empirical insights into the Porter’s hypothesis and highlights gaps and potential 
new venues of research. Paragraph 2 describes how the Porter’s hypothesis has 
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been discussed in the literature and articulated. Next, Section 3 examines the 
empirical evidence on the impact of environmental regulation on economic 
outcomes to date. Highlighting the often-contrasting results in the literature, 
section 4 analyzes the role that policy features other stringency may play in 
shaping the economic outcomes of environmental regulations. Finally, section 5 
discusses the main conclusions and highlights possible new venues of research.  
 
1.2. The Porter’s hypothesis (and its different versions). 
Neoclassical economic theory considers firms as fully rational and profit 
optimizing agents. As such, the introduction of a new constraint to their 
optimization problem, namely environmental regulations, necessarily leads to 
lower competitiveness. This interpretation of the link between environmental 
regulation and productivity has been challenged by Porter almost 25 years ago. 
The main assumption behind the “Porter’s hypothesis” is that companies are 
rationally-bounded agents targeting profit maximization (rather than profit 
optimization) and that they operate in imperfect markets. Therefore, when a 
new constraint – like a tax on emissions or a legal limit on maximum effluents - is 
introduced, they will rethink production process in order to minimize the 
additional costs. In turn, this redesign can potentially lead to improvement in 
their business performance (Porter 1991, Porter and van der Linde 1995). The 
underinvestment in energy efficiency is a commonly cited example of how 
environmental regulation can help promoting both higher economic and 
environmental performance. In fact, notwithstanding the adoption of fuel saving 
technologies can increase competitiveness and – as co-benefit- reduce pollution, 
companies tend to underinvest in this field due to a number of market barriers 
and failures (Howarth and Andersson 1993, IEA 2013).  
 
During the past 25 years, the Porter’s hypothesis has been widely discussed in 
the literature and, over time, has been articulated into three more precisely 
defined versions. The so-called “strong version” highlights how economic agents 
are rationally bounded and operate in incomplete markets. Within this 
framework, companies are naturally brought to optimize and therefore well-
designed environmental regulations can lead to redesign imperfect production 
processes thus allowing to increase efficiency. Instead, both the weak and 
narrow versions of the Porter’s hypothesis focus on innovation but with an 
important difference.  In fact, both suggest that firms will react to newly 
introduced regulation by investing in green innovation and this, in turn, may lead 
to a positive knock-on effect on productivity.  However, the narrow version 
argues that flexible regulations, defined as those that allow the regulated agents 
to freely choose the techniques to reduce pollution, are more likely to drive an 
increase in innovation. Within the current debate, this dynamic efficiency1 is 
often attributed to market-based instruments (e.g. trading schemes), even if 
certain standards, like the Japanese front-runner scheme, can have similar 
properties.   
                                                        
1 The adjective “dynamic” is here used - in the same vein as De serres et al. 
(2011) - to describe policy instruments assumed to create incentives to “… 
searching continuously for cheaper abatement options” (pag.23). 
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1.3. The empirical evidence  
 
The vast majority of studies try to assess the impact of environmental norms on 
the economic outcomes discussed in the different versions of the Porter’s 
hypothesis (innovation and competitiveness) by looking at the severity of 
enforced norms. However, capturing the stringency of enforced process is 
hindered by numerous challenges, specially when cross-countries comparisons 
are attempted. As such, the next paragraph will review this wide body of 
literature leveraging two key classification elements: “how” environmental 
policy stringency has been measured and which impact has been studied.   
 
1.3.1. How (or where) environmental policy stringency is measured 
 
Stringency of enforced environmental norms is a complex variable to capture 
due to numerous challenges. Multidimensionality and identification issues are 
probably among the most cumbersome. Multidimensionality is generated by the 
need to take into consideration that firms pollute different environmental media 
(e.g. water, air, etc.) and that different instruments can be used to regulate these 
negatives externalities. For instance, CO2 emissions can be regulated through a 
tax, a standard, the creation of market for emissions (as the case of the EU 
emission trading scheme) or a combination of these instruments. At the same 
time, firms are likely to pollute more than one environmental media and each 
externality can be, as discussed, regulated by numerous instruments. As such, 
the overall stringency faced by a firm is given by the aggregate effect generated 
by the various environmental policy instruments in place for each of the 
environmental media polluted.  
 
A second key challenge is represented by identification issues. In fact, numerous 
other factors are likely to contribute to determine the ultimate objective of 
environmental regulation, namely (better) environmental performance.  At the 
firm-level, the degree of competitive pressures, access to capital, resource prices 
or even green marketing strategies may lead managers to adopt more or less 
environmental friendly techniques. On a macro level, countries characterised by 
a service economy are likely to exhibit lower pollution levels compared to more 
industry-intensive economies even if the same environmental norms are in 
place. Therefore, it can be particularly complex to identify a casual link between 
the observed environmental performance and the environmental norms in place.  
Other issues that further complicate these efforts include sampling problems and 
slack enforcement (Brunel and Levinson, 2013).   
 
Due to these challenges, researchers leveraged different approaches in order to 
capture this elusive variable in econometric studies. These can be grouped 
according to “where” environmental policy stringency is measured. More 
precisely, moving from the assumption that environmental policies are designed 
to change the behaviour of economic agents in order to lead to a better 
environmental performance, it is possible to classify the various approaches 
according to where the stringency is measured along this cause-effect chain (Fig. 
1). 
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Figure 1. Methodologies to measure environmental policy stringency 
 
Source:  Adapted from Botta and Kozluk, 2014. 
 
The first group is composed by those measures that are based on the direct 
observation of the legislation in a single country (Fig.1 , arrow 1). This includes 
both dummy variables introduced to account for a change in domestic legislation 
(e.g. a modification of national law, the signature of an international treaty) and 
composite indicators that are based on the aggregation of data gathered for 
multiple laws (Botta and Kozluk, 2014. EBRD, 2011. Sato et al. 2015. Schaffrin et 
al. 2015). The second group is based on questionnaires where economic agents 
are asked to evaluate the severity of enforced norms (e.g. WEF questionnaire). 
As such, these measures capture – to some extent - the stringency of 
environmental norms as “perceived” by the regulated entities. A third approach 
focuses on what can be defined as the first level consequences of environmental 
policies, namely the production choices of firms. Following this methodology, 
researchers have often tried to measure the stringency of enforced norms 
through surveys of firms’ expenditures on pollution abatement technologies (e.g. 
US PACE) or, more rarely, through shadow prices estimations.  Finally, several 
studies focused on the second level consequences of environmental policies and 
leveraged the variation in the environmental performance of a firm or a country 
as proxy for the overall stringency of enforced norms (arrow 4) (Botta and 
Kozluk 2014). 
 
Each of these methodologies exhibits its own advantages and weaknesses. 
Broadly speaking, if stringency is measured at the begging of the above 
described cause-effect chain, as for instance when dummy variables or 
composite indicators are leveraged, then the challenges posed by 
multidimensionality are more severe. In fact, the risks of overlooking important 
aspects, omitting significant interaction effects or excessive simplifications 
should not be underestimated. Conversely, identification issues are relatively 
more easily avoided. Instead, measures based on the consequences of the 
enforced norms are more likely to better control the multidimensionality 
challenge but are exposed to identification issues. In fact, the ensemble of policy 
instruments in place is likely to drive firms’ expenditures on pollution abatement 
technologies or environmental performance, thus these data should allow 
controlling for the multidimensionality. However, numerous other exogenous 
factors like green marketing, R&D with collateral improvements or regulations 
pertaining to other policy areas may as well play a key role in determining 
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investment decisions or overall environmental performance. As such, 
identification is often a major challenge for this later type of measures.  
 
 
1.3.2. ..And what is affected? 
 
The second pair of lenses through which can be useful to reflect on the existing 
literature can be provided by looking at the version of the Porter’s hypothesis 
considered. Importantly, the narrow, weak and strong versions mainly describe 
a cause-effect relation as well (Ambec et al. 2013). In fact, it is necessary that 
firms innovate (as underlined by the weak an narrow version) in order for 
environmental policies to improve firms’ both economic and environmental 
performance (the strong version) (Fig. 2).  
 
Figure 2. Cause-consequence relations in the Porter’s hypothesis 
 
Source: Ambec et al. 2013 
 
1.3.3. The effects on innovation 
The studies on the first step of the cause-effect relation suggested by Porter, 
namely innovation, leverages data on R&D expenditures and patents to evaluate 
the role that environmental regulation may play in stimulating inventing activity. 
Jaffe and Palmer (1997) are among the first to focus on this aspect and find a 
positive correlation between expenditure on pollution abatement and control 
equipment (US PACE data) and firms R&D expenditures. However, the results 
are not statistically significant when the patents in green technologies are used 
as innovation proxy. Instead, more recent studies often find a positive relation 
between PACE expenditures and innovation. Brunnermeier and Cohen (2003), 
who leverage as a proxy of environmental policy stringency both PACE 
expenditures and data on government monitoring activities, find a positive 
impact on USA patenting activity between 1983 and 1992. A positive impact is 
also found by Frondel et al. (2007) who analyse the impact of policy stringency, 
measured though an OECD questionnaire distributed in seven countries in 2003, 
on R&D expenditures.  De Vries and Withagen (2005) leverage instead three 
different measures of stringency (ratification of international agreements, an 
index of environmental performance and a latent variable strategy) and identify 
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a positive effect on firms’ patenting activity only with the third methodology. An 
interesting approach is adopted by Wagner (2007) that focuses on the difference 
between process and product innovation. The results show that the 
implementation of environmental management systems leads to an increase on 
environmental process innovation while it decreases the overall inventing 
activity of a firm. Overall, the literature seems to depict a relatively homogenous 
picture pointing out to a positive impact of environmental policy stringency on 
innovation, specially in most recent studies.  Verdolini and Galeotti (2011) study 
how knowledge stocks in energy-efficient and environmentally friendly 
technologies flow across geographical and technological space. In addition to 
showing that that spillovers between countries have a significant positive impact 
on further green innovation, some of their specifications include a policy dummy 
variable to account for the presence of at least one policy targeting energy 
efficiency in the innovating country in any year t. Also in this case, policy is 
shown to have a highly significant effect on domestic innovation. 
 
 
1.3.4. .. and on productivity 
Several studies focus on the second level consequences of environmental 
policies, that is, the economic performance of the regulated agents. The 
performance measures included in these researches vary according to whether 
the study is conducted at the firm, industry or country level. On a macro level, 
the gross domestic product or gross domestic product per capita area among the 
most commonly employed measures. Instead, growth productivity rates or other 
indicators of sectoral competitiveness are often employed in studies at the firm 
or plant level (Constantini and Crespi 2008, Frondel et al. 2007).  Finally, also 
financial measures like profits and gross operating margins are leveraged, even if 
less common (Carbon Trust, 2004). 
 
Few studies adopt a macro perspective, also due to the challenges of identifying 
norms that affect all sectors in a given country to a similar extent.  A large 
portion of the literature opting for a macro perspective leverages the ratification 
of the Kyoto Protocol with contrasting results. Yörük and Zaim (2005), who focus 
on OECD economies, estimate a positive impact of the ratification of the Kyoto 
Protocol on productivity while a negative effect is found by Wu and Wang (2008) 
who leverage a panel of 17 APEC countries. The different results are explained 
by the authors underlining the diversity of studied samples but it should be also 
considered how the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol does not lead to the 
implementation of homogenous norms across countries, thus creating room for a 
large difference of possible impacts.  
 
The stream of literature that leverages a sectoral approach is relatively larger 
and, also in this case, the results are not homogenous. Dufour et al. (1998) 
leverage a short time series (three years) to evaluate the impact of 
environmental policies on the Canadian manufacturing industry estimating a 
negative effect. Barbera and McConnell (1990) exploit a longer time series 
(almost 20 years) and focus on five American manufacturing sectors. However, 
the results are not conclusive since, while the direct effect appear to be mainly 
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negative, the indirect effects are estimated to be both positive and negative, thus 
complicating the identification of the overall impact. Instead, a positive effect is 
estimated in Yang et al. (2012) for the Taiwanese manufacturing industry, by 
Alpay et al. (2002) for the Mexican food processing industry and by Berman and 
Bui (2001) who focus on the refineries located close to Los Angeles.  
 
Finally, most studies conducted at a firm level identify a negative impact on 
productivity.  For instance, Gollop and Roberts (1983) estimate a negative 
impact due to the introduction of more stringent regulations on So2 emission in 
the United States during ’70s. A harmful impact is also identified by Broberg et al. 
(2012) in the case of cellulose industry. While the initial negative impact 
estimated by Managi et al. (2005) for the productivity of off-shore oil & gas 
reserves in the United States tend to reverse and, over time, to compensate for 
the initial productivity lost after. Rassier and Earnhart (2010) find a negative 
impact of water pollution regulation, as measured by permitted wastewater 
discharge limits, on the profitability of 73 US chemical firms in the years 1995 to 
2001.  As opposed to these works, several studies however identify a positive 
impact on environmental regulation on productivity. This is the case, for 
instance, of Van der Vlist et al. (2007) for the Dutch horticulture or Jaraité and Di 
Maria (2012) that focus on the companies regulated through the European ETS. 
 
Importantly, the Porter’s hypothesis envisages a dynamic mechanism that is 
likely to require a certain time lag between the introduction of new regulations 
and the potential gains for the firms due to reorganization and innovation. This 
dynamic dimension is often omitted and, when included, estimations are more 
likely to identify a positive effect. For instance, leveraging a time lag of three and 
four years between the introduction of environmental laws and their impact on 
productivity, Lanoie et al. (2008) verify the presence of an initial negative impact 
that gradually reverses up to the point of compensating initial losses in the case 
seventeen Quebecois sectors. The importance of introducing time lag is further 
strengthened by the results of Hamamoto (2006) who focuses on five Japanese 
manufacturing sectors. At the same time, regulations are often announced before 
they enter into force. As such, it may well be possible that firms start reacting 
before their date of enforcement. For instance, Nicolli and Vona (2016) leverage 
the a one year forward lag (i.e. time t+1) of the stringency variable in order to 
decrease the endogeneity risk and reverse causality, providing further evidence 
of a positive effect on innovation but also highlighting the difficulty in 
determining the correct timing for the analyses. The role played by time lag 
emerges also in a meta-analysis of the literature conducted by Cohen and Tubb 
(2017). In fact, the authors underline how studies that introduce a time lag for 
their policy variables are more likely to find a positive impact, thus reaffirming 
the dynamic nature of the Porter’s hypothesis. 
 
Finally, some recent researches studying the impact of environmental regulation 
have undertaken an “integrated approach” that spans across the various versions 
of the Porter’s hypothesis or aggregation level with interesting insights. For 
instance, Lanoie et al. (2011) leverage an OECD survey on more than 4.000 firms 
located in seven industrialized countries. The results show a positive and 
significant link between (perceived) stringency and green innovation. This 
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evidence for the weak version of the Porter ‘s hypothesis is however coupled 
with negative direct effect on productivity. As such, the results underline that 
innovation only partially compensates the adjustment cost to new 
environmental regulation and a lack of a “global miracle”. Similarly, Rubashkina 
et al. (2015) leverage a panel of European manufacturing sectors between 1997 
and 2009. By adopting an instrumental variable estimation approach, they find 
evidence of a positive impact of environmental regulation on innovation activity, 
as proxied by patents, but find that productivity appears to be unaffected by the 
degree of pollution control and abatement efforts. Instead, a recent OECD study 
attempts to evaluate the impact of environmental regulation on firm, industry 
and country level (Albrizio et al. 2014). The authors summarize the results 
underling a lack of empirical finding of a permanent negative effect on multi-
factor productivity. Furthermore, the study shows how more technologically 
advanced firm are more likely to exhibit productivity gain when new more 
stringent environmental norms are introduced while firms that are more distant 
from the technological frontier are more likely to be negatively affected.  
 
 
1.4. Moving beyond policy stringency  
 
As it emerges from the review of this wide body of literature on the Porter’ 
hypothesis, the conclusions of the different studies are mixed. A possible 
explanation for the often-contrasting results may lie in the multifaceted nature of 
environmental regulation. In fact, notwithstanding Porter and van de Linde 
(1995) underline how “well-designed” regulations may lead to higher 
competitiveness for firms, the vast majority of studies mainly focus on the 
stringency of enforced norms. Nevertheless, a number of other aspects of 
regulations are likely to play a key role in determining their overall impact on 
economic performance. Within the next pages, we will first review the (few) 
theoretical contributions that discuss into detail what the features that should 
characterise a well-designed regulation is. Then, the empirical evidence available 
in the literature on their impact will be reviewed.  
 
Flexibility is among the most often cited features that should characterize well-
design regulation. Porter and van der Linde (1995), when describing the features 
of a well-crafted regulation, underline three principles. “First, they must create 
the maximum opportunity for innovation, leaving the approach to innovation to 
industry and not the standard-setting agency. Second, regulations should foster 
continuous improvement, rather than locking in any particular technology. Third, 
the regulatory process should leave as little room as possible for uncertainty at 
every stage” (Porter and van der Linde, 1995. Pag. 110). Porter then argues that 
these features are more likely to be met by market-based regulation since such 
instruments,” including pollution taxes, deposit-refund schemes and tradable 
permit, […] often allow considerable flexibility, reinforce resource productivity, and 
also create incentives for ongoing innovation” (Porter and van der Linde, 1995. 
Pag. 111). Indeed, the idea that directly pricing externalities – in absence of 
market imperfection - is the most efficient approach to address environmental 
externalities has been widely accepted in the literature for a long time. The main 
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underlying mechanisms, whose intuitions can be almost dated back to the work 
of Pigou (1932) and Coase (1960), lies in the equalization of public and private 
marginal cost and benefit curves. The direct consequence of this explicit pricing 
is that, given that firms are forced to pay for each additional unit of pollution, 
they face an ongoing incentive to reduce the tax payment. However, importantly, 
the term flexible regulations include also performance standards since these 
leave firms free to adopt the production techniques they deem as most effective. 
Nevertheless, in case of market imperfections - such as lack of perfect 
competition - the ranking of market-based and command control policies is more 
ambiguous (Requate,  2005). For instance, Montero (2002) compares the 
incentives to invest in environmental technologies of both tradable permits and  
command-and-control regulations (emissions and performance standards) 
considering imperfect competition on both the output and the permit market. 
Because of this joint market imperfection, the author shows that both emission 
standards and trading schemes where permits are auctioned provide higher 
incentives to invest in environmental technologies than a certificate market with 
free allocation. Furthermore, building on Montero's results, Bruneau (2004) 
shows that performance standards can generate higher incentives to innovate 
than tradable permit system also in perfectly competitive markets.  
  
Among the few other contributions that discuss the issue of what features should 
characterise a well-designed regulation, there is the important contribution of 
De Serres et al (2010). The authors discuss five criteria that policies should meet 
to be considered economically efficient, namely: cost-effectiveness, adoption and 
compliance incentives, uncertainty and stimulus to innovation. They conclude 
that pricing instruments are generally the most efficient single instrument but 
also underline how no single instrument scores well on each of the considered 
criteria. Furthermore, given that environmental damage often results from 
several interacting market failures, a mix of complementary instruments is often 
likely to be required.  Johnstone et al (2010) focus explicitly on innovation and 
suggest that rather than assessing the impacts of environmental policies in terms 
of broad ‘types’ (i.e. market-based instruments vs. “command-and-control” 
regulation), it may be more useful to evaluate more specific characteristics of 
different instruments. To this end, they identify four key features that should 
characterize environmental policy aiming at promoting innovation. These 
include: stringency, dynamic efficiency, uncertainty, flexibility (defined as the 
extent to which innovators are free to identify the best way to comply with the 
environmental regulation) and incidence (defined as the capability to target as 
closely as possible the externalities to be promoted/discouraged).  
 
The importance of uncertainty in characterizing a well-designed regulatory 
settings emerges also in contributions exclusively dedicated to this topic. 
Albrizio and Costa (2013) develop a regulator's objective function including an 
importance parameter that reflects the weight that the regulator puts on 
economic growth over the reduction of CO2 emissions. This parameter follows a 
mean-preserving spread process and, therefore, creates uncertainty in the 
investment process. Then, the authors show that the optimal investment level in 
clean energy decreases as the level of uncertainty increases. Devine et al. (2014) 
examine how different Feed-in Tariff (FiT) designs do not eliminate market price 
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risk but rather transfer this risk to a counterparty. The policymaker’s risk 
preferences is specified through a Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA) utility 
function and, using Stackelberg game theory and option pricing, the authors 
identify the optimal feed-in tariff design.  The main conclusion is that the optimal 
division of risk between investors and policymakers/consumers can be 
considered similar to risk sharing agreements in insurance contracts. 
 
A facet of environmental regulation that is not widely addressed in the academic 
literature but often discussed as a major barrier in industry-led studies is the 
level of red-tape generated on firms. In fact, like all other regulations, 
environmental norms are likely to differ in terms of the administrative burden 
they impose on companies. In turn, this difference may as well help to explain 
the variance in the empirical results on the Porter’s hypothesis.  However, while 
numerous studies analyse the negative impact of the red-tape resulting from a 
wide range of regulations (e.g. Nicoletti and Scarpetta, 2003; Arnold et al. 2009), 
few focus on the potential pitfalls of environmental laws. Kozluk (2014) reviews 
the environmental legislation in 30 OECD countries focusing on both regulatory 
characteristics that may inhibit the entry-exit process and the degree to which 
economic considerations are taken into account in regulation design.  These two 
dimensions are extremely relevant since a poor design may results in position 
rents for incumbents due to limited market contestability, slower diffusion of 
innovative and more efficient technologies, slower relocation of resources to 
more efficient (and environmental friendly) firms and decreased inventing 
activity. Interestingly , the survey results show that countries widely differ in 
terms of the burden of their regulation. Furthermore, the author underlines how 
more stringent regulation is not necessarily associated to higher administrative 
burden to firm. Overall, this lack of correlation between stringent and 
burdensome regulation may offer an additional possible explanation for the 
often-inconclusive results in the empirical literature on the impact of stringent 
norms. 
 
A relatively more limited number of studies analyse the interaction among 
different policy instruments and their possible synergies or misalignments. For 
instance, Fischer and Newell (2008) find that, while pricing is the most efficient 
single policy mechanism to reduce emissions, a policy portfolio composed of 
both emissions pricing and R&D subsidies can decrease emissions at a 
significantly lower cost. Nevertheless, the challenges to integrate multiple policy 
instruments should be carefully considered by policy-makers. For instance, Hood 
(2013) underlines how the interaction between quantity-based carbon pricing 
instruments (e.g. emissions trading) and other policies that can contribute to 
reduce emissions (e.g. energy efficiency standards) may undermine the 
properties of climate policies.  
 
 
1.4.1. Flexibility  
 
Studies often do not allow to clearly identifying the type of regulations 
considered. This is often due to the approach used to capture environmental 
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policy. In fact, since studies often leverage data on aggregate expenditures on 
pollution abatement costs (PACE) or firms environmental performance, 
considerations on the type of instruments enforced are omitted. Cohen and Tubb 
(2017) reflect upon this element and highlight how only 35% of surveyed 
researches allow to distinguish between flexible and “command-and-control” 
regulations. Notwithstanding this, the authors note that studies focusing on 
flexible regulations are much more likely to show positive impact. Furthermore, 
the evidence of whether pure market-based regulations are more effective than 
“command-and-control” (whether technology or performance standards) is 
limited due to complexity of comparing different types of regulations. In fact, 
while the stringency of pricing instruments  (e.g. taxes) is usually measured in 
relation to price paid per amount of pollutant produced, the measurement of the 
stringency of standards is more complex and often captured by either 
introducing a dummy that takes value equal to 1 for newly modified standards or 
by observing the technologies/performance dictated by the standards. In turn, 
these different “measurement units” intricate the efforts to compare directly the 
two different types of instruments. However, some indirect evidence on the 
higher efficiency of market-based versus “command and control” regulation is 
present in the literature. Burtraw (2000) finds evidence that the switch from a 
technological standard with emissions caps to an allowance trading program in 
US environmental regulations for SO2 emissions in 1990 enhanced innovation 
and fostered organizational change. Lanoie et al. (2011) also provide mild 
indirect evidence on this issue, showing that performance standards have a 
significant effect on R&D expenditures while the same does not hold true for 
more prescriptive technological standards. However, they do not find any 
significant positive impact for market-based instruments and argue that “this 
may be due to the fact that, in practice, such measures are frequently applied at too 
low a level to induce innovation” (Lanoie, et al. 2011, pag. 837). Hoglund Isaksson 
(2005) looks at the impact on the abatement cost functions of 114 Swedish 
combustion plants during the 1990–96 period following the introduction of a 
charge on NOx emission. Her results show that the technological developments 
occurred during the considered period allowed reducing emission reduction at 
very low cost. Also Andersen et al (2007) finds a neutral or slightly positive net 
impact of environmental taxes, whose revenues are recycled to cut other taxes, 
on gross domestic product. As opposed to these results, authors that studied the 
introduction of a permits trading mechanism to regulate SO2 emission in USA 
found that innovation declined compared to the previous period when  
command-and-control regulations were in place. For instance, Taylor (2012), 
who analyses patenting data for various SO2 and NOx  technologies characterized 
by different  costs and  performances,  finds that innovation dramatically 
decreased a few years into trading. Popp (2003) also confirms this negative 
trend. However, the author also argues that the innovations developed under the 
permit system contributed more to reduce SO2 emissions than those developed 
under the command and control system. More precisely, Popp leverages patent 
data to study innovation in flue gas desulfurization units (“scrubbers”) and finds 
that the command-and-control regulations generated incentives to reduce the 
costs of operating the scrubbers while the permit system generated mainly 
incentives to improve the removal efficiency of scrubbers.  
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1.4.2. Uncertainty  
 
Policy induced uncertainty is the design feature, other than stringency, probably 
most analysed in the empirical literature. Following the work of Dixit and 
Pindyck (1994), numerous studies adopt a real option approach (ROA) to 
evaluate its impact on investment decisions. Generally speaking these researches 
underline how increased uncertainty hinders the investment signal provided by 
(stringent) environmental policies even if – importantly - the direct impact on 
productivity is scarcely considered. Yang et al. (2008) evaluate the impact of 
climate policy uncertainty on private investment in power generation leveraging 
the market price of CO2 as a proxy for policy stringency. Through a ROA model, 
they show that investors seek higher risk premia the closer an expected price 
shock induced by policy uncertainty is to the time of investment. In addition, 
they find that the process through which CO2 price variations feed to electricity 
price remarkably contributes to determine the overall investment risk faced by 
firms.  Lofgren et al. (2008) estimates the threshold condition that will trigger 
investment in a new abatement technology for a firm facing uncertainty on a tax 
on a polluting production input. The hurdle rates for abatement investments 
linked to an option value in case of uncertainty on the future price of the 
polluting fuel are estimated to range between from 2.7 to 3.6 according to the 
considered industry.  S. Fuss et al. (2008) introduce a distinction between 
market uncertainty (i.e. fluctuation of allowance prices uncertainty) and 
uncertainty pertaining to lack of clarity on policy signals. Through a ROA 
approach, they show that latter uncertainty can lead to larger delays in 
investments in clean energy technologies while market uncertainty is shown – 
up a certain threshold – to have a limited impact.  S. Fuss et al. (2009) reach 
similar conclusions comparing frequency distributions of investments in wind 
energy and fossil-fired generation with CCS. Interestingly, the authors also find 
evidence that climate change policies that are stable over a certain length of time 
and change abruptly lead to smaller cumulative CO2 emissions than less abrupt 
but more frequently changing policy frameworks. More recently, Ritzenhofen 
and Spinler (2014) analyze the timing and the likelihood of investments in 
renewable energy generation considering three different scenarios: a fixed Feed-
in tariff regime (deterministic scenario), a stochastic scenario where electricity is 
sold on the spot market and, thirdly, the case of regime switching where the 
investment is undertaken under a fixed FiT without retroactive changes. They 
find that regulatory uncertainty increases price thresholds required to induce 
investment and that, when FiTs are significantly higher than electricity market 
prices, investors will invest earlier in order to secure the incentive before the 
regulatory change. Leveraging a stated preferences approach, Luthi & 
Wustnhagen (2012) suggest that project developers carefully evaluate the 
risk/return profiles of investment evaluating the return offered by incentives 
against a set of policy risks. Their study, based on a panel of 63 investors, 
estimates that investment environment characterized by low risk of sudden 
policy change lead to tariff 4.10 ct/kWh higher than in case of a completely risk-
free policy environment. A similar finding originates from the work of Chassot et 
al (2014) that leverage a choice experiments on 29 venture capital investors 
based in Europe and USA. Their results show that high levels of regulatory risk 
have a negative effect on the likelihood to invest in renewable energy. In 
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addition, by adopting a behavioural approach, they show that this detrimental 
impact is lower for respondents that have a more positive attitude towards 
government intervention.  
 
Other than investment decisions, the importance of a stable and predictable 
policy framework emerges clearly also in studies dedicated to innovation. In 
their previously mentioned work, Johnstone et al (2010) present empirical 
evidence based on a panel of countries over the period 2000-2007 that the more 
‘inflexible’ and unpredictable a policy regime is, the less patenting activity is 
registered for a given level of policy stringency. Kalamova et al. (2013) assess the 
impact of environmental policy uncertainty on innovation, using patent data as a 
proxy for innovation and volatility in public green R&D expenditures as a 
measure of policy uncertainty. The results, based on a panel data for OECD 
countries over the period 1986–2007, show that a 10% increase in policy 
uncertainty can lead to a 1.2–2.8% decrease in environmental patent activity. 
Furthermore, Nicolli and Vona (2016) argues that ratification of the Kyoto 
Protocol, which determined a more stable and less uncertain policy framework, 
amplifies the inducement effect of both energy policy and market liberalization 
on green energy innovation. 
 
Interestingly, also announcements of planned future modifications to market 
arrangement can affect uncertainty. Fagiani and Hakvoort (2013) estimate the 
impact of both the announcement and of the actual implementation of the 
integration of Swedish and Norwegian renewable energy certificate markets on 
certificate prices through a GARCH model. After accounting for exogenous 
factors, the results show an increased certificate price volatility due to the 
regulatory uncertainty, thus underlining how also planned policy changes can 
affect certificate markets. As such, the authors underline policy-makers planning 
to undertake major modification of enforced regulations should take steps to 
disclose as much information as possible about the status of the discussion, 
future arrangement and any other features that could help investors to form 
rational expectations on the novel arrangement.  
 
1.4.3. Administrative burden 
The literature on the impact of the administrative burden of environmental 
regulations on firms’ performance is relatively limited while their anti-
competitive features have received a larger attention. This is due to the presence 
of norms that discriminate by design against new entrants, also known as  
“vintage differentiated environmental regulations” (or VDR). These impose 
higher environmental performance requirements for newly established plants 
and are widely diffuse and common across countries.  For example, the Canadian 
new rules for coal plants (2015) oblige new firms to install a carbon capture and 
storage equipment (CSS) while existing plants are exempted from this 
requirement until 2030. Similar norms can also be found in USA, Europe and 
China. While VDRs may be justified on political economy grounds, the resulting 
uneven playing field is likely to undermine the mechanism underlying the 
Porter’s hypothesis. More precisely, the higher barrier to entry may undermine 
the entry-exit process and, more broadly, the process of creative destruction 
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underpinning innovation as depicted by Schumpeter. In addition, the slower 
retirement of older vintage capital can result in lower average productivity.  In 
this regard, Coysh et al (2017, forthcoming) shows that VDRs may be associated 
with a lifetime extension of older polluting firms by 8 to even 15 years. A similar 
analysis is carried out by Bushnell and Wolfram (2012) that analyze the effects 
of the USA New Source Review (NSR) environmental regulations that required 
new electric generating plants to install costly pollution control equipment but 
exempted existing plants. The authors estimate that the regulations decreased 
capital investment without, however, identifying any effect on other inputs or 
emissions. Similar results are found also in researches on other sectors. For 
instance, Becker and Henderson (2000) study several industries over the period 
1963-1992 and find that that new regulations significantly decrease the 
likelihood of opening of new plants.  Gruenspecht (1982) estimates that vintage 
differentiated car emissions standards for carbon monoxide (CO) and nitrogen 
oxides (NOx), lowered sales of new cars by 2-5% over the first five years after the 
implementation of the new standards. One of the few contributions on the 
impact of burdensome administrative procedure is provided by Luthi & Prassler 
(2011) who leverage a survey on US and EU developers to perform a conjoint 
analysis. Legal security, duration of administrative process duration and grid 
access regulations emerge as extremely relevant driver of developers’ 
preference. In addition, the study shows that developers may leverage non-
compensatory decision-making and certain minimum “performance” level of the 
regulatory process can be regarded as knockout criteria. 
 
 
1.4.4. “Complementary” regulations 
Finally, a growing body of literature underlines how environmental regulations 
are not introduced in vacuum but in a context characterised by several other 
norms often geared towards more polluting production process. As such, the 
interaction of environmental regulations with pre-existing norms should be 
considered when evaluating their impact on firms’ productivity or innovation.  
Nesta et al (2014) is among the first contributions that empirically assesses the 
complementarity between environmental policies and competition in energy 
production. To this end, the authors build a dataset on renewable energy policies 
and product market regulation (PMR) for OECD countries since the late 1970s. 
The results show that renewable energy policies are more effective in fostering 
green innovation in countries with liberalized energy markets. In particular, the 
combination of environmental policies and market deregulation is the most 
effective method of inducing innovation in renewable energy, particularly near 
the technological frontier.  Nicolli and Vona (2016) further develop the idea 
proposed in Nesta et al. (2014) by assembling a database on EU countries for the 
years 1980 to 2007. Their estimations suggest that, compared to privatization 
and unbundling, lowering entry barriers has a significant positive impact on 
renewable energy technologies. In addition, the authors are able to evaluate the 
impact on eight different renewable technologies and find that the aggregate 
effect of market liberalization found in the previous literature is driven by 
technologies where both patenting activity is less concentrated activity across 
firms and the entry of independent power producers is more likely, such as wind 
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and solar thermal energy. Benatia and Kozluk (2016) show that both the 
likelihood and the volume of entry of renewable power generators are 
significantly influenced by industry regulation, local structural industry 
characteristics, such as concentration, sectoral expansion jointly with renewable 
support policies and installed base. However, notably, also environmental 
regulation shapes can promote or decrease competition in a sector. Cretì and  
Sanin (2017) highlight the potential trade-off between promoting a high 
CO2 price through emission trading schemes and promoting competition in 
energy markets, specially in sectors where firms are vertically integrated (e.g. 
the power sector).  Ang et al (2017) show that both innovation and investment 
flows in renewable power are driven by both incentives in place and the broader 
investment environment, including investment policy (e.g. policies on registering 
property; regulatory quality); investment facilitation (e.g. licenses and permit 
systems) and competition policy (e.g. direct control of the state over 
enterprises).  
 
1.5. Conclusions 
 
While the theoretical arguments for the Porter's Hypothesis appear to be solid, 
the empirical evidence is  - at least – mixed. The literature review confirms the 
presence of a still divided community, specially in relation to the strong version 
of the Porter’s hypothesis. Overall, the number of studies estimating a negative 
effect of tighter environmental norms on firms’ competitiveness appears to be 
almost equal to those finding a positive impact. However, we should note that 
studies conducted at a plant, firm or sectoral level seems to be more likely to 
yield negative estimations of environmental policy impact on productivity. 
Regarding innovation, the literature - and specially most recent studies – often 
identify a positive impact, thus validating the weak version of the Porter‘s 
hypothesis. As such, overall, the literature seems to suggest that firms react to 
new regulation through an increase in innovation but does not allow to clearly 
discerning the overall impact on economic performance. 
 
What rationale can be identified behind these mixed results?  Through a review 
of the literature on environmental policy design, we argue that a possible 
explanation for the lack of homogenous results across studies may lie in the 
multifaceted nature of environmental regulations. In fact, while the vast majority 
of studies focus on the stringency of enforced norms, environmental policy 
instruments enforced in different countries vary along numerous dimensions. In 
turn, these features affect to a various extent different economic outcomes. For 
instance, vintage-differentiated regulations seems to result in slower capital 
turn-over and higher barrier to entries, thus possibly undermining the process of 
creation destruction that underpins Schumpeterian innovation. Uncertainty 
delays investment decision and rises investment costs while environmental red-
tape, which is found to vary considerably across countries and to be 
uncorrelated with environmental policy stringency, can lead to sensibly higher 
compliance cost for firms. Finally, the role of flexibility, which is one of the few 
features characterizing well-designed regulations discussed in the original 
Porter’s work, is limitedly assessed in the literature as well. 
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As such, while the existing literature provides interesting insights on the Porter 
‘s hypothesis, it also underlines new interesting venues of research. First of all, 
the need to sharpen our understanding of the role played by different “types” of 
policy instruments seems to emerge clearly. Cohen and Tubb (2017) reflect upon 
this element and highlight how only 35% of surveyed studies allow to 
distinguish between flexible and “command-and-control” regulations. This 
scarcity of analyses seems even more pronounced – and surprising – in the case 
of innovation since the higher dynamic efficiency of flexible regulation is one of 
the main reason behind its adoption. Therefore, the study of how the impact of 
regulation on innovation varies according to the type of policy implemented 
appears to be an important area for further research.  
 
The role that other features of environmental regulations can play in 
determining their overall impact on economic activity is another unexplored and 
promising areas of research. To this end, further studies may help to reconcile 
the contrasting results in the empirical literature adopting a fine-grained 
approach to environmental policy design. In this regard, policy-induced 
uncertainty, vintage differentiation and the red-tape that policy instruments 
generate on firms constitute potentially fruitful areas of research. An important 
challenge in this regard for researchers, however, may lie in the difficulty of 
identifying data with enough variation across countries. 
 
Thirdly, even if economics is often labelled as the “sad science” because it focuses 
on how to allocate scarce resource, the vast majority of the research on 
innovation considers only the impact of environmental regulation on green 
innovation omitting to examine possible consequences on other technological 
areas. Nevertheless, environmental regulation is more likely to redirect 
innovation efforts towards green technologies rather than increasing innovation 
tout-court. While this is often underlined in models on technological change (e.g. 
Acemoglu 1998 and 2007), only one study seems to deal with this question in the 
literature. Aghion et al. (2016) research the impact that higher taxes on fuels 
have on the type of innovation patented by automotive industry. Their results 
show the presence of a directional effect, that is, a positive impact on green 
innovation coupled with a decrease in the patenting activity for polluting 
technologies.  
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Abstract 
In resource-constrained world, environmental regulation is more likely to steer 
the direction of technological change than simply to increase green innovation. 
Nonetheless, studies on the Porter’s hypothesis have often omitted the impact of 
environmental policy on “not-green” technologies. Furthermore, although there 
are compelling arguments in favour of the higher dynamic efficiency of market-
based policy instruments, only few papers empirically tested such claim within 
the same study also because of the difficulties of comparing environmental 
policy norms across countries. Within this context, the paper empirically 
assesses the consequences of increasingly stringent market- and non-market-
based regulations on the technologies the environmental policy aims to promote 
and on competing innovation. The estimations suggest that different types of 
regulatory instruments have distinct influences on the direction of technological 
efforts but reveal also the presence of path dependency. Market-based 
instruments are shown to be the main driver of increased innovation in the 
technological field that environmental policy wishes to promote while non-
market-based measures principally shift private innovation efforts away from 
polluting technologies.  
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2. Does environmental regulation drive the direction of 
technological change?  
2.1. Introduction 
 
The increasing concerns over the environmental sustainability of current 
development trajectories have brought numerous countries to adopt “greener 
growth strategies” (OECD, 2015). These can be generally defined as a path of 
economic development that not only recognizes the role that environmental 
assets have in sustaining our wellbeing but also considers the environment as 
tool to promote economic growth (OECD, 2011).  However, greener growth 
trajectories are constrained by market failures in relation to the environment 
and therefore environmental regulations are considered necessary to align 
private and public marginal benefits (and cost) curves. Nevertheless, their 
impact on economic activity is debated. In fact, the traditional view on 
environmental policies sees them as a cost to economic growth since firms have 
to invest into pollution prevention and abatement technologies or to curb 
production in order to comply with regulation (Jaffe et al. 1995). More recently, 
Porter introduced an alternative view arguing that well-designed environmental 
regulation might set dynamic incentives to innovate and therefore could increase 
both the level and the growth rate of productivity while ensuring an higher level 
of environmental protection (Porter, 1991. Zipper and Kuzlok, 2014).  
 
This paper focuses on the first step of this virtuous chain delineated by Porter, 
namely innovation. In fact, our main working hypothesis is that that the level of 
stringency of environmental regulation affects innovation decision of firms. 
Numerous scholars investigated this channel through which environmental 
regulation could be beneficial to economic performance. While these studies 
provide excellent insights they are also affected by some limitations. First of all, 
although there are compelling arguments in favour of the higher dynamic 
efficiency of market-based policy instruments, only few researchers  have been 
able to empirically test such claims within the same study (Cohen and Tubb, 
2015). Secondly, there is a limited usage of panel data given the difficulties of 
comparing environmental policy norms across countries. Thirdly, and maybe 
most surprisingly, the vast majority of studies - with few exceptions (Rubashkina 
et al., 2015. Aghion et al. 2016) - consider the impact of environmental 
regulation only in relation to green innovation. However, technological change is 
not neutral: it benefits some production factors and agents more than others 
(Acemoglu, 1998 and 2007. Aghion et al. 2016). Underlining this concept, 
theoretical models on directed technological change highlight the shift between 
two competing activities. Otherwise said, given our resource-constrained world, 
environmental regulation is more likely to steer the direction of technological 
change towards, rather than simply increasing, green innovation. Nonetheless, 
studies on the Porter’s hypothesis have often omitted the impact of 
environmental policy on “not-green” technologies.  
 
In this context, the paper aims at empirically testing the impact of different types 
of environmental regulations on the direction of technological change. Under this 
light, its impact on both green and not green innovation is assessed. To this end, 
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the paper leverages a novel OECD composite indicator of environmental 
regulation - being this an additional innovation to the literature since, while 
often employed in several other economic areas, such measures have never been 
applied to the field of environmental economics and innovation – to test the 
dynamic impact of both market and not market-based regulations on a panel 
dataset. The only similar contribution we are aware of is by Verdolini and Bosetti 
(2017) who use this indicator to study technology diffusion. While the paper is 
not about innovation, diffusion is however part of the technological change 
process which is often studied in this field. 
 
The empirical results provide evidence that market-based regulations are the 
main driver of increased innovation in the technological field that environmental 
policy wishes to promote while non-market-based measures principally shifts 
private innovation efforts away from polluting technologies. At the same time, 
the estimations underline how innovation builds on the cumulated knowledge 
stock in the same technological area.  
 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief literature review on 
environmental regulation and innovation highlighting existing gaps. Section 3 
describes our main working hypothesis and the empirical strategy to test them. 
Section 4 provides the main empirical results while section 5 discusses their 
robustness.  The final paragraph concludes and presents the principal policy 
implications.   
 
2.2. Literature Review 
The traditional view on environmental policies sees them as a cost to economic 
activities since firms have to invest into pollution prevention and abatement 
technologies or to curb production in order to comply with regulation (Jaffe et al. 
1995, Ambec et al., 2013). A second “view”, also known as the Porter’s 
Hypothesis, suggests that “well-designed” environmental policies might not only 
yield environmental benefits but also boost productivity (Porter, 1991. Porter 
and van der Linde, 1995). Extensively discussed in the literature, the Porter’s 
Hypothesis has been articulated into three more narrowly defined “forms” 
nowadays known as the weak, strong and narrow version of the Hypothesis 
(Jaffe and Palmer, 1997).  
 
The strong version of the Porter’s Hypothesis rejects the assumption of perfect 
markets with fully rational agents and assumes instead that firms are not 
operating at the maximum possible efficiency. In this context, well-designed 
environmental policies might induce firms to rethink their production process 
and lead to extra profits. The most often cited example is energy efficiency, 
where numerous market failures impede firms to pursuit cost-effective 
opportunities (Howarth and Andersson, 1993. IEA, 2013). 
 
The weak and narrow version implies that environmental regulation will lead to 
an increase in environmental innovation with an important distinction. As Jaffe 
and Palmer (1997) describe, firms subject to the environmental regulation face 
an additional environmental constraint next to their financial ones. As firms are 
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assumed to be profit-maximizing agents, they will innovate in order to comply 
with the new regulation in the most cost effective manner. Thus, innovation in 
the field of environmental technologies will increase. The narrow version of the 
Porter’s Hypothesis asserts that flexible environmental policy regimes are more 
likely to increase innovation and improve company performance. Flexibility is 
usually characterized as key property of market-based (or explicitly 
externalities- pricing) regulations. In fact, in a first-best world addressing 
externalities entails essentially closing the gaps between the social and private 
costs (and/or benefits) of polluting activities. By setting an explicit opportunity 
cost on emissions, market-based regulations generate an incentive to 
continuously search for cheaper abatement solutions. Therefore they are likely 
to provide higher dynamic incentives compared to non-market-based regulation 
(de Serres et al., 2010). 
 
The first empirical study on the weak version was probably carried out by Jaffe 
and Palmer (1997) and points to a significant positive link between pollution 
control expenditures (PACE) – used as a proxy of environmental policy 
stringency - and R&D expenditures, whereas patents are shown to not be 
affected by more stringent regulation. Instead, positive links between PACE 
expenditure and environmental patents counts are often found by more recent 
studies (Lanoie et al., 2011). Similar results are found by Brunnermeier and 
Cohen (2003) who use USA patent data between 1983 and 1992 and, as an 
indicator for environmental policy stringency, both pollution abatement 
expenditures and government monitoring activities. de Vries and Withagen 
(2005) exploit data on EU environmentally related patents and measure policy 
stringency according to three different indicators: Compliance with international 
agreements by individual signatories; an index of environmental sensitivity 
performance combining different pollutants, and stringency modelled as a latent 
variable. Only the third stringency indicator is found to have a strong positive 
relationship with environmental innovation. Wagner (2007) finds “…that the 
implementation level of environmental management systems has a positive 
effect exclusively on environmental process innovation, whereas it is negatively 
associated with the level of a firm’s general patenting activities.” Econometric 
results leveraging a 2003 OECD survey covering seven countries (Canada, 
France, Germany, Hungary, Japan, Norway, and the USA) finds that R&D 
expenditures increase following an increase in the perceived policy stringency of 
the questioned firm (Frondel et al. 2007). Again leveraging the 2003 OECD 
survey, Lanoie et al. (2007) find strong support for the weak version and 
qualified support for the two other versions of the Porter’s  hypothesis. Using a 
panel data set of Italian firms in 2002 and 2004, Mazzanti and Zoboli (2006) find 
that environmental policies and environmental voluntary auditing schemes exert 
some relevant direct and indirect effects on innovation although “… evidence is 
mixed and further research is particularly needed.”  
 
From the above literature review, some limitations emerge. First of all, there is 
scarce evidence of the ability of environmental policies to direct technological 
change. Technological change is not neutral: it benefits some production factors 
and agents more than others. These distributional impacts imply that some 
groups will embrace new technologies and others will oppose them. Underlining 
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this concept, theoretical models on directed technological change highlight the 
shift between two competing activities. Initially conceived by Hicks (1932) and 
Habakkuk (1962) and later on perfectioned by Acemoglu (1998, 2002; 2007), 
these models have only recently been extended to the field of environmental 
innovation and regulation (Aghion et al. 2016). These recent contributions help 
to understand that, in a constrained resource world, environmental regulation is 
likely to steer innovation efforts towards green knowledge and away from other 
technological areas.  As such, both changes should be empirically measured to 
properly assess the soundness of the underpinning theoretical arguments. 
Nevertheless, since most of the empirical studies focus only on green 
technologies and omit the competing effects on other innovation, there is limited 
evidence on the capability of environmental regulation of directing innovation 
efforts away from other technologies (whether “polluting” or not) towards green 
innovation. The main contribution in this regard is Aghion et al. (2016) who 
develop a one-period model of an economy of directed technical change and 
empirically test their conclusions. They show that firms tend to innovate 
relatively more in clean technologies when they face higher tax-inclusive fuel 
prices though firm-level panel data on auto industry patents across 80 countries 
over several decades. Rubashkina et al. (2015) also test the weak version of the 
Porter’s hypothesis not focusing only on green innovation but on total 
innovation in order to account for possible opportunity cost (e.g. firms may 
decrease innovation in other fields to develop new technologies to comply with 
environmental regulation). Their results show that more stringent 
environmental regulation leads to higher overall patenting activity. 
 
Secondly, while the narrow version of the Porter’s hypothesis is a theoretical 
compelling argument, surprisingly there are few studies assessing jointly the 
impact of both market and non-market-based regulation (Cohen and Tubb, 
2015). In fact, the vast majority of articles focus either on market or non-market-
based regulation and therefore do not provide a fully homogenous framework 
for testing the narrow version of the Porter’s hypothesis. An important exception 
is Johnstone et al. (2010) who consider seven policy instruments including: 
Research and Development, Feed-in Tariffs Taxes, Investment Incentives, 
Voluntary Programmes, Obligations, Tradable Permits. However, as the authors 
underline, they lack continuous stringency variables for several policies under 
consideration and therefore they are forced to code many as dummies (Binary 
variables are constructed for tax measures, investment incentives, bidding 
systems, voluntary programs, and quantity obligations) limiting the explicative 
power of their research.  
 
Thirdly, composite indicators of environmental policy have never been applied 
to the field of environmental economics and innovation. In order to estimate 
impact of environmental regulation it is necessary to leverage an adequate proxy 
of implemented policies. Nevertheless, the identification of a suitable candidate 
is hindered by several challenges (Brunel and Levison, 2013). In order to cope 
with these issues, most of the empirical studies try to capture the level of 
stringency of the implemented policies focusing on the first-level consequences 
of regulation, namely firms’ environmental related expenditures. However, these 
measures suffer from identification and sampling issues. In fact, overall 
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expenditure in pollution abetment technologies might be due to other policies 
(e.g. labour policies, capital regulation, etc.), to firms’ decisions (e.g. “green” 
marketing, efficiency/profit seeking investments in capital, etc.) and are 
intrinsically difficult to use in cross-country studies since economies 
characterized by a larger presence of heavy industries are more likely to register 
higher level of pollution and therefore higher expenditures in abatement 
technologies (Brunel and Levinson, 2013. Galeotti et al. 2015). Few studies 
leverage policy-based measures of environmental policy stringency like the 
introduction or change of a certain policy. Compared to “ex-post measures” of 
stringency, their key advantage is that they do not suffer from the identification 
issues but are heavily exposed to multidimensionality. In this regards, the main 
assumption is that it is possible to proxy for the overall policy stringency in a 
country for a given sector by aggregating selected instruments. In addition, the 
usage of such measures is further complicated by the difficulty of comparing the 
enforced environmental norms across countries. For this reason, most of the 
studies leveraging policy – based stringency measures either focus on a single 
country or, when panel studies are considered, often introduce a dummy 
variable (usually for the date of signature of an international treaty) and 
therefore rarely allow for testing the influence of particular aspects of the policy 
change (e.g. phase in, accompanying measures, design characteristics, policy 
interactions) (Van der Vlist et al. 2007; Curtis, 2012). The few panel studies 
leveraging policy variables that are not based on dummies can be classified in 
two groups according to the type of regulation analyzed: either market-based or 
non-market-based. Regarding market-based regulations, scholars often use total 
taxes on fuels as a proxy for environmental policy stringency implicitly assuming 
that fuel taxation steams mainly from environmental concerns. Leveraging this 
method, both Popp (2002) and Aghion et al (2016) find a significant impact from 
both energy prices and past knowledge stocks on patents. The evidence 
regarding non-market-based regulations is even more limited. One of the most 
interesting panel studies is provided by Popp (2006) who shows that inventors 
respond to environmental regulatory pressure in their own country but not to 
foreign environmental regulations focusing on the case of NOX and SO2 
regulation in the US, Japan, and Germany. Composite policy based indicators, 
which are a specific kind of policy based proxy of policies, are commonly 
leveraged to test the impact of regulation in several economic fields but have 
never been applied in the area of environmental economics and innovation. This 
is specially due to the lack of a sufficient time-series dimension of the handful 
available (Dasgupta et al. 1995. EBRD, 2011).  
We build on this literature and we contribute to it in two main ways. First, we 
test empirically the narrow version of the Porter’s Hypothesis in panel setting. 
To our knowledge, very few panel data studies include both market and not-
market-based regulation and therefore are able to provide a fully homogenous 
framework for testing such hypothesis. To this end, the paper leverages an OECD 
composite indicator of environmental policy stringency to disentangle the 
impact that different kind of environmental regulations have on innovation. 
Secondly, we provide some further evidence that environmental regulation is 
able to drive the direction of the technological efforts. The closest contribution is 
Aghion et al (2016) who show that stricter environmental norms for the 
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automotive sector increase green innovation and decrease grey innovation using 
firm level patent data. However, since they leverage firm level data our concern 
is that they might not capture the full extent of the induced innovation impact.  In 
fact, innovations are increasingly achieved through the convergence of different 
scientific fields and technologies. This interdisciplinary nature is specially 
evident for green technologies. A review of the literature cited in patents, a 
technique used to assess science and industry linkages, shows that green 
innovations frequently draw on material science, chemistry and engineering and 
therefore go beyond the narrow categories of environmental science (Igami, 
2007. OECD, 2010). In a less formal way, this means that the scrubber that allows 
a power plant to meet certain emission levels are not necessary developed 
within the energy sector but most probably by firms operating in the machinery 
industry. For this reason, we leverage aggregate patent data in order to avoid 
overlooking induced innovation taking place outside the directly regulated 
industry.  
 
2.3. Main hypothesis  
 
Our main working hypothesis is that the direction of technological change is 
driven by two key factors: the level of stringency of environmental regulation 
and available knowledge stock. Furthermore, we assume that different types of 
regulations provide different dynamic incentives. More in detail we put forward 
three hypotheses: 
 
I. Market-based regulation provides dynamic incentives and therefore 
stimulates higher rates of green innovation than non-market-based 
regulations 
II. A more stringent environmental regulation may steer innovation away 
from other technologies towards green technologies. This crowding-
out effect should take place chiefly in polluting technologies but a-
priori cannot be excluded to be present in other fields.    
III.  The direction of technological change is affected by the cumulated 
knowledge stock  
 
 
Our first research hypothesis is that market-based regulations provide higher 
dynamics incentives than non-market based regulations. In a first-best world 
addressing externalities entails essentially closing the gaps between the social 
and private costs (and/or benefits) of polluting activities. By setting an 
opportunity cost on the emissions, market-based regulation is supposed to close 
this gap while providing polluters with incentives to continuously search for 
cheaper abatement solutions in order to keep the marginal cost of abatement 
below the emission price set by the tax or the permit market (de Serres et al. 
2010). Under command-and-control regulations, which usually set a maximum 
level of allowed pollution, polluters have little incentives to search for abatement 
options once they have complied with the standard (Jaffe et al. 2001). In this 
sense, market-based instruments outperform the non-market based regulation 
under a dynamic efficiency criterion. 
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Importantly,  we leverage aggregated patent data in order to capture the full 
extent of induced innovation. This is due to the assumption that innovations 
designed in order to comply with environmental regulation are not necessary 
developed in the regulated industry. More generally, we assume that 
technologies leveraged in an industry are not always developed within the same 
sector. A common example could be the converter or the microfilm used for solar 
panels. These are being developed in response to increasing environmental 
concern and ensuing stricter regulation for the energy sector but large 
incumbent electricity producers are not the main innovators. For this reason, we 
leverage a measure of stringency of regulation affecting energy generation and 
we estimate its impact on “green energy generation” patents regardless of the 
applicant’s industry of specialization.   
 
Our second objective is to investigate the presence of a crowding-out effect. 
Tighter environmental regulations are assumed to lead to an increase of 
environmental innovation under both the weak and narrow version of the 
Porter’s hypothesis. However, in a resource-constrained world higher innovation 
efforts in a specific field are likely to come at cost of innovation efforts in other 
fields. More formally, in a resource-constrained world environmental regulation 
is likely to steer innovation efforts towards green technologies and away from 
other technological areas. It is important to underline that while polluting 
technologies are the most likely to suffers from increasing environmental policy 
stringency, the crowding out effect might be taking place also in other 
“segments” of human knowledge as firms change the focus of their innovation 
efforts in order to profit for a growing market for environmental technologies. It 
should be noted that this phenomenon does not imply that environmental 
regulation is detrimental for growth. As in the case of energy efficiency, green 
innovation might well be environmental friendly and profit enhancing.  
 
Our third main working hypothesis relates to the arguments of path dependency. 
In fact, the stock of cumulated knowledge is a key explanatory factor of 
innovation performance but it might also drive the direction of technological 
change. The capability of innovating depends on the currently available 
knowledge, a well - know phenomenon called with different names in the various 
literature: “inter-temporal knowledge spill-overs” in growth theory, “Cumulated 
knowledge” in evolutionary economics or “Standing on the shoulders of giants” 
in philosophical studies  (Keller, 2002. Verdolini and Galeotti, 2011. Aghion et al, 
2016). Overall, actors (being these countries, firms or industries) who exhibited 
greater investment in technological development are also more likely to engage 
in innovative practices in the future (Baumol, 2002). Nevertheless, as underlined 
by Acemoglu et al (2012), knowledge accumulation can be a double-edged 
sword. In fact, increasing specialization in a given technological field might 
decrease the relative cost of continuing innovating along the same technological 
trajectory compared to others. If this is true, then we might face a vicious path 
dependency in polluting technologies against green technologies. At the same 
time, however, as the stock of cumulated green knowledge grows, a virtuous 
path dependent process might be started where green innovation becomes 
progressively more convenient. For this reason, the stock of cumulated 
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knowledge can be a substantive factor in explaining the direction of innovation. 
Notably, the rate of technological change can also be influenced by the stock of 
foreign cumulated knowledge as often underlined in the catch-up literature. 
However, these international flows are hindered by numerous barriers.  For 
instance geographical distance, different language and technological 
specialization are often found to be inversely correlated with knowledge spill-
overs (Jaffe et al. 1993, Jaffe and Trajtenberg, 1996. Keller, 2002. Peri, 2005).  
2.3.1. The econometric model and data 
 
The following empirical model is developed to test the hypotheses set out above: 
 
𝒆𝒒. 𝟏: 𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑒𝑐ℎ,𝑖𝑡+1 = 𝐸𝑁𝑉𝑃𝑂𝐿𝑖𝑡 + 𝐷𝑂𝑀𝐸𝑆𝑇𝐼𝐶_𝐾𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝐿1. 𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐼𝐺𝑁_𝐾𝑆𝑖𝑡+𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑖𝑡 + 𝜂𝑖 + 𝜏𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  
 
𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑖 = 1 … 𝑁,     
 𝑡 = 1 … 𝑇,   
𝑡𝑒𝑐ℎ = 𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑛_𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦, 𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙_𝑝𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑒_ 𝑒𝑛𝑣𝑖𝑟𝑜𝑛_𝑡𝑒𝑐ℎ. 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑦_𝑡𝑒𝑐ℎ 
 
where INNtech,it is our proxy of innovation for a given type of technology 
(either green energy, other green or grey technologies) in country i and in 
year t; ENVPOLit is the measure of environmental policy stringency; 
DOMESTIC_KSit and FOREIGN_KSit are respectively the country’s available 
domestic and foreign knowledge stock; Controlit is a matrix of control 
variables and εit is an error term.  
 
The innovation performance of an agent (being this a country, a firm or other) is 
usually captured in empirically studies using data either/both on R&D 
expenditures or/and on number of patents application/granted. Compared to 
R&D expenditures, which are a measure of the inputs in the innovation process, 
patents data focus on the outputs of the inventive process (Griliches 1990; OECD 
2009) and have several advantages: they have a close link to invention; patent 
documents are a rich source of information (on the applicant, inventor, 
technology category, claims, etc.) and data are often readily available from patent 
offices (Dernis et al. 2001). This richness of information also asks further 
questions to the meticulous researcher. For instance, the distinction between 
residence of applicant and inventor is important to consider since these do not 
always match and leads to wonder which country a given innovation should be 
attributed to. However, patents have also major weaknesses. First of all, they are 
designed to only protect technological innovations and therefore other kinds of 
innovation (like organisational, managerial and non-technological innovations) 
are not captured. Secondly, much knowledge is tacit and therefore not 
protectable through legal means. Thirdly, since patenting requires disclosing all 
information regarding an innovation, inventors might prefer to protect their 
knowledge through secrecy. Fourthly, not all patented inventions are of the same 
quality. In fact some patents might represent a small progress for the scientific 
community while others might be of higher importance. The problem of 
difference in quality of patented inventions is further exacerbated by tactical 
approaches to patenting by firms which include requesting patents for minor 
modification of a previous invention in order to increase protection, strategies to 
enter patent pools, etc. Finally, a patent application is a lengthy process. For 
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instance, the European patent grant procedure takes between three to five years 
from the date the application is filed2. This issue is exacerbated by the presence 
of “grace periods” (several countries, including USA, have a grace period of 
twelve or six months during which an invention, even if it has been disclosed, it 
is still patentable) and the Paris convention which allows to use the filling date of 
the first patent application as priority date in following patent applications in 
other countries. These features of the patenting system make data for most 
recent years less reliable.   
 
In order to mitigate these issues, we capture innovation by the number of 
patents granted annually in a country leveraging patent families. A patent family 
is a set of individual patents covering different geographical regions, that is, all 
the equivalent patent applications deposited at various patent offices 
corresponding to a single invention (Haščič and Migotto, 2015). They are often 
used in empirical analysis since they provide numerous advantages over simple 
patents counts.  First, they provide a common measure of innovation across 
countries. For example, if the same invention is covered by two different patents 
in US and in Japan, this will be counted as a single invention (Hascic and Migotto, 
2015). Secondly, as with citations, they are extensively used to mitigate issues 
with the quality of inventions (Lanjouw and Schankerman, 2004. Guellec and van 
Pottelsberghe de la Potterie,  2000.  Harhoff et al. 2002. OECD, 20093). While the 
lack of data on citations is a weakness of our analysis, we claim that this is not a 
major drawback for our research questions that aim at shedding light on the 
ability of regulation to drive the direction of innovation efforts, regardless of the 
quality of the resulting invention. The most commonly used patent family is the 
so-called triadic patent family (TPF) which is a specific family composed by 
inventions that have been patented in all three world’s major patents offices 
(USPTO in the US, EPO in Europe and JPO in Japan). Unfortunately, this family 
class is not very suited for econometric analysis in case of environmental 
technologies given the high number of zero that risk to bias the results. For this 
reason, we leverage a novel dataset elaborated the by OECD Environment and 
Innovation Department. This database offers information on national innovation 
performance through patents families but providing two additional key benefits. 
First, it offers a more fine-grained breakdown of patents in different 
environmental classes (e.g. the OECD triadic database offers data on overall 
patents in renewable energy technologies while this novel dataset drills down to 
single technologies like solar, wind, hydro, etc. ). Secondly, the database offers 
multiple definitions of patents families:  all patents that have been registered at 
least one (PF1),  at least two (PF2), at least three (PF3) and four patent offices 
(PF4). Through this increasingly stringent definition of patent families, lower 
quality innovations are filtered out without losing as many observations as when 
three patent offices in three different continents, as in the case of the triadic 
patent family, are considered. Given these elements, we focus our analysis on the 
highest quality inventions and therefore on the category PF4.  Finally, since we 
suspect that firms need time to innovate in response to a change in the 
regulation, as common in the literature, we introduce a one-year lag to reflect 
                                                        
2 EPO website. Accessed on the 9th March 2016. 
3 OECD, 2009. OECD Patent Statistics Manual  
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this delayed response. Importantly, our patent data are fractional (non-negative 
continuous variables) since – as usually for patent statistics – patents are 
assigned to countries according to the inventor’s (or applicant’s) residence, using 
fractional counting if there are multiple inventors to avoid double counting.  
 
 
The OECD PATSTAT provides information on yearly environment-related 
patents grouped into several sub-categories (Appendix B provides a detailed 
break-down of the different technologies). Importantly, these patents are not 
assigned to a given sub-category according to the industry where the applicant 
operates but according to the purpose of the developed technology (e.g. solar 
energy or effluent control). We aggregate these data into three main groups.  The 
first group is composed by all patents in green energy technologies identified as 
patents related to Solar thermal and photovoltaic (PV)  energy,  Solar thermal-PV 
hybrids,    Geothermal energy, Marine energy (excluding tidal), Hydro energy - 
tidal, stream or damless, Hydro energy – conventional, biofuels and fuels from 
waste, combustion technologies with mitigation potential (ex. Combined heat 
and power (CHP), Combined cycles (incl. CCPP, CCGT, IGCC, IGCC+CCS), and Heat 
utilisation in combustion or incineration of waste), Technologies for an efficient 
electrical power generation, transmission or distribution, Enabling technologies 
in the energy sector (e.g. energy storage) and technologies for the Capture, 
storage, sequestration or disposal of greenhouse gases. We collect all the other 
green patents into a second group called “other green”. This group includes 
patents in the following areas: General Environmental Management (air, water, 
waste and soil remediation); Water-related adaptation technologies (e.g. Indoor 
water conservation or Irrigation water conservation), Nuclear energy, Fuel 
efficiency in transportation (road, marine and train) and Energy efficiency in 
buildings and lighting. Finally, we consider all remaining patents as not-
environmental related innovation and therefore we label them as “grey”. This 
group is equal to the difference between "total patents" and sum of the patents in 
the two groups above mentioned for each country in a given year. It is important 
to underline that this group is composed of all patents that are not deemed to 
have an environmental impact and therefore comprises a large set of 
technologies ranging from traditional (polluting) combustion technologies to 
health technologies and others. As shown in figure 1, air pollution abatement, 
hovering at around 30% of the green knowledge stock cumulated in OECD 
countries, is the largest category among all environmental technologies. The 
second largest category is environmental technologies in transportation. Overall, 
patents belonging to the group labelled as “green energy generation” weight for 
22% of environmental knowledge stocks in OECD countries. Finally, 
environmental patents count for small portion of portion of the national stocks 
of countries (on average 11% of total patents).  
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Figure 3.  Environmental Patents by category 
OECD Countries, 1980 - 2012 
 
 
 
 
Our main explanatory variable is a novel composite indicator of environmental 
policy stringency developed by the OECD. The index covers 26 OECD countries 
combining information on 15 environmental policy instruments (both market-
based and not-market-based) over the years 1990-2012. This indicator ranges 
from 0 to 6 where 0 is associated with lax regulation while 6 with more stringent 
policies. Furthermore, it is composed of two main components, one capturing 
market-based regulation and one capturing non-market-based regulation. 
Among the two indicators proposed by the OECD, one focusing on the energy 
sector and another that includes additional information to obtain a proxy for the 
whole economy, we leverage the first measure due to several factors. First, we 
are interested in studying the impact of environmental regulation in directing 
technological change. For this reason, we need a variable that is as close as 
possible to the type of technological efforts we are interested in. From this 
standpoint the first indicator, being built as a measure of environmental norms 
regulating the negative externalities deriving from the generation of electricity, 
eliminates spurious impact from regulation of other activities. Secondly, this 
indicator also better matches our first group of patent data that focus on green 
energy generation. As such, given our hypothesis of direction of technological 
change, we expect a positive impact of our indicator of environmental policy 
stringency on green energy generation innovation and negative impact on grey 
technologies. The effect on other green innovation cannot be defined a-priori as 
it might be negative, if firms change the focus of their innovation efforts in order 
to sell products to meet the increasingly stringent regulation in the energy 
sector, or positive, if the environmental policies applicable to other economic 
activities  increase simultaneously with the stringency of norms regulating 
electricity generation.  
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Finally, we assume that firms are forward-looking and/or alternatively that 
environmental policies are announced before their implementation. As such, we 
expect that companies may react to new regulation before this enters into force. 
However, at the same time, the argument in favour of market-based instruments 
is rooted in their dynamic efficiency after their introduction (since firms, the 
theory predicts, will continue to innovate in order to minimize the cost of the 
environmental externalities). Otherwise said, this means that we expect the 
lagged structure of market-based instruments to be chiefly positive and to 
outperform non-market-based regulation. In fact, in the case of performance 
standards, the inventing steps should be visible before the introduction of these 
instruments since the inability to comply with them once these enter into force 
will simply mean that the firm is in violation of the law and therefore subject to 
fines.  From this standpoint, market-based instruments offer a wait-and-see 
approach that non-market-based instruments lack.  Given these competing 
suggestions to focus either on a forwards and lagged structure, our main 
explicative models leverage both a contemporaneous and forward/lagged 
structure for the environmental policy stringency indicators.   
 
As common in the empirical literature, we capture the available knowledge stock 
in a country at time t by accumulated patents (Klaassen et al. 2005. Kobos et al. 
2006). However, since we are interested in verifying the presence of any path-
dependence in the innovation process, that is, if previous experience in a given 
technology fields is likely to drive innovation in the same technological area, we 
include separate variables for the knowledge stock of the green technology that 
is supposedly promoted by the environmental regulation captured by the 
indicator (green generation), for other green technologies and for “not-
environmental related” (or “grey”) technologies.   
 
Furthermore, since knowledge is often assumed to be subject to obsolescence 
and to become less valuable over time, a depreciation rate δ describing the 
annual loss is considered when computing the knowledge stock. There have been 
different estimates of this rate in literature and generally it is assumed to range 
between 10% (Keller, 2002. Verdolini and Galeotti, 2011) and 20% (Aghion et al, 
2016). Often, it is also argued that the appropriate discount factor varies 
according to the technology considered (Bointer, 2014). For instance, Grubler et 
al. (2012) in their literature review find typical depreciation rates of 10–40% in 
the energy sector. Watanabe et al. (2000) consider a 20.3% obsolescence for PV 
while Miketa and Schrattenholzer (2004) and Kahouli-Brahmi (2009) used a 
depreciation rate of 3% for several energy technologies. Kobos et al. (2006) 
indicates 2.5% for wind and suggests 10% for PV. Klaassen et al. (2005) used 5% 
depreciation for wind energy. We use a conservative approach and consider a 
depreciation rate equal to 10% for both types of environmental technologies 
while 20% for not-environmental related technologies. The  knowledge stock in 
country i at time zero (1990 in our analysis) is set equal to  
𝑘𝑛𝑜𝑤_𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑡𝑒𝑐ℎ,𝑖,1990 =
𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑐ℎ,𝑖𝑡
𝛿
.   To summarize, the resulting law of motion of 
knowledge, calculated using the perpetual inventory method (Verdolini and 
Galeotti, 2011), is: 
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𝒆𝒒. 𝟐:  𝑘𝑛𝑜𝑤_𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑡𝑒𝑐ℎ,𝑖𝑡 = 𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑐ℎ,𝑖𝑡 + (1 − 𝛿) ∗ 𝑘𝑛𝑜𝑤𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑡𝑒𝑐ℎ,𝑖𝑡−1 
 
Given that for two countries in our sample (Australia and Spain), the knowledge 
stock for green energy patents is equal to zero in 1990 and that we use the 
logarithm of this variable in our econometric model, we add a small constant 
(0.0001) to all knowledge stocks to avoid the problem of the logarithm being 
undefined in zero.   
 
As discussed, we believe that path dependency might work also across national 
boundaries. To this end, a measure of foreign knowledge available for domestic 
innovation is constructed using country specific weights. This approach relies on 
the idea that only a portion of knowledge stock of country A is available for 
domestic innovation in country B because of the barriers to international flows. 
Furthermore, these barriers are considered to be specific to each country pair 
(e.g. residents in USA are likely to more easily access knowledge generated in UK 
than in France).  In the literature, two main methods have been used to estimate 
the intensity of foreign knowledge spill-overs. Following Coe and Helpman 
(1995), several articles leverage trade data either in the form of bilateral import 
shares (Keller, 2002. Madden et all. 2001) or foreign direct investments to proxy 
for knowledge flows (Conley & Ligon, 2002; Keller, 2002b).  More recently, 
patents citations have been used since they provide a trail of the flow between 
the cited and citing document (Jaffe, et all. 1992 . Adams, 2002. Jaffe and 
Trajtenberg, 2002. Jozefowicz, 2002. Peri, 2005). An innovative contribution 
underlines that knowledge flows could differ also according to the type of 
technology considered and provide an estimation of flows specific to renewable 
energy and energy efficiency related technologies (Verdolini and Galeotti, 2011). 
Given our focus on different types of technologies, we would ideally leverage 
such kind of technology and country specific coefficients to determine the level 
of foreign knowledge available to each country. Unfortunately, the only analysis 
with this level of detail is provided by Verdolini and Galeotti (2011) for 
renewable energy and energy efficiency related technologies. For this reason, we 
leverage their estimated coefficients to compute the foreign knowledge stock 
available to each country in relation to green energy generation and we recour to 
bilateral trade import data for the other two types of technology groups 
considered in our analysis.  More in detail, the weighted foreign knowledge stock 
available to country i at time t is defined as 
 
𝒆𝒒. 𝟑: 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛_ 𝐾𝑆𝑖𝑡 = ∑ 𝑖𝑚𝑝_𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑗 ∗ 𝐷𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐_𝐾𝑆𝑗𝑡 
 
where 𝑖𝑚𝑝_𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑗 = 𝑀𝑖𝑗/ ∑ 𝑀𝑖𝑗𝑖≠𝑗 ,  ∑ 𝑖𝑚𝑝_𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑗 = 1  and Mij is country i’s 
imports of goods and services from country j. Bilateral imports data are from 
the OECD Trade Database. The average bilateral import share for each 
country is used. In the above formula, imp_shij is substituted by the 
knowledge flow coefficient KFij as estimated by Verdolini and Galeotti  (2011) 
in case of green energy technology. We add a lag to foreign knowledge stock 
to take into account barriers that may slow-down the flow of knowledge. 
 
Finally, we control for the level of domestic competition regulations. In fact, 
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Schumpeterian theories describe a non-linear relationship between competition 
and innovation. More in detail, market regulation can influence the rate of entry 
and exit processes of firms, i.e. the so-called process of creative destruction - 
which is found to be a key driver of country’s innovation and growth 
(Bartelsman et al. 2008; OECD, 2009; Bravo-Biosca et al. 2012).  To this end, we 
include in our analysis the indicator of regulation in energy (ETCR) developed by 
the OECD. This indicator ranges from 0 (most liberalised) to 6 (least liberalised) 
and it builds on seven sub-indicators: electricity, telecoms, gas, post, rail, air 
passenger transport, and road freight (Nicoletti and Scarpetta, 2005). Given our 
focus on the electricity generation sector, we include in the analysis only the 
component regarding the first sector. Finally, we include GDP as additional 
control and we also allow for unobservable factors by introducing  country fixed 
effect (ηi), a full set of time dummies (TDt) and an error term (εit) assumed to be 
uncorrelated with the right hand side variables.  
 
 
2.3.2. The Econometric specifications 
 
Our dataset is a strongly balanced panel covering 17 countries4 for a time period 
of over 32 years (1980 to 2012). Importantly, the first ten years of observations 
(1980-1989) are used to compute the pre-sample mean necessary to leverage 
the estimator proposed by Blundell, Griffith and Van Reenen (described in the 
next paragraphs5 ) and therefore not used for the econometric regression.   Given 
that the EPS data start in 1990, the years before this date are a natural cut-off to 
compute the pre-sample mean 
 
Generally speaking, patent data are fitted through models such as the Poisson or 
Negative Binomial distribution. However, three characteristics of our data 
suggest particular caution in choosing the most appropriate estimator.  First of 
all, the dependent variables – green energy, other green technologies and grey 
patents by inventor’s country of residence – show a high standard deviation that 
is almost double their mean6 (Table 1). This high dispersion of observed data is 
likely to affect the estimation results. In fact, the Poisson’s distribution builds on 
the assumption of a mean equal to λ and a variance equal to λ as well. If not, the 
key hypothesis of equi-dispersion underlying the Poisson regression is likely to 
be violated. Under this circumstance, the estimates would be still unbiased but 
inefficient and therefore produce inconsistent standard errors. A second concern 
is due to the dynamic specification of our model. In fact, among our regressors 
we have the knowledge stock that is not contemporaneously correlated with our 
dependent variable, given the forward lag, but it is still dependent on previous 
                                                        
4The following countries are part of our sample: Australia, Austria, Belgium, 
Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan,  Netherlands, Norway, 
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and United States. 
5 Please note that Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics only for the years 
included in the econometric regression (1990 – 2012). 
6 Within green energy patents , 7% of observations are zero while there are no 
zero observations within the other green technologies group. 
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realization of the patents flows. More in detail, this might be an issue for the 
traditional fixed effect approach, which relying on the work of Hausman, Hall 
and Griliches (HHG), requires strict exogeneity, i.e. the shock εc,it must be 
uncorrelated with xit in all periods (not only contemporaneously), i.e. E{ εc,it | xit } 
= 0 for all t. When using explanatory variables that depend on past realizations of 
the dependent variable, as in our case the knowledge stocks, this assumption is 
likely to be violated.  
 
For these reasons, the data are fitted through numerous models in order to test 
the robustness of the results. First, we leverage a traditional Poisson panel 
model. As noted by Wooldridge (2002), while the leading application of Poisson’s 
distribution is on count data, the fixed effects Poisson estimator can also be 
applied to non-negative continuous variable. This application is common in the 
trade literature (Silva and Tenreyro, 2006) but is not limited to this field (for 
example Ang et al. 2017).  However, given the possible violation of the equi-
dispersion assumption and the dynamic specification of our model, we replicate 
our estimation using two additional models  
 
More precisely, we leverage the negative binomial pre-sample mean (PSM) 
estimator proposed by Blundell, Griffith and Van Reenen (1999) that is robust to 
over-dispersion and to the relaxation of the strict exogeneity assumption.  The 
PSM relies on introducing a control function term for the fixed effects, which is 
identified by the logarithm of the average realizations of the dependent variable 
in a pre-sample period. The theoretical results on the properties of the estimator 
build on an assumption that the number of pre-sample periods approaches 
infinity but Blundell et al. (2002) demonstrate that the pre-sample mean 
estimators perform reasonably well even when the number of time periods is 
relatively small. Importantly, the “traditional” negative binomial estimator is 
more limitedly applied to non-negative continuous variables than Poisson. For 
this reason, we test for the robustness of these results leveraging the approach of 
Tavassoli and Carbonara (2014). The authors - who analyse fractional patent 
data -  apply the negative binomial model on the original data and, then, on their 
rounded values. The authors underline how “the result of binomial regressions 
before and after rounding is quite similar”.  Also in our case, the estimations 
obtained with the rounded and fractional values are remarkably similar (the 
results on the rounded data are reported in the appendix A as a robustness test). 
 
As a third robustness test, we repeat the estimations using the two-step negative 
binomial QMLE (NB- QMLE) estimator that has been proposed to study 
continuous non-negative variables by  Head et al. (2009)  and that has been 
applied in several studies  (e.g. Briant et al, 2014. Castellani et al., 2013). Also in 
this case, we control for the fixed effects using the pre-sample mean. It should be 
noted, however, as underlined by Bosquet and Boulhol (2010), that the two step 
NGQML may be inappropriate when the choice of unit of the dependent variable 
is arbitrary (e.g. meters versus kilometres or billions versus millions). In case of 
patent data, this issue is likely to be less relevant since patent data are not 
usually expressed in different unit of measures than the single digit, also because 
yearly granted patents in several countries do not go above 1,500 units per year 
(with notable exceptions as, for instance, the USA where the annual average is 
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150,000 units per year).  
 
The results (reported in tables 2-10) are consistent among these three 
methodologies in relation to green energy patents. More precisely, increasingly 
stringent market-based regulation (lagged) is significantly and positively 
correlated with innovation in green energy generation technologies across all 
four models. The second main results of our paper, namely the negative impact 
of increasingly stringent regulation on other technological areas, are statistically 
significant only when the negative binomial models are considered.  
 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
 
2.4. Main results 
 
2.4.1. The weak version of the Porter’s Hypothesis: does increasing 
environmental policy stringency lead to more green innovation? 
 
Our first concern regards the impact of increasing environmental policy 
stringency on the technology that is meant to promote (in our case, green energy 
generation).  As such, the following tables show the impact that overall, market- 
based and not-market-based environmental policy stringency has on green 
energy innovation (Tables 2, 3 and 4). In these tables, as in all the following ones, 
we start our analysis at current time (t=0) and different lag and forward 
structures are tested until the first insignificant coefficient is found. This is due, 
as discussed, to the competing assumptions that regulations are known in 
advance and that market-based instruments should provide higher dynamic 
incentives chiefly after their introduction. For each time structure, we control for 
the fixed effects a là Haussman, Hall and Griliches in the Poisson model (columns 
titled as “HGG”) while the pre-sample mean estimator is leveraged when the 
negative binomials distribution is assumed (columns titled as “BVGR” and 
“NBGML”).  All estimates include year dummies and GDP.   
 
As reported in tables 2.A, 2.C (forward structure) and 2.B, 2.D (lag structure), 
increasing overall policy stringency (eps) seems to have a positive impact on 
green energy innovation when a forward structure is considered.  More in detail, 
both the BVGR - Columns (3) and (4) in table 2.A -  and the NBGML - table 2.C – 
estimators suggest that firms take their investment decisions in green innovation 
based on the expectations about the level of overall environmental policy 
stringency over a time horizon of around two years, which appears to be 
reasonable. Interestingly, the two-step negative binomial estimator seems to 
suggest the presence also of a lagged impact for the EPS variable (table 2.D).  
 
Tables 3.A-3.D report the results of increasingly stringent market-based 
environmental regulation (eps_market) on green energy innovation. As 
discussed, market-based instruments are usually favoured given their higher 
likelihood to provide incentives to innovate. More in detail, their higher dynamic 
performance is grounded on the reasoning that firms will keep innovating in 
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order to minimize the payments (either in forms of taxes or permits) due to the 
cost of their environmental externalities. The positive and statistically significant 
coefficient associated to the lagged eps_market variables across all models 
provide a remarkably robust evidence of this dynamic (lagged) effect. 
 
Finally, tables 4.A – 4.D provide the estimation results when non-market-based 
regulation is considered. Confirming the hypothesis on their lower dynamic 
efficiency, the coefficients associated to non-market regulation (eps_nonmarket) 
are positive on green energy innovation but always insignificant. Overall, the 
estimations of Tables 3.A - 3.D and 4.A - 4.D seem mostly to confirm the higher 
dynamic properties of market-based regulation.  
 
The variables capturing the domestic knowledge stocks (in logs) take signs 
weakly consistent with the path dependency hypothesis in innovation. In fact, 
previous domestic experience with green energy technologies is a significant 
good predictor of innovation in the same technological area. However, the 
evidence for the “negative” side of path dependency is somewhat weak.  In fact, 
the coefficients associated to domestic cumulated knowledge stocks in grey 
technologies are not statistically significant in most of the models.  Surprisingly, 
the cumulated domestic knowledge stock in other green technologies appears to 
have a negative, albeit again insignificant across all models, impact on domestic 
green energy innovation. Once we turn to the foreign knowledge stocks (named 
“FKS_*”), we find two main results. First of all, larger cumulated foreign expertise 
with “other green technologies” seems to be associated with a decrease  in 
domestic green energy innovation. This  negative effect, which seems to be 
operating  both on a domestic and foreign level, might suggest that countries 
tend to specialise in certain segments within the spectrum of environmental 
technologies and/or that green energy and other green technologies compete for 
similar resources. Secondly, the coefficients associated to the stock of foreign 
grey knowledge - albeit not always significant – are positive except for a few 
cases when they are insignificant. This positive feedback between foreign grey 
knowledge and domestic green energy innovation underlines the importance of 
having access  to the numerous general purpose technologies included in the 
foreign grey knowledge stock for domestic green energy innovation.  
 
Table 2. Green Energy Innovation: Overall environmental policy stringency 
Table 3. Green Energy Innovation: Market-based policy stringency 
Table 4. Green Energy Innovation: Non-market-based policy stringency 
 
Finally, it is interesting to notice the stability of the significantly negative sign of 
the ETCR Index on renewable energy patenting. This seems to suggest that the 
lack of competition within the electricity sector leads firms (incumbents) to 
focus on traditional fossil fuel technologies instead of pursuing more disruptive 
green technologies7.   
                                                        
7 The coefficient of GDP is positive and significant but not in all models.  This might 
suggest that larger economies tend to have a more suitable environmental for green 
innovation. Alternatively, it might be linked to the environmental Kuznet curves 
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2.4.2. Direction of technological change: Does increasingly stringent 
environmental  regulation crowd out other types of innovation? 
 
Our second research question concerns the direction of technological change or, 
otherwise said, the possibility that promoting innovation along a given 
technological trajectory might crowd innovation out of other technological areas.  
To this end, the impact of increasingly stringent policy on “grey” and on “other 
green” technologies is estimated in the tables from 5.A to 10.D.  
 
Tables 5.A-D and 7.A-D provide some evidence that increasingly stringent 
environmental policy decreases innovative efforts in “grey” technological areas.  
In fact, one of our estimator (BVGR) suggests a negative impact of the variable of 
overall policy stringency (EPS in tables 5.A and 5.B) and of the forward structure 
of non-market based regulation  (table 7.A). However, our most robust result 
concerns the negative effect of the lagged non-market-based regulation. In fact, 
both binomial models (BVGR and NBGML) estimate a statistically significant 
negative impact of increasingly stringent non-market-based regulations on grey 
innovation when a lagged structure is considered (Tables 7.B and 7.D).  This 
robust negative effect can be explained assuming that non-market based 
regulation, like performance standards or “bans”, may erase off the board 
specific (polluting) technological trajectories that are included in the grey group. 
 
Unfortunately, our pre-sample mean is not significant when the two-step 
negative binomial model is applied to other green technologies (Tables 8.C-D, 
9.C-D and 10.C-D). Therefore, we cannot be sure we are controlling for the fixed 
effects and, as such, we avoid any interpretation based on this estimator 
(NBGML). At the same time, the coefficients associated to the policy variables are 
never significant when the Poisson’s distribution is considered (Tables 8.A-B, 
9.A-B and 10.A-B).  Given that only the BVGR estimator provides some evidence 
of the effect of environmental policy stringency on this technological area, we 
only briefly comment these results. More precisely, the tables 8.A-B, 9.A-B and 
10.A-B suggest that increasingly stringent regulation for the energy sector may 
decrease innovation not only for polluting technologies but also in other 
environmental technologies. The time structure of this impact depends on the 
type of regulation considered. In fact, companies seem to change their innovation 
focus before the entry into of force market-based regulations (Table 9.A) and, for 
non-market-based regulation, on the year of their introduction (Table 10.A).  
This negative effect may be due to firms that are operating in the field of 
environmental technologies and that may decide to shift the focus of their R&D 
towards areas where the regulation is becoming more stringent in order to profit 
from increasing market opportunities.  However, as discussed, the evidence is 
rather weak since these results hinge only on one model. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                              
hypothesis since an increase in GDP seems to stimulate demand for green 
innovation. 
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Table 5. Grey Innovation: Overall environmental policy stringency 
Table 6. Grey Innovation: Market-based  policy stringency 
Table 7. Grey Innovation: Non-market-based policy stringency 
 
 
In relation to the path dependency hypothesis, the results presented earlier are 
confirmed. In fact, the likelihood of successful innovation in a given technological 
area  increases in the relative domestic cumulated knowledge as shown by the 
positive and significant coefficient of the domestic grey knowledge stock on grey 
innovation (tables 5, 6 and 7) and of the domestic other green knowledge stock 
on other green innovation (table 8, 9 and 10). Regarding foreign knowledge 
stocks, the coefficients associated to grey knowledge are statistically significant 
and positive when both grey (Table 5, 6 and 7) and other green patents (Tables 
8, 9 and 10) are considered, thus strengthening the previous consideration on 
the importance of having access to foreign general purpose technologies for 
domestic – whether environmental or not -  innovation. Finally, larger foreign 
knowledge stocks in the field of other green technologies seem to hinder not 
only grey but – interestingly - also innovation the same technological area. As 
such, we cannot conclude that this is an example of negative path dependency 
(i.e. past success history in a given technological area hampering innovation in 
other scientific fields).  
 
Finally, it is interesting to notice the stability of the significantly negative sign of 
the ETCR Index on the grey patents. This suggests that not only innovation in 
green electricity generation but also in polluting technologies is hindered by high 
barriers to entry.  Instead, given that the ETCR index focuses on competition in 
the electricity sector, its lack of significance for the other green technologies is 
expected 
 
Table 8. Other green innovation: Overall environmental policy stringency 
Table 9. Other green Innovation: Market-based  policy stringency 
Table 10. Other green Innovation: Non-market-based  policy stringency 
 
 
 
2.5. Conclusions 
 
This paper focuses on two main hypotheses. First of all, we investigate whether 
market-based regulation stimulates higher rates of green innovation than non-
market-based regulations. Secondly, we check whether this potential increase in 
the technologies that environmental policies aim to promote is associated to a 
decrease in innovation in other technological areas.  
 
The empirical results, whose robustness is tested through several models, 
provide evidence of the higher dynamic incentives of market-based regulations. 
In fact, across all the models considered, increasingly stringent market-based 
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regulation is associated to higher rate of green innovation while we find no 
evidence of a similar effect for non-market policies. Furthermore, the 
estimations underline the importance of appropriately considering the timing of 
the evaluation. In fact, the hypothesis on higher dynamic performance of market-
based instruments is grounded on the assumption that firms will keep 
innovating in order to minimize the payments (either in forms of taxes or 
permits) due to the internalised cost of their environmental externalities. 
Otherwise said, this means that we expect the lagged structure of market-based 
instruments to be chiefly positive. Indeed, our estimations provide strong 
evidence of this lagged positive impact.  
 
The evidence on the “crowding-out” effect of environmental policy is rather 
mixed. We test for the presence of this potential crowding-out effect in two 
technological areas, namely grey innovation - defined as a mixed group including 
all “non-environmental technologies” - and other green technologies  - defined as 
those environmental technologies that are not explicitly targeted by the policies 
captured by our proxy of environmental policy stringency. We find a strong 
evidence of a negative impact of non-market-based instruments on grey 
innovation and we suggest that this decrease is due to the polluting technologies 
included in this group. Instead, only a weak evidence of a similar negative effect 
on “other green” technologies is found.   This decrease may suggest that companies 
that are already operating in the field of environmental technologies may redirect 
their innovation efforts towards areas where the regulation is becoming more 
stringent in order to profit from increasing market opportunities. However, we 
highlight once more how this evidence is rather weak since these results hinge only 
on one model. 
 
These results provide important insights for policy makers and suggest some 
possible venues for further research. First of all, policy makers interested in 
stimulating green innovation should rely mainly on market-based instruments. 
However, it is important to underline how non-market based regulations should 
not be disregarded since, if well designed, they may provide incentive to 
innovate as well (e.g. the Japanese top-runner standard). Finally, the “ability” of 
environmental regulation of discouraging competing innovation needs further 
studies. This is specially true since, as discussed, the innovations required to 
comply with certain regulation are not necessarily developed within the 
regulated sector. From this standpoint, this reallocation of resources might be 
working also in scientific fields that societies do wish to encourage (e.g. health, 
education or other environmental technologies as investigated in this paper). In 
this regard, additional research on the substitutability between different 
technologies is deemed as necessary 
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TABLE 1 – Descriptive statistics 
 
VARIABLES N mean sd min max 
      
Environmental policy stringency  
(EPS) 
386 1.55 0.9 0.3 4.20 
Market-based env. policy stringency 
(eps_market) 
391 0.92 0.8 0.0 3.67 
Non-market-based env. policy stringency 
(eps_nonmarket) 
386 2.17 1.3 0.5 5.31 
Green energy patents  
(pat_greenenergy) 
391 88 162.2 0.0 1103.7 
Patents in other green tech. 
(pat_othergreentech.) 
391 304.9 523.6 2.0 3311.7 
Patents in “grey”tech.  
(pat_grey) 
391 2980.4 4399.3 45.2 18154.9 
Knowledge stock in green energy tech. 
(KS_greenenergy) 
391 571.9 1037.2 0.0 6287.1 
Knowledge stock in other green tech. 
(KS_othergreen) 
391 2466.3 3951.7 20.0 21024.6 
Knowledge stock in grey tech. 
(KS_grey) 
391 19584.31 28327.1 326.1 103318.5 
Foreign Knowl. stock in green energy tech. 
(FKS_greenenergy) 
391 1230.2 726.2 286.7 3451.1 
Foreign Knowl. stock in other green tech. 
(FKS_othergreen) 
391 3255.2 1240.9 1328.5 8264.4 
Foreign Knowl. stock in grey tech 
(FKS_grey) 
391 25058.4 9913.5 13720.2 67279.67 
Gross Domestic product  
(gdp) 
391 1,832,384 2,942,613 125,071 15,600,000 
Regulation of the electricity sector  
(etcr) 
371 3.36 1.6 0.87 6 
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Table 2.A – Forward structure  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
VARIABLES HGG - 
GREEN 
BGVR - 
GREEN 
HGG - 
GREEN 
BGVR - 
GREEN 
HGG - 
GREEN 
BGVR - 
GREEN 
HGG - 
GREEN 
BGVR - 
GREEN 
  
           
eps 0.0912 0.0361         
 (0.0645) (0.0347)         
F.eps   0.0811 0.0644**       
   (0.0583) (0.0327)       
F2.eps     0.0786 0.0734**     
     (0.0639) (0.0343)     
F3.eps       0.0106 0.0155   
       (0.0545) (0.0374)   
           
           
KS_greenenergy 0.883*** 0.742*** 0.893*** 0.738*** 0.866*** 0.701*** 0.889*** 0.656***   
 (0.147) (0.0792) (0.127) (0.0772) (0.151) (0.0788) (0.163) (0.0886)   
KS_othergreen -0.566 -0.167 -0.563 -0.166 -0.541 -0.205 -0.567 -0.232   
 (0.491) (0.147) (0.475) (0.144) (0.477) (0.148) (0.502) (0.164)   
KS_grey -0.480 -0.270 -0.467 -0.242 -0.534 -0.300* -0.658 -0.368**   
 (0.456) (0.167) (0.476) (0.164) (0.518) (0.169) (0.530) (0.184)   
L1.FKS_greenenergy 6.045*** 0.0261 5.263*** -0.0140 3.326 -0.0776 4.650* 0.0153   
 (1.697) (0.173) (1.774) (0.166) (2.292) (0.171) (2.619) (0.188)   
L1.FKS_othergreen -0.392 -1.052*** -0.675 -1.125*** -1.213 -1.348*** -0.905 -1.297***   
 (1.312) (0.406) (1.379) (0.398) (1.516) (0.416) (1.511) (0.437)   
L1.FKS_grey -0.312 0.511 0.0966 0.593 1.246 0.837** 0.617 0.765*   
 (1.625) (0.398) (1.687) (0.390) (2.085) (0.415) (2.325) (0.438)   
PSMpatge  0.343***  0.329***  0.423***  0.498***   
  (0.0950)  (0.0907)  (0.110)  (0.128)   
etcr -0.0898** -0.0356 -0.0901** -0.0360 -0.0973** -0.0474* -0.107*** -0.0550**   
 (0.0395) (0.0257) (0.0389) (0.0254) (0.0382) (0.0252) (0.0401) (0.0262)   
lgdp -1.203 0.223*** -1.124 0.218*** -0.821 0.265*** -0.555 0.310***   
 (0.874) (0.0683) (0.839) (0.0665) (0.795) (0.0685) (0.692) (0.0740)   
           
Constant  0.522  0.433  0.333  0.211   
  (1.753)  (1.696)  (1.797)  (1.970)   
Observations 337 337 338 338 323 323 307 307   
Fixed Effects - Time 
Dummies 
YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES   
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 2.B – Lagged structure  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
VARIABLES HGG - 
GREEN 
BGVR - 
GREEN 
HGG - 
GREEN 
BGVR - 
GREEN 
      
           
eps 0.0912 0.0361         
 (0.0645) (0.0347)         
L.eps   0.112 0.0370       
   (0.0710) (0.0362)       
           
           
           
           
           
KS_greenenergy 0.883*** 0.742*** 1.016*** 0.766***       
 (0.147) (0.0792) (0.0793) (0.0777)       
KS_othergreen -0.566 -0.167 -0.426 -0.142       
 (0.491) (0.147) (0.389) (0.143)       
KS_grey -0.480 -0.270 -0.322 -0.263       
 (0.456) (0.167) (0.462) (0.162)       
L1.FKS_greenenergy 6.045*** 0.0261 7.703*** 0.0376       
 (1.697) (0.173) (1.723) (0.166)       
L1.FKS_othergreen -0.392 -1.052*** 0.205 -1.026**       
 (1.312) (0.406) (1.106) (0.400)       
L1.FKS_grey -0.312 0.511 -0.560 0.486       
 (1.625) (0.398) (1.376) (0.389)       
PSMpatge  0.343***  0.299***       
  (0.0950)  (0.0861)       
etcr -0.0898** -0.0356 -0.0774** -0.0306       
 (0.0395) (0.0257) (0.0361) (0.0252)       
lgdp -1.203 0.223*** -1.014 0.216***       
 (0.874) (0.0683) (0.740) (0.0660)       
           
Constant  0.522  0.479       
  (1.753)  (1.690)       
Observations 337 337 334 334       
Fixed Effects - Time Dummies YES YES YES YES       
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 2.C – Forward structure  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)   
VARIABLES NBGML - 
GREEN 
NBGML - 
GREEN 
NBGML - 
GREEN 
NBGML - 
GREEN 
NBGML - 
GREEN 
  
        
eps 0.128***       
 (0.0416)       
F.eps  0.126***      
  (0.0407)      
F2.eps   0.119***     
   (0.0411)     
F3.eps    0.0905*    
    (0.0465)    
F4.eps     0.0707   
     (0.0514)   
        
KS_greenenergy 0.664*** 0.681*** 0.643*** 0.560*** 0.476***   
 (0.148) (0.135) (0.131) (0.159) (0.180)   
KS_othergreen -0.127 -0.102 -0.0587 -0.0640 -0.0125   
 (0.106) (0.104) (0.102) (0.112) (0.115)   
KS_grey -0.187 -0.204 -0.246** -0.222* -0.218   
 (0.127) (0.125) (0.122) (0.130) (0.134)   
L1.FKS_greenenergy -0.117* -0.119* -0.0984 -0.0952 -0.0939   
 (0.0693) (0.0694) (0.0694) (0.0768) (0.0847)   
L1.FKS_othergreen -1.282*** -1.193*** -1.229*** -1.501*** -1.661***   
 (0.449) (0.409) (0.388) (0.443) (0.485)   
L1.FKS_grey 0.829** 0.723* 0.721** 1.022** 1.254***   
 (0.411) (0.372) (0.350) (0.409) (0.454)   
etcr -0.0197 -0.0149 -0.0136 -0.0224 -0.0268   
 (0.0188) (0.0177) (0.0174) (0.0190) (0.0209)   
lgdp 0.293*** 0.287*** 0.308*** 0.320*** 0.328***   
 (0.0722) (0.0673) (0.0642) (0.0689) (0.0707)   
PSMpatge 0.276*** 0.260*** 0.266*** 0.299*** 0.310**   
 (0.106) (0.0969) (0.0943) (0.112) (0.126)   
        
Constant -0.359 -0.00472 0.111 -0.659 -1.732   
 (1.104) (1.072) (1.051) (1.148) (1.203)   
        
Observations 337 338 323 307 291   
Fixed Effects - Time Dummies YES YES YES YES YES   
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 2.D – Lagged structure  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES NBGML - GREEN NBGML - GREEN NBGML - GREEN NBGML - GREEN NBGML - GREEN 
      
eps 0.128***     
 (0.0416)     
L.eps  0.125***    
  (0.0403)    
L2.eps   0.100**   
   (0.0413)   
L3.eps    0.118***  
    (0.0407)  
L4.eps     0.122*** 
     (0.0427) 
      
KS_greenenergy 0.664*** 0.791*** 0.802*** 0.840*** 1.031*** 
 (0.148) (0.0728) (0.0763) (0.0770) (0.0685) 
KS_othergreen -0.127 -0.119 -0.0834 -0.102 -0.106 
 (0.106) (0.106) (0.108) (0.113) (0.118) 
KS_grey -0.187 -0.159 -0.217* -0.215* -0.0795 
 (0.127) (0.119) (0.122) (0.126) (0.130) 
L1.FKS_greenenergy -0.117* -0.110 -0.104 -0.101 -0.0751 
 (0.0693) (0.0680) (0.0674) (0.0701) (0.0750) 
L1.FKS_othergreen -1.282*** -0.931*** -0.734*** -0.622** -0.192 
 (0.449) (0.273) (0.266) (0.267) (0.267) 
L1.FKS_grey 0.829** 0.504* 0.310 0.236 -0.158 
 (0.411) (0.263) (0.258) (0.259) (0.260) 
etcr -0.0197 -0.0102 -0.0147 -0.0213 -0.0167 
 (0.0188) (0.0173) (0.0174) (0.0181) (0.0191) 
lgdp 0.293*** 0.235*** 0.239*** 0.241*** 0.143*** 
 (0.0722) (0.0457) (0.0471) (0.0488) (0.0431) 
PSMpatge 0.276*** 0.194*** 0.205*** 0.197***  
 (0.106) (0.0615) (0.0633) (0.0650)  
      
Constant -0.359 0.208 0.554 0.399 0.681 
 (1.104) (1.029) (1.019) (1.000) (1.059) 
      
Observations 337 334 318 302 286 
Fixed Effects - Time Dummies YES YES YES YES YES 
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3.A – Forward structure 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
VARIABLES HGG - 
GREEN 
BGVR - 
GREEN 
HGG - 
GREEN 
BGVR - 
GREEN 
      
           
eps_market 0.0288 0.0379         
 (0.0361) (0.0303)         
F.eps_market   0.0275 0.0459       
   (0.0336) (0.0285)       
           
           
           
           
           
KS_greenenergy 0.870*** 0.673*** 0.869*** 0.677***       
 (0.152) (0.0787) (0.151) (0.0786)       
KS_othergreen -0.555 -0.165 -0.552 -0.163       
 (0.496) (0.146) (0.500) (0.144)       
KS_grey -0.491 -0.267 -0.483 -0.254       
 (0.513) (0.166) (0.522) (0.164)       
L1.FKS_greenenergy 5.138*** 0.0239 5.022** -0.00192       
 (1.990) (0.170) (2.056) (0.166)       
L1.FKS_othergreen -0.636 -1.137*** -0.631 -1.124***       
 (1.403) (0.403) (1.428) (0.399)       
L1.FKS_grey 0.153 0.619 0.287 0.628       
 (1.855) (0.396) (1.932) (0.393)       
PSMpatge  0.384***  0.376***       
  (0.0949)  (0.0937)       
etcr -0.0911** -0.0438* -0.0935** -0.0452*       
 (0.0379) (0.0256) (0.0397) (0.0255)       
lgdp -0.900 0.232*** -0.890 0.225***       
 (0.798) (0.0698) (0.788) (0.0689)       
           
Constant  0.244  0.201       
  (1.751)  (1.719)       
           
Observations 339 339 339 339       
Fixed Effects - Time Dummies YES YES YES YES       
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3.B – Lagged structure  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
VARIABLES HGG - 
GREEN 
BGVR - 
GREEN 
HGG - 
GREEN 
BGVR - 
GREEN 
HGG - 
GREEN 
BGVR - 
GREEN 
HGG - 
GREEN 
BGVR - 
GREEN 
HGG - 
GREEN 
BGVR - 
GREEN 
eps_market  0.0288 0.0379         
 (0.0361) (0.0303)         
L.eps_market   0.0951** 0.0874***       
   (0.0459) (0.0314)       
L2.eps_market     0.0972* 0.0982***     
     (0.0546) (0.0331)     
L3.eps_market       0.111** 0.0857**   
       (0.0528) (0.0345)   
L4.eps_market         0.0980* 0.0621* 
         (0.0549) (0.0365) 
KS_greenenergy 0.870*** 0.673*** 0.842*** 0.672*** 0.861*** 0.714*** 0.903*** 0.757*** 1.099*** 0.811*** 
 (0.152) (0.0787) (0.156) (0.0761) (0.136) (0.0769) (0.169) (0.0804) (0.112) (0.0823) 
KS_othergreen -0.555 -0.165 -0.598 -0.135 -0.561 -0.123 -0.611 -0.156 -0.494 -0.205 
 (0.496) (0.146) (0.462) (0.139) (0.474) (0.140) (0.510) (0.144) (0.413) (0.147) 
KS_grey -0.491 -0.267 -0.343 -0.238 -0.450 -0.251 -0.543 -0.228 -0.398 -0.167 
 (0.513) (0.166) (0.451) (0.155) (0.472) (0.155) (0.492) (0.158) (0.494) (0.163) 
L1.FKS_greenenergy 5.138*** 0.0239 5.281*** -0.0100 6.198*** -0.0170 7.067*** -0.00827 8.697*** 0.00662 
 (1.990) (0.170) (1.832) (0.147) (1.666) (0.135) (1.628) (0.133) (1.443) (0.138) 
L1.FKS_othergreen -0.636 -1.137*** -0.618 -1.174*** -0.563 -1.104*** -0.256 -0.926** 0.290 -0.814** 
 (1.403) (0.403) (1.388) (0.375) (1.357) (0.371) (1.378) (0.375) (1.126) (0.387) 
L1.FKS_grey 0.153 0.619 0.329 0.666* 0.376 0.583* -0.0651 0.416 -0.857 0.309 
 (1.855) (0.396) (1.744) (0.364) (1.667) (0.353) (1.801) (0.354) (1.513) (0.366) 
PSMpatge  0.384***  0.348***  0.318***  0.299***  0.263*** 
  (0.0949)  (0.0843)  (0.0783)  (0.0779)  (0.0763) 
etcr -0.0911** -0.0438* -0.0803** -0.0355 -0.0839*** -0.0296 -0.0908*** -0.0361 -0.0828** -0.0413 
 (0.0379) (0.0256) (0.0325) (0.0249) (0.0316) (0.0248) (0.0332) (0.0257) (0.0327) (0.0266) 
lgdp -0.900 0.232*** -1.158 0.215*** -1.189 0.211*** -1.469 0.202*** -1.096 0.182*** 
 (0.798) (0.0698) (0.780) (0.0631) (0.828) (0.0606) (0.906) (0.0607) (0.763) (0.0620) 
           
Constant  0.244  0.183  0.469  0.538  0.827 
  (1.751)  (1.557)  (1.452)  (1.437)  (1.495) 
           
Observations 339 339 339 339 323 323 307 307 291 291 
Fixed Effects - Time 
Dummies 
YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3.C – Forward structure  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES NBGML - GREEN NBGML - GREEN NBGML - GREEN NBGML - GREEN NBGML - GREEN 
      
eps_market 0.137***     
 (0.0330)     
F.eps_market  0.122***    
  (0.0309)    
F2.eps_market   0.0996***   
   (0.0334)   
F3.eps_market    0.0753**  
    (0.0369)  
F4.eps_market     0.0582 
     (0.0418) 
      
KS_greenenergy 0.647*** 0.676*** 0.639*** 0.576*** 0.489*** 
 (0.154) (0.140) (0.150) (0.166) (0.185) 
KS_othergreen -0.135 -0.0965 -0.0744 -0.0630 -0.00840 
 (0.106) (0.103) (0.104) (0.111) (0.114) 
KS_grey -0.149 -0.187 -0.215* -0.216* -0.218 
 (0.130) (0.127) (0.124) (0.130) (0.134) 
L1.FKS_greenenergy -0.0964 -0.0970 -0.0783 -0.0758 -0.0799 
 (0.0685) (0.0669) (0.0687) (0.0744) (0.0810) 
L1.FKS_othergreen -1.417*** -1.274*** -1.341*** -1.507*** -1.661*** 
 (0.447) (0.403) (0.419) (0.439) (0.469) 
L1.FKS_grey 0.992** 0.816** 0.855** 1.024*** 1.247*** 
 (0.402) (0.356) (0.369) (0.394) (0.430) 
etcr -0.0346* -0.0282 -0.0272 -0.0291 -0.0317 
 (0.0191) (0.0177) (0.0184) (0.0187) (0.0198) 
lgdp 0.218*** 0.222*** 0.251*** 0.274*** 0.293*** 
 (0.0786) (0.0739) (0.0754) (0.0792) (0.0844) 
PSMpatge 0.288*** 0.264*** 0.273*** 0.294** 0.307** 
 (0.108) (0.0998) (0.105) (0.115) (0.127) 
      
Constant -0.0845 0.442 0.329 -0.178 -1.299 
 (1.006) (0.961) (0.974) (1.090) (1.184) 
      
Observations 339 339 323 307 291 
Fixed Effects - Time Dummies YES YES YES YES YES 
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3.D – Lagged structure  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES NBGML - GREEN NBGML - GREEN NBGML - GREEN NBGML - GREEN NBGML - GREEN 
      
eps_market 0.137***     
 (0.0330)     
L.eps_market  0.141***    
  (0.0302)    
L2.eps_market   0.121***   
   (0.0320)   
L3.eps_market    0.147***  
    (0.0320)  
L4.eps_market     0.141*** 
     (0.0315) 
      
KS_greenenergy 0.647*** 0.648*** 0.673*** 0.698*** 1.035*** 
 (0.154) (0.148) (0.137) (0.161) (0.0711) 
KS_othergreen -0.135 -0.137 -0.0598 -0.117 -0.123 
 (0.106) (0.103) (0.105) (0.106) (0.113) 
KS_grey -0.149 -0.160 -0.279** -0.247* -0.0572 
 (0.130) (0.129) (0.131) (0.132) (0.126) 
L1.FKS_greenenergy -0.0964 -0.0774 -0.0472 -0.0504 -0.0310 
 (0.0685) (0.0668) (0.0667) (0.0675) (0.0732) 
L1.FKS_othergreen -1.417*** -1.400*** -1.221*** -1.164** -0.343 
 (0.447) (0.435) (0.406) (0.475) (0.263) 
L1.FKS_grey 0.992** 0.962** 0.718** 0.715* -0.0138 
 (0.402) (0.394) (0.361) (0.426) (0.255) 
etcr -0.0346* -0.0329* -0.0277 -0.0399** -0.0283 
 (0.0191) (0.0189) (0.0187) (0.0194) (0.0192) 
lgdp 0.218*** 0.220*** 0.248*** 0.241*** 0.0796* 
 (0.0786) (0.0748) (0.0700) (0.0775) (0.0418) 
PSMpatge 0.288*** 0.295*** 0.291*** 0.302***  
 (0.108) (0.105) (0.0956) (0.108)  
      
Constant -0.0845 0.0212 0.812 0.617 1.190 
 (1.006) (1.017) (1.011) (1.000) (0.998) 
      
Observations 339 339 323 307 291 
Fixed Effects - Time Dummies YES YES YES YES YES 
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4.A – Forward structure 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
VARIABLES HGG - 
GREEN 
BGVR - 
GREEN 
HGG - 
GREEN 
BGVR - 
GREEN 
      
           
eps_nonmarket 0.0686 0.00750         
 (0.0513) (0.0236)         
F.eps_nonmarket   0.0516 0.0253       
   (0.0362) (0.0207)       
           
           
           
           
           
           
KS_greenenergy 0.902*** 0.746*** 0.914*** 0.736***       
 (0.133) (0.0808) (0.111) (0.0789)       
KS_othergreen -0.549 -0.187 -0.556 -0.188       
 (0.497) (0.149) (0.478) (0.148)       
KS_grey -0.596 -0.296* -0.585 -0.285*       
 (0.465) (0.170) (0.467) (0.169)       
L1.FKS_greenenergy 6.528*** 0.0575 5.550*** 0.0400       
 (1.978) (0.182) (1.716) (0.180)       
L1.FKS_othergreen -0.348 -1.062** -0.769 -1.145***       
 (1.358) (0.421) (1.394) (0.421)       
L1.FKS_grey -0.718 0.505 -0.323 0.574       
 (1.799) (0.415) (1.602) (0.413)       
PSMpatge  0.372***  0.367***       
  (0.0961)  (0.0936)       
etcr -0.0921** -0.0376 -0.0880** -0.0374       
 (0.0407) (0.0258) (0.0384) (0.0256)       
lgdp -1.116 0.231*** -1.004 0.237***       
 (0.817) (0.0715) (0.778) (0.0703)       
           
Constant  0.626  0.589       
  (1.851)  (1.840)       
           
Observations 337 337 338 338       
Fixed Effects - Time Dummies YES YES YES YES       
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4.B – Lagged structure 
  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
VARIABLES HGG - 
GREEN 
BGVR - 
GREEN 
HGG - 
GREEN 
BGVR - 
GREEN 
      
           
eps_nonmarket 0.0686 0.00750         
 (0.0513) (0.0236)         
L.eps_nonmarket   0.0386 -0.0212       
   (0.0428) (0.0253)       
           
           
           
           
KS_greenenergy 0.902*** 0.746*** 1.041*** 0.790***       
 (0.133) (0.0808) (0.0855) (0.0803)       
KS_othergreen -0.549 -0.187 -0.393 -0.181       
 (0.497) (0.149) (0.424) (0.147)       
KS_grey -0.596 -0.296* -0.452 -0.304*       
 (0.465) (0.170) (0.493) (0.167)       
L1.FKS_greenenergy 6.528*** 0.0575 7.316*** 0.0795       
 (1.978) (0.182) (2.000) (0.181)       
L1.FKS_othergreen -0.348 -1.062** 0.0495 -1.029**       
 (1.358) (0.421) (1.163) (0.425)       
L1.FKS_grey -0.718 0.505 -0.499 0.485       
 (1.799) (0.415) (1.437) (0.419)       
PSMpatge  0.372***  0.345***       
  (0.0961)  (0.0923)       
etcr -0.0921** -0.0376 -0.0835** -0.0340       
 (0.0407) (0.0258) (0.0378) (0.0252)       
lgdp -1.116 0.231*** -0.703 0.211***       
 (0.817) (0.0715) (0.712) (0.0708)       
           
Constant  0.626  0.728       
  (1.851)  (1.850)       
           
Observations 337 337 334 334       
Fixed Effects - Time Dummies YES YES YES YES       
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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TABLE 4.C – Forward structure 
 (1) (2)    
VARIABLES NBGML - GREEN NBGML - GREEN    
      
eps_nonmarket 0.0317     
 (0.0296)     
F.eps_nonmarket  0.0348    
  (0.0284)    
      
      
      
KS_greenenergy 0.670*** 0.674***    
 (0.144) (0.138)    
KS_othergreen -0.0752 -0.0700    
 (0.107) (0.106)    
KS_grey -0.262** -0.265**    
 (0.127) (0.126)    
L1.FKS_greenenergy -0.0747 -0.0747    
 (0.0721) (0.0716)    
L1.FKS_othergreen -1.153*** -1.133***    
 (0.439) (0.425)    
L1.FKS_grey 0.614 0.589    
 (0.402) (0.387)    
etcr -0.00686 -0.00513    
 (0.0184) (0.0180)    
lgdp 0.298*** 0.298***    
 (0.0751) (0.0731)    
PSMpatge 0.278*** 0.274***    
 (0.101) (0.0979)    
      
Constant 0.638 0.687    
 (1.128) (1.115)    
      
Observations 337 338    
Fixed Effects - Time Dummies YES YES    
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4.D – Lagged structure  
 (1) (2)    
VARIABLES NBGML - GREEN NBGML - GREEN    
      
eps_nonmarket 0.0317     
 (0.0296)     
L.eps_nonmarket  0.0312    
  (0.0298)    
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
KS_greenenergy 0.670*** 0.796***    
 (0.144) (0.0765)    
KS_othergreen -0.0752 -0.0808    
 (0.107) (0.109)    
KS_grey -0.262** -0.213*    
 (0.127) (0.120)    
L1.FKS_greenenergy -0.0747 -0.0834    
 (0.0721) (0.0705)    
L1.FKS_othergreen -1.153*** -0.820***    
 (0.439) (0.284)    
L1.FKS_grey 0.614 0.330    
 (0.402) (0.268)    
etcr -0.00686 -0.000666    
 (0.0184) (0.0171)    
lgdp 0.298*** 0.239***    
 (0.0751) (0.0516)    
PSMpatge 0.278*** 0.196***    
 (0.101) (0.0630)    
      
Constant 0.638 0.983    
 (1.128) (1.036)    
      
Observations 337 334    
Fixed Effects - Time Dummies YES YES    
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 5.A – Forward structure 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
VARIABLES HGG - 
GREY 
BGVR - GREY HGG - 
GREY 
BGVR - 
GREY 
HGG - 
GREY 
BGVR - 
GREY 
HGG - 
GREY 
BGVR - 
GREY 
HGG - 
GREY 
BGVR - 
GREY 
           
Eps 0.0514 -0.0488***         
 (0.0421) (0.0163)         
F.eps   0.0662* -0.0285*       
   (0.0345) (0.0156)       
F2.eps     0.0421 -0.0251*     
     (0.0269) (0.0139)     
F3.eps       0.0202 -0.0305**   
       (0.0230) (0.0134)   
F4.eps         0.00806 -0.0312** 
         (0.0195) (0.0130) 
           
KS_greenenergy -0.0304 -0.0254 -0.0111 -0.0254 0.0722* 0.00436 0.0886** 0.0156 0.104** 0.0370 
 (0.0997) (0.0369) (0.0775) (0.0367) (0.0425) (0.0298) (0.0430) (0.0308) (0.0432) (0.0325) 
KS_othergreen -0.240 -0.0627 -0.237 -0.109 -0.300 -0.0665 -0.314 -0.0854 -0.342 -0.132* 
 (0.264) (0.0783) (0.232) (0.0764) (0.244) (0.0707) (0.255) (0.0721) (0.257) (0.0742) 
KS_grey 0.862*** 0.757*** 0.902*** 0.831*** 0.835*** 0.802*** 0.797*** 0.760*** 0.763*** 0.726*** 
 (0.198) (0.109) (0.187) (0.106) (0.171) (0.0979) (0.182) (0.0970) (0.192) (0.0952) 
L1.FKS_greenenergy 3.727*** 0.345 3.624*** 0.307 2.508*** -0.249 2.010*** -0.666** 1.694** -0.841** 
 (0.949) (0.345) (0.764) (0.356) (0.513) (0.331) (0.605) (0.336) (0.687) (0.333) 
L1.FKS_othergreen -0.463 -0.826** -0.506 -0.854** -1.082* -1.474*** -1.349** -1.702*** -1.568** -1.864*** 
 (0.700) (0.346) (0.652) (0.357) (0.629) (0.297) (0.649) (0.284) (0.664) (0.280) 
L1.FKS_grey -0.459 1.295*** -0.275 1.495*** 0.651 1.922*** 1.136 2.294*** 1.391* 2.496*** 
 (0.730) (0.458) (0.678) (0.472) (0.595) (0.397) (0.731) (0.385) (0.728) (0.370) 
PSMpatgrey  0.635***  0.627***  0.786***  0.886***  0.946*** 
  (0.0798)  (0.0814)  (0.0803)  (0.0827)  (0.0840) 
etcr -0.00351 -0.0218* -0.00279 -0.0225* -0.00643 -0.0122 -0.0158 -0.0167* -0.0205 -0.0183* 
 (0.0152) (0.0115) (0.0146) (0.0116) (0.0143) (0.0104) (0.0154) (0.0101) (0.0158) (0.00986) 
lgdp -2.267*** -1.278*** -2.297*** -1.335*** -1.948*** -1.185*** -1.772*** -1.066*** -1.636*** -0.968*** 
 (0.474) (0.130) (0.409) (0.130) (0.362) (0.120) (0.343) (0.114) (0.346) (0.114) 
           
Constant  1.912  0.931  1.864  0.845  0.0614 
  (3.358)  (3.454)  (3.161)  (2.976)  (2.808) 
           
Observations 337 337 338 338 323 323 307 307 291 291 
Fixed Effects - Time Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 5.B – Lagged structure 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
VARIABLES HGG - 
GREY 
BGVR - 
GREY 
HGG - 
GREY 
BGVR - 
GREY 
HGG - 
GREY 
BGVR - 
GREY 
HGG - 
GREY 
BGVR - 
GREY 
HGG - 
GREY 
BGVR - 
GREY 
           
eps 0.0514 -0.0488***         
 (0.0421) (0.0163)         
L.eps   0.0111 -0.0726***       
   (0.0391) (0.0179)       
L2.eps     0.000534 -0.0625***     
     (0.0340) (0.0201)     
L3.eps       -0.00558 -0.0382*   
       (0.0264) (0.0196)   
L4.eps         0.00843 -0.0200 
         (0.0243) (0.0197) 
           
KS_greenenergy -0.0304 -0.0254 0.0442 -0.00770 0.0675 0.0178 0.0919 0.0573 0.108** 0.0728* 
 (0.0997) (0.0369) (0.0633) (0.0374) (0.0576) (0.0393) (0.0598) (0.0400) (0.0549) (0.0422) 
KS_othergreen -0.240 -0.0627 -0.161 0.00635 -0.0911 -0.0106 -0.0672 -0.123 -0.0285 -0.169* 
 (0.264) (0.0783) (0.261) (0.0819) (0.249) (0.0908) (0.241) (0.0888) (0.217) (0.0874) 
KS_grey 0.862*** 0.757*** 0.876*** 0.697*** 0.853*** 0.724*** 0.788*** 0.753*** 0.832*** 0.870*** 
 (0.198) (0.109) (0.203) (0.112) (0.211) (0.122) (0.204) (0.121) (0.213) (0.127) 
L1.FKS_greenenergy 3.727*** 0.345 3.840*** 0.341 4.107*** 0.419 4.328*** 0.579 4.616*** 0.646 
 (0.949) (0.345) (0.916) (0.335) (0.844) (0.351) (0.871) (0.376) (0.898) (0.396) 
L1.FKS_othergreen -0.463 -0.826** -0.392 -0.849** -0.188 -0.805** -0.0669 -0.753* 0.176 -0.690* 
 (0.700) (0.346) (0.646) (0.337) (0.629) (0.355) (0.613) (0.388) (0.570) (0.416) 
L1.FKS_grey -0.459 1.295*** -0.372 1.174*** -0.451 1.222*** -0.658 1.137** -0.867 1.114** 
 (0.730) (0.458) (0.651) (0.436) (0.636) (0.458) (0.699) (0.502) (0.722) (0.538) 
PSMpatgrey  0.635***  0.605***  0.574***  0.559***  0.490*** 
  (0.0798)  (0.0808)  (0.0856)  (0.0912)  (0.0976) 
etcr -0.00351 -0.0218* 0.00141 -0.0194* 0.00228 -0.0187 0.00252 -0.0242** 0.00843 -0.0243** 
 (0.0152) (0.0115) (0.0135) (0.0115) (0.0134) (0.0118) (0.0139) (0.0119) (0.0127) (0.0124) 
lgdp -2.267*** -1.278*** -1.996*** -1.183*** -1.980*** -1.236*** -2.039*** -1.355*** -2.030*** -1.405*** 
 (0.474) (0.130) (0.447) (0.133) (0.407) (0.138) (0.377) (0.135) (0.352) (0.146) 
           
Constant  1.912  2.273  1.725  3.217  3.060 
  (3.358)  (3.237)  (3.372)  (3.594)  (3.835) 
           
Observations 337 337 334 334 318 318 302 302 286 286 
Fixed Effects - Time Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 5.C – Forward structure 
 (1) (2)    
VARIABLES NBGML - GREY NBGML - GREY    
      
eps -0.00968     
 (0.0192)     
F.eps  -0.00249    
  (0.0216)    
     
 
      
      
    
 
 
    
  
KS_greenenergy -0.0965 -0.0914    
 (0.0934) (0.0863)    
KS_othergreen -0.0520 -0.0556    
 (0.0675) (0.0681)    
KS_grey 0.960*** 0.966***    
 (0.0788) (0.0789)    
L1.FKS_greenenergy -0.0851 -0.0884    
 (0.0550) (0.0547)    
L1.FKS_othergreen -1.058*** -1.046***    
 (0.348) (0.317)    
L1.FKS_grey 1.107*** 1.097***    
 (0.349) (0.316)    
etcr -0.0333** -0.0332**    
 (0.0151) (0.0142)    
lgdp 0.00973 0.00962    
 (0.0257) (0.0247)    
PSMpatgrey 0.102* 0.0974*    
 (0.0603) (0.0585)    
      
Constant -3.158*** -3.160***    
 (0.887) (0.791)    
      
Observations 337 338    
Fixed Effects - Time 
Dummies 
YES YES    
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 5.D – Lagged structure 
 (1) (2)    
VARIABLES NBGML - GREY NBGML - GREY    
      
eps -0.00968     
 (0.0192)     
L.eps  -0.0174    
  (0.0220)    
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
KS_greenenergy -0.0965 0.0181    
 (0.0934) (0.0230)    
KS_othergreen -0.0520 -0.113**    
 (0.0675) (0.0459)    
KS_grey 0.960*** 1.015***    
 (0.0788) (0.0618)    
L1.FKS_greenenergy -0.0851 -0.130***    
 (0.0550) (0.0380)    
L1.FKS_othergreen -1.058*** -0.657***    
 (0.348) (0.129)    
L1.FKS_grey 1.107*** 0.706***    
 (0.349) (0.130)    
etcr -0.0333** -0.0207**    
 (0.0151) (0.00946)    
lgdp 0.00973 -0.0171    
 (0.0257) (0.0159)    
PSMpatgrey 0.102* 0.0628    
 (0.0603) (0.0500)    
      
Constant -3.158*** -2.091***    
 (0.887) (0.399)    
      
Observations 337 334    
Fixed Effects - Time 
Dummies 
YES YES    
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 6.A – Forward structure 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
VARIABLES HGG - GREY BGVR - 
GREY 
HGG - GREY BGVR - 
GREY 
      
           
eps_market 0.0163 -0.0130         
 (0.0218) (0.0161)         
F.eps_market   0.0341 -0.00233       
   (0.0215) (0.0154)       
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
KS_greenenergy 0.0425 0.00326 0.0369 0.000132       
 (0.0458) (0.0288) (0.0474) (0.0286)       
KS_othergreen -0.213 -0.145* -0.226 -0.156**       
 (0.255) (0.0753) (0.252) (0.0739)       
KS_grey 0.829*** 0.858*** 0.882*** 0.890***       
 (0.192) (0.111) (0.193) (0.109)       
L1.FKS_greenenergy 3.660*** 0.295 3.563*** 0.266       
 (0.733) (0.347) (0.685) (0.353)       
L1.FKS_othergreen -0.506 -0.938*** -0.490 -0.939***       
 (0.714) (0.357) (0.702) (0.360)       
L1.FKS_grey -0.408 1.653*** -0.182 1.729***       
 (0.712) (0.448) (0.702) (0.452)       
PSMpatgrey  0.612***  0.614***       
  (0.0805)  (0.0811)       
etcr 0.000695 -0.0208* -0.00117 -0.0208*       
 (0.0144) (0.0116) (0.0153) (0.0116)       
lgdp -2.066*** -1.331*** -2.149*** -1.362***       
 (0.375) (0.135) (0.380) (0.133)       
           
Constant  0.0314  -0.294       
  (3.490)  (3.479)       
Observations 339 339 339 339       
Time Dummies YES YES YES YES       
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 6.B – Lagged structure 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
VARIABLES HGG - GREY BGVR - 
GREY 
HGG - GREY BGVR - 
GREY 
HGG - GREY BGVR - 
GREY 
    
           
eps_market 0.0163 -0.0130         
 (0.0218) (0.0161)         
L.eps_market   0.0160 -0.0301*       
   (0.0270) (0.0165)       
L2.eps_market     0.0148 -0.0185     
     (0.0246) (0.0173)     
           
           
           
           
           
KS_greenenergy 0.0425 0.00326 0.0430 0.00914 0.00416 0.00434     
 (0.0458) (0.0288) (0.0461) (0.0290) (0.0734) (0.0387)     
KS_othergreen -0.213 -0.145* -0.214 -0.132* -0.178 -0.159**     
 (0.255) (0.0753) (0.256) (0.0752) (0.244) (0.0767)     
KS_grey 0.829*** 0.858*** 0.826*** 0.814*** 0.771*** 0.851***     
 (0.192) (0.111) (0.197) (0.110) (0.208) (0.112)     
L1.FKS_greenenergy 3.660*** 0.295 3.702*** 0.337 3.863*** 0.313     
 (0.733) (0.347) (0.761) (0.341) (0.943) (0.364)     
L1.FKS_othergreen -0.506 -0.938*** -0.508 -0.920*** -0.407 -0.961***     
 (0.714) (0.357) (0.718) (0.353) (0.716) (0.369)     
L1.FKS_grey -0.408 1.653*** -0.426 1.531*** -0.396 1.698***     
 (0.712) (0.448) (0.709) (0.445) (0.768) (0.462)     
PSMpatgrey  0.612***  0.613***  0.631***     
  (0.0805)  (0.0799)  (0.0843)     
etcr 0.000695 -0.0208* 0.00181 -0.0225* -0.00236 -0.0240**     
 (0.0144) (0.0116) (0.0138) (0.0116) (0.0125) (0.0118)     
lgdp -2.066*** -1.331*** -2.058*** -1.305*** -2.142*** -1.385***     
 (0.375) (0.135) (0.379) (0.132) (0.387) (0.135)     
           
Constant  0.0314  0.712  0.499     
  (3.490)  (3.489)  (3.525)     
Observations 339 339 339 339 323 323     
Time Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES     
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 6.C – Forward structure 
 (1) (2)    
VARIABLES NBGML - GREY NBGML - GREY    
      
eps_market 0.0147     
 (0.0189)     
F.eps_market  0.0172    
  (0.0198)    
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
KS_greenenergy -0.0184 -0.0182    
 (0.0381) (0.0382)    
KS_othergreen -0.116** -0.118**    
 (0.0484) (0.0484)    
KS_grey 0.980*** 0.983***    
 (0.0836) (0.0858)    
L1.FKS_greenenergy -0.111** -0.113**    
 (0.0462) (0.0475)    
L1.FKS_othergreen -0.961*** -0.968***    
 (0.245) (0.242)    
L1.FKS_grey 1.004*** 1.013***    
 (0.230) (0.227)    
etcr -0.0295*** -0.0300***    
 (0.0111) (0.0108)    
lgdp 0.00627 0.00474    
 (0.0329) (0.0349)    
PSMpatgrey 0.0861 0.0858    
 (0.0553) (0.0554)    
      
Constant -2.754*** -2.770***    
 (0.520) (0.506)    
      
Observations 339 339    
Fixed Effects - Time 
Dummies 
YES YES    
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 6.D – Lagged structure 
 (1) (2)    
VARIABLES NBGML - GREY NBGML - GREY    
      
eps_market 0.0147     
 (0.0189)     
L.eps_market  0.0116    
  (0.0198)    
      
      
      
      
      
KS_greenenergy -0.0184 -0.0185    
 (0.0381) (0.0382)    
KS_othergreen -0.116** -0.114**    
 (0.0484) (0.0484)    
KS_grey 0.980*** 0.977***    
 (0.0836) (0.0834)    
L1.FKS_greenenergy -0.111** -0.109**    
 (0.0462) (0.0459)    
L1.FKS_othergreen -0.961*** -0.953***    
 (0.245) (0.246)    
L1.FKS_grey 1.004*** 0.994***    
 (0.230) (0.232)    
etcr -0.0295*** -0.0290***    
 (0.0111) (0.0112)    
lgdp 0.00627 0.00785    
 (0.0329) (0.0327)    
PSMpatgrey 0.0861 0.0867    
 (0.0553) (0.0554)    
      
      
Constant -2.754*** -2.737***    
 (0.520) (0.523)    
      
      
Observations 339 339    
Fixed Effects - Time 
Dummies 
YES YES    
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 7.A – Forward structure 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
VARIABLES HGG - GREY BGVR - GREY HGG - GREY BGVR - 
GREY 
HGG - GREY BGVR - 
GREY 
HGG - GREY BGVR - 
GREY 
  
           
eps_nonmarket 0.0329 -0.0321***         
 (0.0274) (0.00988)         
F.eps_nonmarket   0.0326 -0.0216**       
   (0.0204) (0.00966)       
F2.eps_nonmarket     0.0252 -0.0155*     
     (0.0163) (0.00879)     
F3.eps_nonmarket       0.0157 -0.0129   
       (0.0152) (0.00868)   
           
           
KS_greenenergy -0.0161 -0.0351 0.00630 -0.0306 0.0786* 0.00142 0.0910** 0.0141   
 (0.0945) (0.0370) (0.0726) (0.0367) (0.0433) (0.0299) (0.0435) (0.0311)   
KS_othergreen -0.222 -0.0615 -0.210 -0.1000 -0.286 -0.0714 -0.308 -0.0998   
 (0.260) (0.0762) (0.232) (0.0753) (0.237) (0.0695) (0.247) (0.0708)   
KS_grey 0.794*** 0.810*** 0.805*** 0.858*** 0.776*** 0.837*** 0.772*** 0.802***   
 (0.188) (0.100) (0.179) (0.0992) (0.166) (0.0930) (0.175) (0.0940)   
L1.FKS_greenenergy 3.879*** 0.302 3.753*** 0.296 2.595*** -0.294 2.013*** -0.743**   
 (0.977) (0.349) (0.774) (0.355) (0.505) (0.330) (0.586) (0.339)   
L1.FKS_othergreen -0.447 -0.797** -0.527 -0.840** -1.138* -1.484*** -1.395** -1.732***   
 (0.702) (0.348) (0.674) (0.355) (0.656) (0.297) (0.675) (0.287)   
L1.FKS_grey -0.666 1.369*** -0.586 1.498*** 0.442 2.008*** 1.091 2.472***   
 (0.781) (0.448) (0.660) (0.458) (0.527) (0.381) (0.674) (0.373)   
PSMpatgrey  0.640***  0.628***  0.796***  0.904***   
  (0.0799)  (0.0809)  (0.0803)  (0.0833)   
etcr -0.00406 -0.0215* -0.00116 -0.0226** -0.00475 -0.0129 -0.0145 -0.0181*   
 (0.0153) (0.0115) (0.0142) (0.0115) (0.0144) (0.0104) (0.0151) (0.0102)   
lgdp -2.174*** -1.336*** -2.135*** -1.367*** -1.853*** -1.231*** -1.727*** -1.127***   
 (0.407) (0.123) (0.355) (0.125) (0.319) (0.116) (0.308) (0.111)   
           
Constant  1.595  1.033  1.696  0.263   
  (3.283)  (3.382)  (3.127)  (2.972)   
Observations 337 337 338 338 323 323 307 307   
Fixed effects - Time Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES   
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 7.B – Lagged structure 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
VARIABLES HGG - GREY BGVR - GREY HGG - GREY BGVR - GREY HGG - GREY BGVR - GREY HGG - GREY BGVR - 
GREY 
HGG - GREY BGVR - 
GREY 
           
eps_nonmarket 0.0329 -0.0321***         
 (0.0274) (0.00988)         
L.eps_nonmarket   -0.00332 -0.0425***       
   (0.0219) (0.0113)       
L2.eps_nonmarket     -0.0102 -0.0351***     
     (0.0204) (0.0119)     
L3.eps_nonmarket       -0.0215 -0.0215*   
       (0.0153) (0.0115)   
L4.eps_nonmarket         -0.0241 -0.00667 
         (0.0191) (0.0119) 
           
KS_greenenergy -0.0161 -0.0351 0.0469 -0.0250 0.0674 0.00407 0.0908 0.0499 0.112** 0.0698* 
 (0.0945) (0.0370) (0.0646) (0.0381) (0.0602) (0.0401) (0.0631) (0.0406) (0.0573) (0.0424) 
KS_othergreen -0.222 -0.0615 -0.150 -0.00134 -0.0809 -0.0258 -0.0553 -0.129 0.000395 -0.185** 
 (0.260) (0.0762) (0.255) (0.0815) (0.238) (0.0881) (0.231) (0.0872) (0.211) (0.0877) 
KS_grey 0.794*** 0.810*** 0.857*** 0.781*** 0.842*** 0.791*** 0.771*** 0.779*** 0.776*** 0.899*** 
 (0.188) (0.100) (0.184) (0.102) (0.186) (0.110) (0.192) (0.115) (0.216) (0.125) 
L1.FKS_greenenergy 3.879*** 0.302 3.674*** 0.202 3.979*** 0.354 4.204*** 0.564 4.516*** 0.635 
 (0.977) (0.349) (0.848) (0.344) (0.765) (0.361) (0.796) (0.386) (0.811) (0.403) 
L1.FKS_othergreen -0.447 -0.797** -0.435 -0.865** -0.209 -0.791** -0.0978 -0.722* 0.174 -0.702 
 (0.702) (0.348) (0.631) (0.341) (0.620) (0.363) (0.613) (0.396) (0.554) (0.427) 
L1.FKS_grey -0.666 1.369*** -0.299 1.390*** -0.390 1.353*** -0.699 1.167** -1.099 1.161** 
 (0.781) (0.448) (0.585) (0.426) (0.574) (0.451) (0.662) (0.504) (0.721) (0.551) 
PSMpatgrey  0.640***  0.613***  0.573***  0.554***  0.485*** 
  (0.0799)  (0.0816)  (0.0864)  (0.0915)  (0.0979) 
etcr -0.00406 -0.0215* 0.00102 -0.0165 0.00259 -0.0174 0.00417 -0.0235* 0.0116 -0.0243* 
 (0.0153) (0.0115) (0.0147) (0.0118) (0.0147) (0.0121) (0.0150) (0.0120) (0.0145) (0.0125) 
lgdp -2.174*** -1.336*** -1.928*** -1.248*** -1.938*** -1.288*** -2.003*** -1.364*** -1.958*** -1.419*** 
 (0.407) (0.123) (0.389) (0.125) (0.354) (0.129) (0.340) (0.132) (0.321) (0.149) 
           
Constant  1.595  1.397  1.084  2.797  2.880 
  (3.283)  (3.213)  (3.357)  (3.579)  (3.846) 
Observations 337 337 334 334 318 318 302 302 286 286 
Time Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 7.C – Forward structure 
 (1) (2)    
VARIABLES NBGML - GREY NBGML - GREY    
      
eps_nonmarket -0.0175     
 (0.0118)     
F.eps_nonmarket  -0.0114    
  (0.0127)    
      
      
      
      
      
KS_greenenergy -0.0952 -0.0903    
 (0.0934) (0.0861)    
KS_othergreen -0.0496 -0.0527    
 (0.0652) (0.0647)    
KS_grey 0.957*** 0.961***    
 (0.0755) (0.0744)    
L1.FKS_greenenergy -0.0817 -0.0850    
 (0.0545) (0.0527)    
L1.FKS_othergreen -1.057*** -1.041***    
 (0.355) (0.325)    
L1.FKS_grey 1.105*** 1.090***    
 (0.357) (0.327)    
etcr -0.0335** -0.0332**    
 (0.0152) (0.0144)    
lgdp -0.000849 0.00228    
 (0.0270) (0.0267)    
 (0.0552) (0.0559)    
PSMpatgrey 0.105* 0.100*    
 (0.0593) (0.0572)    
      
Constant -3.033*** -3.046***    
 (0.923) (0.843)    
      
Observations 337 338    
Fixed Effects - Time 
Dummies 
YES YES    
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 7.D – Lagged structure 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES NBGML - GREY NBGML - GREY NBGML - GREY NBGML - GREY NBGML - GREY 
      
eps_nonmarket -0.0175     
 (0.0118)     
L.eps_nonmarket  -0.0296**    
  (0.0140)    
L2.eps_nonmarket   -0.0280**   
   (0.0138)   
L3.eps_nonmarket    -0.0254**  
    (0.0129)  
L4.eps_nonmarket     -0.0267** 
     (0.0127) 
       
KS_greenenergy -0.0952 0.0198 0.0296 0.0382 0.0487* 
 (0.0934) (0.0228) (0.0239) (0.0264) (0.0272) 
KS_othergreen -0.0496 -0.111** -0.123*** -0.152*** -0.161*** 
 (0.0652) (0.0442) (0.0435) (0.0437) (0.0437) 
KS_grey 0.957*** 1.011*** 1.026*** 1.045*** 1.031*** 
 (0.0755) (0.0595) (0.0615) (0.0643) (0.0649) 
L1.FKS_greenenergy -0.0817 -0.124*** -0.143*** -0.164*** -0.180*** 
 (0.0545) (0.0370) (0.0372) (0.0385) (0.0385) 
L1.FKS_othergreen -1.057*** -0.646*** -0.549*** -0.530*** -0.483*** 
 (0.355) (0.129) (0.111) (0.114) (0.115) 
L1.FKS_grey 1.105*** 0.697*** 0.625*** 0.628*** 0.580*** 
 (0.357) (0.129) (0.113) (0.115) (0.115) 
etcr -0.0335** -0.0212** -0.0212** -0.0241** -0.0215** 
 (0.0152) (0.00898) (0.00928) (0.00968) (0.00905) 
lgdp -0.000849 -0.0343* -0.0401** -0.0416** -0.0430** 
 (0.0270) (0.0188) (0.0180) (0.0186) (0.0190) 
PSMpatgrey 0.105* 0.0693 0.0786 0.0919* 0.114** 
 (0.0593) (0.0502) (0.0506) (0.0521) (0.0517) 
      
Constant -3.033*** -1.912*** -1.901*** -2.025*** -1.803*** 
 (0.923) (0.397) (0.394) (0.414) (0.403) 
      
Observations 337 334 318 302 286 
Fixed Effects - Time Dummies YES YES YES YES YES 
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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TABLE 8.A – Forward structure 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
VARIABLES HGG - GO BGVR - GO HGG - GO BGVR - 
GO 
      
           
eps 0.0521 -0.0942***         
 (0.0661) (0.0281)         
F.eps   0.0694 -0.0398       
   (0.0576) (0.0284)       
           
           
           
           
           
KS_greenenergy 0.101 0.0622 0.116 0.0508       
 (0.117) (0.0682) (0.0916) (0.0693)       
KS_othergreen 0.312 0.628*** 0.314 0.607***       
 (0.459) (0.135) (0.420) (0.140)       
KS_grey -0.243 -0.455*** -0.203 -0.390**       
 (0.426) (0.165) (0.423) (0.171)       
L1.FKS_greenenergy 4.788*** -0.0766 4.475*** 0.0287       
 (1.141) (0.300) (1.071) (0.335)       
L1.FKS_othergreen 0.00962 -1.033** -0.119 -0.972**       
 (1.111) (0.436) (1.142) (0.460)       
L1.FKS_grey -0.466 1.102** -0.175 1.103**       
 (1.240) (0.508) (1.297) (0.558)       
PSMpatgo  0.583***  0.553***       
  (0.0819)  (0.0801)       
etcr -0.0134 0.00591 -0.0132 0.00677       
 (0.0291) (0.0196) (0.0293) (0.0201)       
lgdp -1.881** -0.0985 -1.912*** -0.184       
 (0.772) (0.142) (0.677) (0.157)       
           
Constant  -1.688  -1.942       
  (3.095)  (3.397)       
           
Observations 337 337 338 338       
Fixed Effects - Time Dummies YES YES YES YES       
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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TABLE 8.B – Lagged structure 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
VARIABLES HGG - GO BGVR - GO HGG - GO BGVR - GO HGG - GO BGVR - GO HGG - GO BGVR - GO HGG - GO BGVR - GO 
           
eps 0.0521 -0.0942***         
 (0.0661) (0.0281)         
L.eps   0.0807 -0.0933***       
   (0.0653) (0.0293)       
L2.eps     0.0554 -0.0971***     
     (0.0604) (0.0307)     
L3.eps       -0.00443 -0.127***   
       (0.0527) (0.0340)   
L4.eps         0.00900 -0.101*** 
         (0.0502) (0.0346) 
           
KS_greenenergy 0.101 0.0622 0.200** 0.0792 0.216** 0.0715 0.279** 0.0882 0.294** 0.00129 
 (0.117) (0.0682) (0.0932) (0.0686) (0.0962) (0.0715) (0.126) (0.0761) (0.128) (0.0657) 
KS_othergreen 0.312 0.628*** 0.384 0.645*** 0.486 0.646*** 0.556 0.692*** 0.568 0.705*** 
 (0.459) (0.135) (0.429) (0.134) (0.400) (0.142) (0.414) (0.146) (0.396) (0.114) 
KS_grey -0.243 -0.455*** -0.138 -0.430*** -0.124 -0.414** -0.265 -0.487** -0.190 -0.00352 
 (0.426) (0.165) (0.395) (0.164) (0.459) (0.180) (0.508) (0.190) (0.542) (0.161) 
L1.FKS_greenenergy 4.788*** -0.0766 5.906*** -0.136 6.048*** -0.0796 6.642*** -0.0323 7.187*** -0.238** 
 (1.141) (0.300) (1.393) (0.300) (1.272) (0.331) (1.301) (0.337) (1.272) (0.110) 
L1.FKS_othergreen 0.00962 -1.033** 0.417 -1.122** 0.557 -1.138** 0.583 -1.172** 0.740 -0.921*** 
 (1.111) (0.436) (1.043) (0.440) (0.963) (0.468) (0.958) (0.469) (0.934) (0.308) 
L1.FKS_grey -0.466 1.102** -0.664 1.303** -0.339 1.426** -0.0272 1.371** 0.0221 0.800*** 
 (1.240) (0.508) (1.154) (0.525) (1.089) (0.577) (1.148) (0.582) (1.213) (0.305) 
PSMpatgo  0.583***  0.562***  0.569***  0.581***  0.236*** 
  (0.0819)  (0.0875)  (0.0932)  (0.0998)  (0.0804) 
etcr -0.0134 0.00591 -0.00374 0.00751 -0.00679 0.00533 -0.0153 0.000726 -0.0105 0.0196 
 (0.0291) (0.0196) (0.0272) (0.0196) (0.0273) (0.0199) (0.0304) (0.0199) (0.0309) (0.0191) 
lgdp -1.881** -0.0985 -1.867*** -0.117 -1.624** -0.216 -1.457** -0.205 -1.367*** 0.0139 
 (0.772) (0.142) (0.724) (0.145) (0.632) (0.162) (0.565) (0.168) (0.493) (0.0518) 
           
Constant  -1.688  -2.569  -2.639  -2.074  -2.454* 
  (3.095)  (3.023)  (3.333)  (3.353)  (1.382) 
           
Observations 337 337 334 334 318 318 302 302 286 286 
Fixed Effects - Time Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 8.C – Forward structure 
 (1) (2)    
VARIABLES NBGML - GO NBGML - GO    
      
Eps -0.000944     
 (0.0360)     
F.eps  -0.00405    
  (0.0374)    
      
      
      
      
KS_greenenergy -0.0652 -0.0790    
 (0.117) (0.111)    
KS_othergreen 0.635*** 0.636***    
 (0.0930) (0.0934)    
KS_grey 0.382*** 0.381***    
 (0.0958) (0.0971)    
L1.FKS_greenenergy -0.200*** -0.196***    
 (0.0612) (0.0623)    
L1.FKS_othergreen -1.384*** -1.437***    
 (0.416) (0.394)    
L1.FKS_grey 1.320*** 1.371***    
 (0.407) (0.384)    
etcr -0.00268 -0.00373    
 (0.0195) (0.0190)    
Lgdp -0.0236 -0.0195    
 (0.0432) (0.0420)    
PSMpatgo 0.0152 0.0198    
 (0.0668) (0.0669)    
      
Constant -3.180*** -3.284***    
 (1.182) (1.123)    
      
Observations 337 338    
Fixed Effects - Time 
Dummies 
YES YES    
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 8.D – Lagged structure 
 (1) (2)    
VARIABLES NBGML - GO NBGML - GO    
      
Eps -0.000944     
 (0.0360)     
L.eps  0.00290    
  (0.0330)    
      
      
      
      
KS_greenenergy -0.0652 0.0421    
 (0.117) (0.0443)    
KS_othergreen 0.635*** 0.605***    
 (0.0930) (0.0803)    
KS_grey 0.382*** 0.395***    
 (0.0958) (0.0885)    
L1.FKS_greenenergy -0.200*** -0.234***    
 (0.0612) (0.0469)    
L1.FKS_othergreen -1.384*** -0.978***    
 (0.416) (0.192)    
L1.FKS_grey 1.320*** 0.919***    
 (0.407) (0.189)    
etcr -0.00268 0.0129    
 (0.0195) (0.0147)    
Lgdp -0.0236 -0.0580*    
 (0.0432) (0.0298)    
PSMpatgo 0.0152 -0.00260    
 (0.0668) (0.0648)    
      
Constant -3.180*** -2.174***    
 (1.182) (0.742)    
      
Observations 337 334    
Fixed Effects - Time 
Dummies 
YES YES    
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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TABLE 9.A – Forward structure 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
VARIABLES HGG - GO BGVR - 
GO 
HGG - GO BGVR - 
GO 
HGG - GO BGVR - GO HGG - GO BGVR - GO HGG - GO BGVR - GO 
           
eps_market 0.0327 -0.0444*         
 (0.0511) (0.0251)         
F.eps_market   0.0141 -0.0420*       
   (0.0499) (0.0240)       
F2.eps_market     0.00301 -0.0478**     
     (0.0404) (0.0236)     
F3.eps_market       -0.0152 -0.0695***   
       (0.0484) (0.0235)   
F4.eps_market         -0.0191 -0.0731*** 
         (0.0431) (0.0243) 
           
KS_greenenergy 0.135** 0.0526 0.143** 0.0492 0.136** 0.0448 0.169*** 0.0628 0.196*** 0.110* 
 (0.0610) (0.0565) (0.0629) (0.0563) (0.0592) (0.0530) (0.0592) (0.0545) (0.0538) (0.0622) 
KS_othergreen 0.322 0.605*** 0.336 0.608*** 0.402 0.657*** 0.374 0.641*** 0.388 0.588*** 
 (0.439) (0.140) (0.448) (0.141) (0.471) (0.140) (0.472) (0.144) (0.486) (0.155) 
KS_grey -0.220 -0.410** -0.267 -0.415** -0.348 -0.546*** -0.420 -0.602*** -0.485 -0.610*** 
 (0.397) (0.172) (0.419) (0.173) (0.449) (0.178) (0.451) (0.177) (0.458) (0.178) 
L1.FKS_greenenergy 4.517*** -0.0423 4.523*** 0.0117 4.824*** 0.243 4.486** -0.158 3.904* -0.330 
 (1.034) (0.325) (1.134) (0.329) (1.271) (0.362) (1.766) (0.334) (2.351) (0.317) 
L1.FKS_othergreen -0.0400 -1.079** -0.0460 -1.041** 0.0176 -0.945** -0.353 -1.343*** -0.687 -1.605*** 
 (1.133) (0.454) (1.144) (0.453) (1.163) (0.464) (1.237) (0.470) (1.368) (0.491) 
L1.FKS_grey -0.216 1.209** -0.261 1.114** -0.488 0.863 -0.000142 1.311** 0.522 1.644*** 
 (1.309) (0.544) (1.499) (0.548) (1.645) (0.574) (1.908) (0.549) (2.127) (0.548) 
PSMpatgo  0.560***  0.552***  0.578***  0.622***  0.619*** 
  (0.0809)  (0.0801)  (0.0792)  (0.0827)  (0.0835) 
etcr -0.0110 0.00525 -0.0131 0.00753 -0.0198 0.000513 -0.0330 -0.00748 -0.0421 -0.0108 
 (0.0275) (0.0199) (0.0309) (0.0198) (0.0314) (0.0195) (0.0307) (0.0192) (0.0314) (0.0191) 
lgdp -1.762*** -0.162 -1.672*** -0.156 -1.590*** -0.185 -1.376*** -0.0177 -1.167** 0.105 
 (0.623) (0.156) (0.616) (0.156) (0.603) (0.152) (0.529) (0.136) (0.566) (0.120) 
           
Constant  -1.853  -1.596  -0.231  -0.786  -2.258 
  (3.385)  (3.405)  (3.700)  (3.286)  (3.002) 
Observations 339 339 339 339 323 323 307 307 291 291 
Fixed Effects - Time Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Standard errors in parentheses*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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TABLE 9.B – Lagged structure 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
VARIABLES HGG - GO BGVR - 
GO 
HGG - GO BGVR - 
GO 
      
           
eps_market 0.0327 -0.0444*         
 (0.0511) (0.0251)         
L.eps_market   0.0673 -0.0361       
   (0.0442) (0.0265)       
           
           
           
           
           
           
KS_greenenergy 0.135** 0.0526 0.123** 0.0551       
 (0.0610) (0.0565) (0.0580) (0.0569)       
KS_othergreen 0.322 0.605*** 0.290 0.589***       
 (0.439) (0.140) (0.425) (0.141)       
KS_grey -0.220 -0.410** -0.138 -0.378**       
 (0.397) (0.172) (0.359) (0.171)       
L1.FKS_greenenergy 4.517*** -0.0423 4.668*** -0.0792       
 (1.034) (0.325) (1.031) (0.337)       
L1.FKS_othergreen -0.0400 -1.079** -0.0145 -1.075**       
 (1.133) (0.454) (1.117) (0.460)       
L1.FKS_grey -0.216 1.209** -0.135 1.289**       
 (1.309) (0.544) (1.172) (0.558)       
PSMpatgo  0.560***  0.562***       
  (0.0809)  (0.0819)       
etcr -0.0110 0.00525 -0.00389 0.00326       
 (0.0275) (0.0199) (0.0231) (0.0203)       
lgdp -1.762*** -0.162 -1.907*** -0.206       
 (0.623) (0.156) (0.597) (0.154)       
           
Constant  -1.853  -2.021       
  (3.385)  (3.476)       
           
Observations 339 339 339 339       
Fixed Effects - Time Dummies YES YES YES YES       
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 9.C – Forward structure 
 (1) (2)    
VARIABLES NBGML - GO NBGML - GO    
      
eps_market 0.0713**     
 (0.0341)     
F.eps_market  0.0542    
  (0.0339)    
      
      
      
      
      
KS_greenenergy -0.0413 -0.0404    
 (0.0625) (0.0627)    
KS_othergreen 0.586*** 0.592***    
 (0.0816) (0.0820)    
KS_grey 0.440*** 0.427***    
 (0.101) (0.102)    
L1.FKS_greenenergy -0.215*** -0.217***    
 (0.0569) (0.0566)    
L1.FKS_othergreen -1.509*** -1.469***    
 (0.335) (0.325)    
L1.FKS_grey 1.479*** 1.430***    
 (0.309) (0.298)    
etcr -0.0129 -0.0102    
 (0.0160) (0.0159)    
lgdp -0.0542 -0.0471    
 (0.0514) (0.0518)    
PSMpatgo -0.000514 0.00420    
 (0.0649) (0.0652)    
      
Constant -3.408*** -3.297***    
 (0.827) (0.814)    
      
Observations 339 339    
Fixed Effects - Time 
Dummies 
YES YES    
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 9.D – Lagged structure 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)    
VARIABLES NBGML - GO NBGML - GO NBGML - GO NBGML - GO NBGML - GO    
         
eps_market 0.0713**        
 (0.0341)        
L.eps_market  0.0652*       
  (0.0340)       
L2.eps_market   0.0603*      
   (0.0351)      
L3.eps_market    0.0620**     
    (0.0294)     
L4.eps_market     0.0693**    
     (0.0283)    
         
KS_greenenergy -0.0413 -0.0416 -0.0963 -0.0841 0.0465    
 (0.0625) (0.0620) (0.122) (0.143) (0.0558)    
KS_othergreen 0.586*** 0.588*** 0.649*** 0.659*** 0.619***    
 (0.0816) (0.0823) (0.0974) (0.104) (0.0854)    
KS_grey 0.440*** 0.433*** 0.396*** 0.375*** 0.412***    
 (0.101) (0.0998) (0.0979) (0.105) (0.0976)    
L1.FKS_greenenergy -0.215*** -0.209*** -0.193*** -0.195*** -0.238***    
 (0.0569) (0.0565) (0.0626) (0.0639) (0.0489)    
L1.FKS_othergreen -1.509*** -1.487*** -1.576*** -1.509*** -0.946***    
 (0.335) (0.333) (0.432) (0.502) (0.227)    
L1.FKS_grey 1.479*** 1.453*** 1.518*** 1.454*** 0.926***    
 (0.309) (0.307) (0.417) (0.484) (0.222)    
etcr -0.0129 -0.0110 -0.0171 -0.0200 -0.00767    
 (0.0160) (0.0162) (0.0186) (0.0190) (0.0153)    
lgdp -0.0542 -0.0503 -0.0291 -0.0166 -0.0569*    
 (0.0514) (0.0498) (0.0497) (0.0527) (0.0328)    
PSMpatgo -0.000514 0.00153 0.00594 0.00340 -0.0278    
 (0.0649) (0.0652) (0.0665) (0.0681) (0.0634)    
         
Constant -3.408*** -3.373*** -3.344*** -3.143*** -2.277***    
 (0.827) (0.825) (1.170) (1.194) (0.786)    
         
Observations 339 339 323 307 291    
Fixed Effects - Time Dummies YES YES YES YES YES    
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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TABLE 10.A – Forward structure. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
VARIABLES HGG - GO BGVR - GO HGG - GO BGVR - 
GO 
      
           
eps_nonmarket 0.0232 -0.0590***         
 (0.0329) (0.0191)         
F.eps_nonmarket   0.0474 -0.00875       
   (0.0289) (0.0183)       
           
           
           
           
           
           
KS_greenenergy 0.117 0.0575 0.140* 0.0539       
 (0.105) (0.0685) (0.0832) (0.0692)       
KS_othergreen 0.329 0.625*** 0.330 0.592***       
 (0.464) (0.134) (0.420) (0.141)       
KS_grey -0.313 -0.375** -0.307 -0.334**       
 (0.425) (0.161) (0.412) (0.167)       
L1.FKS_greenenergy 4.839*** -0.105 4.790*** -0.0333       
 (1.122) (0.309) (1.018) (0.347)       
L1.FKS_othergreen -0.00956 -1.014** -0.155 -1.037**       
 (1.115) (0.442) (1.155) (0.469)       
L1.FKS_grey -0.598 1.176** -0.617 1.264**       
 (1.207) (0.518) (1.157) (0.567)       
PSMpatgo  0.566***  0.547***       
  (0.0818)  (0.0810)       
etcr -0.0143 0.00902 -0.0106 0.00771       
 (0.0298) (0.0196) (0.0280) (0.0203)       
lgdp -1.744** -0.163 -1.805*** -0.245       
 (0.688) (0.144) (0.595) (0.154)       
           
Constant  -2.064  -2.159       
  (3.129)  (3.504)       
          
 
Observations 337 337 338 338       
Fixed Effects - Time Dummies YES YES YES YES       
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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TABLE 10.B – Lagged structure 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
VARIABLES HGG - GO BGVR - GO HGG - GO BGVR - GO HGG - GO BGVR - GO HGG - GO BGVR - GO HGG - GO BGVR - GO 
           
eps_nonmarket 0.0232 -0.0590***         
 (0.0329) (0.0191)         
L.eps_nonmarket   0.0278 -0.0665***       
   (0.0310) (0.0203)       
L2.eps_nonmarket     -0.0176 -0.0855***     
     (0.0284) (0.0215)     
L3.eps_nonmarket       -0.0495* -0.101***   
       (0.0297) (0.0249)   
L4.eps_nonmarket         -0.0293 -0.0843*** 
         (0.0306) (0.0239) 
           
KS_greenenergy 0.117 0.0575 0.224** 0.0716 0.239** 0.0513 0.284** 0.0421 0.305** -0.0134 
 (0.105) (0.0685) (0.0910) (0.0684) (0.103) (0.0710) (0.129) (0.0770) (0.129) (0.0564) 
KS_othergreen 0.329 0.625*** 0.420 0.659*** 0.542 0.684*** 0.574 0.710*** 0.591 0.711*** 
 (0.464) (0.134) (0.442) (0.131) (0.412) (0.136) (0.408) (0.140) (0.397) (0.0975) 
KS_grey -0.313 -0.375** -0.242 -0.373** -0.218 -0.373** -0.305 -0.381** -0.251 0.116 
 (0.425) (0.161) (0.416) (0.159) (0.464) (0.169) (0.499) (0.190) (0.553) (0.122) 
L1.FKS_greenenergy 4.839*** -0.105 5.714*** -0.160 5.544*** -0.143 6.290*** -0.0990 7.059*** -0.227*** 
 (1.122) (0.309) (1.287) (0.289) (1.147) (0.300) (1.240) (0.303) (1.242) (0.0787) 
L1.FKS_othergreen -0.00956 -1.014** 0.328 -1.100** 0.429 -1.080** 0.456 -1.079** 0.716 -0.835*** 
 (1.115) (0.442) (1.029) (0.434) (0.966) (0.449) (0.984) (0.453) (0.968) (0.251) 
L1.FKS_grey -0.598 1.176** -0.656 1.286** -0.0937 1.321** -0.109 1.207** -0.271 0.719*** 
 (1.207) (0.518) (1.091) (0.510) (0.975) (0.543) (1.126) (0.557) (1.362) (0.243) 
PSMpatgo  0.566***  0.538***  0.549***  0.537***  0.177*** 
  (0.0818)  (0.0882)  (0.0973)  (0.123)  (0.0542) 
etcr -0.0143 0.00902 -0.00838 0.0148 -0.00875 0.0152 -0.0111 0.0133 -0.00557 0.0330* 
 (0.0298) (0.0196) (0.0300) (0.0195) (0.0292) (0.0196) (0.0310) (0.0201) (0.0308) (0.0186) 
lgdp -1.744** -0.163 -1.620** -0.127 -1.321** -0.174 -1.350*** -0.169 -1.284*** -0.0339 
 (0.688) (0.144) (0.652) (0.139) (0.565) (0.157) (0.504) (0.183) (0.457) (0.0442) 
           
Constant  -2.064  -2.723  -2.635  -1.887  -2.494** 
  (3.129)  (2.896)  (3.025)  (3.004)  (1.121) 
           
Observations 337 337 334 334 318 318 302 302 286 286 
Fixed Effects - Time Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 10.C – Forward structure 
 (1) (2)      
VARIABLES NBGML - GO NBGML - GO      
        
eps_nonmarket -0.0461**       
 (0.0209)       
F.eps_nonmarket  -0.0355      
  (0.0219)      
        
        
        
        
        
KS_greenenergy -0.0548 -0.0718      
 (0.111) (0.110)      
KS_othergreen 0.643*** 0.639***      
 (0.0900) (0.0911)      
KS_grey 0.360*** 0.367***      
 (0.0914) (0.0926)      
L1.FKS_greenenergy -0.189*** -0.188***      
 (0.0571) (0.0596)      
L1.FKS_othergreen -1.318*** -1.407***      
 (0.400) (0.395)      
L1.FKS_grey 1.238*** 1.331***      
 (0.394) (0.389)      
Etcr 0.000671 -0.00255      
 (0.0188) (0.0189)      
Lgdp -0.0531 -0.0418      
 (0.0443) (0.0444)      
PSMpatgo 0.0301 0.0305      
 (0.0652) (0.0649)      
        
Constant -2.520** -2.833**      
 (1.167) (1.162)      
        
        
Observations 337 338      
Fixed Effects - Time Dummies YES YES      
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 10.D – Lagged structure 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)    
VARIABLES NBGML - GO NBGML - GO NBGML - GO NBGML - GO NBGML - GO    
         
eps_nonmarket -0.0461**        
 (0.0209)        
L.eps_nonmarket  -0.0407*       
  (0.0214)       
L2.eps_nonmarket   -0.0671***      
   (0.0195)      
L3.eps_nonmarket    -0.0726***     
    (0.0218)     
L4.eps_nonmarket     -0.0834***    
     (0.0228)    
         
KS_greenenergy -0.0548 0.0443 0.0415 0.0497 0.0568    
 (0.111) (0.0436) (0.0438) (0.0462) (0.0497)    
KS_othergreen 0.643*** 0.620*** 0.668*** 0.668*** 0.660***    
 (0.0900) (0.0800) (0.0787) (0.0811) (0.0808)    
KS_grey 0.360*** 0.367*** 0.312*** 0.302*** 0.295***    
 (0.0914) (0.0860) (0.0873) (0.0921) (0.0955)    
L1.FKS_greenenergy -0.189*** -0.218*** -0.208*** -0.210*** -0.234***    
 (0.0571) (0.0466) (0.0447) (0.0448) (0.0442)    
L1.FKS_othergreen -1.318*** -0.926*** -0.781*** -0.732*** -0.697***    
 (0.400) (0.189) (0.161) (0.167) (0.178)    
L1.FKS_grey 1.238*** 0.850*** 0.687*** 0.647*** 0.608***    
 (0.394) (0.186) (0.163) (0.169) (0.178)    
etcr 0.000671 0.0155 0.0166 0.0136 0.0168    
 (0.0188) (0.0141) (0.0136) (0.0136) (0.0136)    
lgdp -0.0531 -0.0811** -0.0906*** -0.0877*** -0.0879***    
 (0.0443) (0.0315) (0.0300) (0.0303) (0.0317)    
PSMpatgo 0.0301 0.0132 0.0338 0.0403 0.0585    
 (0.0652) (0.0642) (0.0669) (0.0691) (0.0720)    
         
Constant -2.520** -1.626** -0.965 -0.925 -0.709    
 (1.167) (0.730) (0.713) (0.733) (0.751)    
         
Observations 337 334 318 302 286    
Fixed Effects - Time Dummies YES YES YES YES YES    
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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Appendix A – BVGR – Rounded values 
Table 11.A – Forward structure  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
VARIABLES HGG - 
GREEN 
BGVR - 
GREEN 
HGG - 
GREEN 
BGVR - 
GREEN 
HGG - 
GREEN 
BGVR - 
GREEN 
HGG - 
GREEN 
BGVR - 
GREEN 
  
           
eps 0.0381 0.0352         
 (0.0362) (0.0347)         
F.eps   0.0586 0.0623*       
   (0.0363) (0.0327)       
F2.eps     0.0575 0.0712**     
     (0.0385) (0.0343)     
F3.eps       0.0180 0.0124   
       (0.0415) (0.0372)   
           
           
           
KS_greenenergy 0.885*** 0.744*** 0.872*** 0.736*** 0.817*** 0.698*** 0.773*** 0.652***   
 (0.0899) (0.0789) (0.0888) (0.0772) (0.0915) (0.0788) (0.102) (0.0887)   
KS_othergreen -0.254 -0.164 -0.271 -0.165 -0.260 -0.207 -0.233 -0.236   
 (0.185) (0.147) (0.184) (0.144) (0.188) (0.148) (0.204) (0.164)   
KS_grey -0.184 -0.275* -0.145 -0.249 -0.117 -0.310* -0.219 -0.382**   
 (0.226) (0.167) (0.229) (0.164) (0.227) (0.170) (0.237) (0.187)   
L1. FKS_greenenergy 1.588*** 0.0178 1.482*** -0.0200 1.142** -0.0841 1.548*** 0.00917   
 (0.472) (0.172) (0.482) (0.166) (0.506) (0.172) (0.506) (0.191)   
L1.FKS_othergreen -1.083* -1.043** -1.206* -1.125*** -1.419** -1.357*** -1.118* -1.311***   
 (0.614) (0.405) (0.616) (0.399) (0.633) (0.418) (0.679) (0.441)   
L1.FKS_grey -0.290 0.505 -0.177 0.594 0.228 0.848** -0.275 0.782*   
 (0.766) (0.397) (0.767) (0.391) (0.792) (0.419) (0.844) (0.444)   
PSMpatge  0.344***  0.334***  0.433***  0.513***   
  (0.0951)  (0.0916)  (0.113)  (0.131)   
etcr2_ele -0.0456* -0.0353 -0.0463* -0.0362 -0.0535* -0.0480* -0.0602** -0.0561**   
 (0.0275) (0.0256) (0.0276) (0.0254) (0.0277) (0.0252) (0.0283) (0.0262)   
lgdp 0.00352 0.222*** -0.0159 0.220*** 0.0712 0.268*** 0.148 0.313***   
 (0.161) (0.0682) (0.163) (0.0667) (0.164) (0.0691) (0.172) (0.0749)   
           
Constant 2.122 0.600 2.759 0.504 1.535 0.393 1.378 0.279   
 (5.160) (1.750) (5.100) (1.701) (5.132) (1.814) (5.248) (2.002)   
           
Observations 337 337 338 338 323 323 307 307   
Fixed Effects - Time Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES   
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 11.B – Lagged structure  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
VARIABLES HGG - 
GREEN 
BGVR - 
GREEN 
HGG - 
GREEN 
BGVR - 
GREEN 
      
           
eps 0.0381 0.0352         
 (0.0362) (0.0347)         
L.eps   0.0311 0.0364       
   (0.0372) (0.0361)       
           
           
           
           
           
KS_greenenergy 0.885*** 0.744*** 0.906*** 0.767***       
 (0.0899) (0.0789) (0.0881) (0.0774)       
KS_othergreen -0.254 -0.164 -0.253 -0.137       
 (0.185) (0.147) (0.180) (0.143)       
KS_grey -0.184 -0.275* -0.216 -0.269*       
 (0.226) (0.167) (0.217) (0.162)       
L1. FKS_greenenergy 1.588*** 0.0178 1.532*** 0.0303       
 (0.472) (0.172) (0.475) (0.165)       
L1.FKS_othergreen -1.083* -1.043** -1.279** -1.017**       
 (0.614) (0.405) (0.619) (0.398)       
L1.FKS_grey -0.290 0.505 0.273 0.480       
 (0.766) (0.397) (0.835) (0.388)       
PSMpatge  0.344***  0.298***       
  (0.0951)  (0.0859)       
etcr2_ele -0.0456* -0.0353 -0.0471* -0.0303       
 (0.0275) (0.0256) (0.0273) (0.0251)       
lgdp 0.00352 0.222*** 0.0305 0.215***       
 (0.161) (0.0682) (0.158) (0.0658)       
           
Constant 2.122 0.600 -1.453 0.549       
 (5.160) (1.750) (5.883) (1.686)       
           
Observations 337 337 334 334       
Fixed Effects - Time Dummies YES YES YES YES       
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 12.A – Forward structure  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
VARIABLES HGG - 
GREEN 
BGVR - 
GREEN 
HGG - 
GREEN 
BGVR - 
GREEN 
      
           
eps_market 0.0368 0.0370         
 (0.0302) (0.0303)         
F.eps_market   0.0282 0.0443       
   (0.0293) (0.0285)       
           
           
           
           
           
           
KS_greenenergy 0.796*** 0.670*** 0.794*** 0.674***       
 (0.0910) (0.0786) (0.0916) (0.0786)       
KS_othergreen -0.280 -0.165 -0.275 -0.162       
 (0.184) (0.146) (0.185) (0.144)       
KS_grey -0.107 -0.274* -0.0991 -0.261       
 (0.226) (0.166) (0.229) (0.165)       
L1. FKS_greenenergy 1.520*** 0.0165 1.467*** -0.00790       
 (0.468) (0.170) (0.475) (0.167)       
L1.FKS_othergreen -1.198* -1.141*** -1.211* -1.128***       
 (0.627) (0.403) (0.629) (0.400)       
L1.FKS_grey -0.0877 0.624 -0.0299 0.632       
 (0.780) (0.397) (0.783) (0.394)       
PSMpatge  0.389***  0.382***       
  (0.0958)  (0.0947)       
etcr2_ele -0.0532* -0.0439* -0.0549** -0.0454*       
 (0.0277) (0.0255) (0.0278) (0.0254)       
lgdp 0.00518 0.234*** 0.0144 0.228***       
 (0.165) (0.0700) (0.165) (0.0692)       
           
Constant 1.481 0.309 1.161 0.268       
 (5.157) (1.753) (5.143) (1.725)       
           
Observations 339 339 339 339       
Fixed Effects - Time Dummies YES YES YES YES       
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 12.B – Lagged structure  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
VARIABLES HGG - 
GREEN 
BGVR - 
GREEN 
HGG - 
GREEN 
BGVR - 
GREEN 
HGG - 
GREEN 
BGVR - 
GREEN 
HGG - 
GREEN 
BGVR - 
GREEN 
HGG - 
GREEN 
BGVR - 
GREEN 
eps_market 0.0368 0.0370         
 (0.0302) (0.0303)         
L.eps_market   0.0707** 0.0869***       
   (0.0317) (0.0313)       
L2.eps_market     0.0645* 0.0968***     
     (0.0352) (0.0331)     
L3.eps_market       0.0588* 0.0850**   
       (0.0356) (0.0344)   
L4.eps_market         0.0351 0.0624* 
         (0.0382) (0.0363) 
KS_greenenergy 0.796*** 
(0.0910) 
0.670*** 
(0.0786) 
0.788*** 
(0.0909) 
0.670*** 
(0.0760) 
0.833*** 
(0.0940) 
0.709*** 
(0.0769) 
0.885*** 
(0.0990) 
0.756*** 
(0.0803) 
0.931*** 
(0.103) 
0.809*** 
(0.0820) 
KS_othergreen -0.280 -0.165 -0.261 -0.134 -0.272 -0.121 -0.289 -0.153 -0.331 -0.203 
 (0.184) (0.146) (0.183) (0.138) (0.189) (0.140) (0.198) (0.144) (0.201) (0.147) 
KS_grey -0.107 
(0.226) 
-0.274* 
(0.166) 
-0.0878 
(0.224) 
-0.243 
(0.154) 
-0.111 
(0.239) 
-0.256* 
(0.155) 
-0.137 
(0.252) 
-0.231 
(0.158) 
-0.118 
(0.259) 
-0.166 
(0.163) 
L1.FKS_greenenergy 1.520*** 
(0.468) 
0.0165 
(0.170) 
1.525*** 
(0.468) 
-0.0171 
(0.147) 
1.570*** 
(0.487) 
-0.0225 
(0.135) 
1.684*** 
(0.505) 
-0.0134 
(0.133) 
1.466*** 
(0.523) 
0.000105 
(0.138) 
L1.FKS_othergreen -1.198* 
(0.627) 
-1.141***  
(0.403) 
-1.210** 
(0.617) 
-1.176*** 
(0.375) 
-1.285** 
(0.633) 
-1.108*** 
(0.372) 
-0.945 
(0.658) 
-0.919** 
(0.375) 
-0.971 
(0.682) 
-0.809** 
(0.386) 
L1.FKS_grey -0.0877 
(0.780) 
0.624 
(0.397) 
-0.0916 
(0.772) 
0.669* 
(0.364) 
-0.0639 
(0.786) 
0.587* 
(0.355) 
-0.568 
(0.811) 
0.411 
(0.354) 
-0.189 
(0.907) 
0.308 
(0.365) 
PSMpatge  0.389*** 
(0.0958) 
 0.352*** 
(0.0849) 
 0.322*** 
(0.0791) 
 0.300*** 
(0.0780) 
 0.262*** 
(0.0760) 
etcr2_ele -0.0532* 
(0.0277) 
-0.0439* 
(0.0255) 
-0.0470* 
(0.0276) 
-0.0356 
(0.0249) 
-0.0448 
(0.0280) 
-0.0300 
(0.0248) 
-0.0530* 
(0.0284) 
-0.0365 
(0.0257) 
-0.0610** 
(0.0291) 
-0.0417 
(0.0265) 
lgdp 0.00518 
(0.165) 
0.234*** 
(0.0700) 
0.00640 
(0.159) 
0.216*** 
(0.0632) 
-0.0173 
(0.164) 
0.213*** 
(0.0609) 
-0.0152 
(0.168) 
0.202*** 
(0.0607) 
0.0299 
(0.168) 
0.181*** 
(0.0619) 
           
Constant 1.481 0.309 1.314 0.245 1.733 0.535 3.179 0.587 0.622 0.856 
 (5.157) (1.753) (5.119) (1.556) (5.212) (1.458) (5.239) (1.441) (5.753) (1.494) 
Observations 339 339 339 339 323 323 307 307 291 291 
Fixed Effects - Time 
Dummies 
YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 13.A – Forward structure  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
VARIABLES HGG - 
GREEN 
BGVR - 
GREEN 
HGG - 
GREEN 
BGVR - 
GREEN 
      
           
eps_nonmarket 0.0104 0.00686         
 (0.0259) (0.0235)         
F.eps_nonmarket   0.0334 0.0244       
   (0.0245) (0.0207)       
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
KS_greenenergy 0.893*** 0.748*** 0.879*** 0.734***       
 (0.0904) (0.0805) (0.0885) (0.0788)       
KS_othergreen -0.260 -0.184 -0.282 -0.187       
 (0.185) (0.149) (0.184) (0.148)       
KS_grey -0.209 -0.302* -0.192 -0.292*       
 (0.223) (0.169) (0.225) (0.169)       
L1. FKS_greenenergy 1.623*** 0.0486 1.558*** 0.0319       
 (0.472) (0.181) (0.475) (0.180)       
L1.FKS_othergreen -1.112* -1.052** -1.274** -1.146***       
 (0.614) (0.420) (0.617) (0.421)       
L1.FKS_grey -0.268 0.500 -0.248 0.577       
 (0.766) (0.414) (0.762) (0.414)       
PSMpatge  0.373***  0.372***       
  (0.0962)  (0.0943)       
etcr2_ele -0.0465* -0.0373 -0.0445 -0.0375       
 (0.0275) (0.0257) (0.0275) (0.0256)       
lgdp 0.0340 0.229*** 0.0274 0.238***       
 (0.158) (0.0713) (0.159) (0.0705)       
           
Constant 1.739 0.708 3.347 0.659       
 (5.238) (1.847) (5.214) (1.841)       
Observations 337 337 338 338       
Fixed Effects - Time Dummies YES YES YES YES       
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 13.B – Lagged structure  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
VARIABLES HGG - 
GREEN 
BGVR - 
GREEN 
HGG - 
GREEN 
BGVR - 
GREEN 
      
           
eps_nonmarket 0.0104 0.00686         
 (0.0259) (0.0235)         
L.eps_nonmarket   -0.0124 -0.0216       
   (0.0266) (0.0252)       
           
           
           
  
           
           
           
KS_greenenergy 0.893*** 0.748*** 0.927*** 0.792***       
 (0.0904) (0.0805) (0.0881) (0.0800)       
KS_othergreen -0.260 -0.184 -0.260 -0.177       
 (0.185) (0.149) (0.178) (0.146)       
KS_grey -0.209 -0.302* -0.235 -0.310*       
 (0.223) (0.169) (0.213) (0.167)       
L1. FKS_greenenergy 1.623*** 0.0486 1.540*** 0.0715       
 (0.472) (0.181) (0.476) (0.180)       
L1.FKS_othergreen -1.112* -1.052** -1.307** -1.021**       
 (0.614) (0.420) (0.619) (0.424)       
L1.FKS_grey -0.268 0.500 0.441 0.481       
 (0.766) (0.414) (0.841) (0.418)       
PSMpatge  0.373***  0.345***       
  (0.0962)  (0.0923)       
etcr2_ele -0.0465* -0.0373 -0.0493* -0.0337       
 (0.0275) (0.0257) (0.0270) (0.0251)       
lgdp 0.0340 0.229*** 0.0600 0.210***       
 (0.158) (0.0713) (0.155) (0.0706)       
           
Constant 1.739 0.708 -3.132 0.807       
 (5.238) (1.847) (6.009) (1.847)       
           
Observations 337 337 334 334       
Fixed Effects - Time Dummies YES YES YES YES       
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 14.A – Forward structure  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
VARIABLES HGG - 
GREY 
BGVR - 
GREY 
HGG - 
GREY 
BGVR - 
GREY 
HGG - GREY BGVR - 
GREY 
HGG - GREY BGVR - 
GREY 
HGG - GREY BGVR - 
GREY 
           
Eps -0.0410** -0.0489***         
 (0.0181) (0.0163)         
F.eps   -0.0273 -0.0286*       
   (0.0178) (0.0156)       
F2.eps     -0.0360** -0.0251*     
     (0.0176) (0.0139)     
F3.eps       -0.0392** -0.0305**   
       (0.0183) (0.0134)   
F4.eps         -0.0353* -0.0313** 
         (0.0185) (0.0130) 
           
KS_greenenergy 0.0754** -0.0255 0.0742** -0.0255 0.0864*** 0.00421 0.0915*** 0.0155 0.0901*** 0.0369 
 (0.0350) (0.0369) (0.0343) (0.0367) (0.0315) (0.0298) (0.0335) (0.0308) (0.0332) (0.0325) 
KS_othergreen -0.140 -0.0624 -0.168** -0.109 -0.156* -0.0663 -0.149 -0.0853 -0.181* -0.132* 
 (0.0866) (0.0783) (0.0848) (0.0764) (0.0848) (0.0707) (0.0928) (0.0721) (0.0982) (0.0742) 
KS_grey 0.825*** 0.757*** 0.863*** 0.831*** 0.856*** 0.801*** 0.827*** 0.761*** 0.806*** 0.726*** 
 (0.113) (0.109) (0.112) (0.106) (0.111) (0.0978) (0.119) (0.0970) (0.125) (0.0952) 
L1. FKS_greenenergy 1.762*** 0.346 1.733*** 0.308 1.535*** -0.248 1.595*** -0.666** 1.710*** -0.840** 
 (0.370) (0.345) (0.371) (0.356) (0.383) (0.331) (0.408) (0.336) (0.423) (0.333) 
L1.FKS_othergreen -0.978** -0.826** -0.988** -0.854** -1.484*** -1.474*** -1.644*** -1.702*** -1.828*** -1.864*** 
 (0.428) (0.346) (0.433) (0.357) (0.427) (0.297) (0.451) (0.284) (0.482) (0.280) 
L1.FKS_grey -0.293 1.294*** -0.176 1.494*** 0.0295 1.921*** 0.204 2.294*** 0.315 2.495*** 
 (0.509) (0.458) (0.517) (0.472) (0.495) (0.397) (0.516) (0.385) (0.536) (0.370) 
PSMpatgrey  0.635***  0.627***  0.786***  0.886***  0.946*** 
  (0.0798)  (0.0814)  (0.0802)  (0.0827)  (0.0840) 
etcr2_ele -0.0289** -0.0219* -0.0291** -0.0226* -0.0283** -0.0122 -0.0327*** -0.0168* -0.0364*** -0.0183* 
 (0.0120) (0.0115) (0.0120) (0.0116) (0.0117) (0.0104) (0.0120) (0.0101) (0.0119) (0.00986) 
Lgdp -1.083*** -1.279*** -1.102*** -1.335*** -1.059*** -1.185*** -0.985*** -1.066*** -0.942*** -0.968*** 
 (0.117) (0.130) (0.118) (0.130) (0.120) (0.120) (0.126) (0.114) (0.131) (0.114) 
           
Constant 11.33*** 1.923 10.58*** 0.943 13.13*** 1.875 11.53*** 0.851 11.01** 0.0713 
 (3.988) (3.359) (4.038) (3.455) (4.059) (3.162) (4.218) (2.976) (4.314) (2.809) 
Observations 337 337 338 338 323 323 307 307 291 291 
Fixed Effects - Time Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 14.B – Lagged structure 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
VARIABLES HGG - GREY BGVR - GREY HGG - GREY BGVR - GREY HGG - GREY BGVR-
GREY 
HGG - GREY BGVR - 
GREY 
HGG - GREY BGVR - 
GREY 
           
eps -0.0410** -0.0489***         
 (0.0181) (0.0163)         
L.eps   -0.0512*** -0.0727***       
   (0.0186) (0.0179)       
L2.eps     -0.0345* -0.0625***     
     (0.0199) (0.0201)     
L3.eps       -0.0121 -0.0383*   
       (0.0197) (0.0196)   
L4.eps         -0.000980 -0.0200 
         (0.0199) (0.0197) 
KS_greenenergy 0.0754** -0.0255 0.0917*** -0.00781 0.117*** 0.0177 0.154*** 0.0570 0.155*** 0.0724* 
 (0.0350) (0.0369) (0.0344) (0.0374) (0.0359) (0.0393) (0.0362) (0.0400) (0.0386) (0.0422) 
KS_othergreen -0.140 -0.0624 -0.111 0.00662 -0.144 -0.0104 -0.221** -0.123 -0.216** -0.168* 
 (0.0866) (0.0783) (0.0871) (0.0819) (0.0918) (0.0907) (0.0897) (0.0888) (0.0888) (0.0874) 
KS_grey 0.825*** 0.757*** 0.835*** 0.697*** 0.892*** 0.724*** 0.859*** 0.753*** 0.967*** 0.870*** 
 (0.113) (0.109) (0.114) (0.112) (0.121) (0.122) (0.124) (0.121) (0.132) (0.127) 
L1.FKS_greenenergy  1.762*** 0.346 1.548*** 0.342 1.531*** 0.419 1.731*** 0.579 1.581*** 0.646 
 (0.370) (0.345) (0.373) (0.335) (0.393) (0.351) (0.407) (0.376) (0.424) (0.396) 
L1.FKS_othergreen -0.978** -0.826** -1.076** -0.849** -1.010** -0.805** -0.806* -0.754* -0.745 -0.691* 
 (0.428) (0.346) (0.429) (0.337) (0.447) (0.355) (0.468) (0.388) (0.475) (0.416) 
L1.FKS_grey -0.293 1.294*** -0.000371 1.174*** 0.161 1.222*** -0.178 1.137** -0.0700 1.115** 
 (0.509) (0.458) (0.514) (0.436) (0.539) (0.458) (0.579) (0.502) (0.595) (0.538) 
PSMpatgrey  0.635***  0.605***  0.574***  0.558***  0.490*** 
  (0.0798)  (0.0808)  (0.0856)  (0.0912)  (0.0976) 
etcr2_ele -0.0289** 
(0.0120) 
-0.0219* 
(0.0115) 
-0.0288** 
(0.0119) 
-0.0195* 
(0.0115) 
-0.0281** 
(0.0120) 
-0.0187 
(0.0118) 
-0.0316*** 
(0.0119) 
-0.0242** 
(0.0119) 
-0.0300** 
(0.0124) 
-0.0244** 
(0.0124) 
lgdp -1.083*** 
(0.117) 
-1.279*** 
(0.130) 
-1.088*** 
(0.115) 
-1.184*** 
(0.133) 
-1.146*** 
(0.118) 
-1.236*** 
(0.138) 
-1.183*** 
(0.118) 
-1.355*** 
(0.135) 
-1.258*** 
(0.126) 
-1.405*** 
(0.146) 
Constant 11.33*** 1.923 10.40*** 2.281 8.884** 1.731 10.40** 3.227 10.01** 3.069 
 (3.988) (3.359) (3.893) (3.238) (4.023) (3.373) (4.249) (3.595) (4.527) (3.837) 
Observations 337 337 334 334 318 318 302 302 286 286 
Fixed Effects - Time 
Dummies 
YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 15.A – Forward structure  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
VARIABLES HGG - GREY BGVR - GREY HGG - GREY BGVR - GREY       
           
eps_market -0.00688 -0.0130         
 (0.0180) (0.0161)         
F.eps_market   -0.000597 -0.00231       
   (0.0175) (0.0154)       
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
KS_greenenergy 0.0698** 0.00300 0.0684** -0.000125       
 (0.0295) (0.0288) (0.0294) (0.0286)       
KS_othergreen -0.201** -0.145* -0.206** -0.156**       
 (0.0834) (0.0753) (0.0830) (0.0739)       
KS_grey 0.891*** 0.858*** 0.904*** 0.890***       
 (0.116) (0.111) (0.116) (0.109)       
L1. FKS_greenenergy 1.626*** 0.296 1.625*** 0.267       
 (0.368) (0.347) (0.369) (0.353)       
L1.FKS_othergreen -1.073** -0.939*** -1.057** -0.940***       
 (0.443) (0.357) (0.443) (0.360)       
L1.FKS_grey 0.0381 1.653*** 0.0580 1.729***       
 (0.517) (0.448) (0.519) (0.452)       
PSMpatgrey  0.612***  0.614***       
  (0.0805)  (0.0811)       
etcr2_ele -0.0303** -0.0209* -0.0304** -0.0208*       
 (0.0120) (0.0116) (0.0120) (0.0116)       
lgdp -1.106*** -1.332*** -1.114*** -1.363***       
 (0.120) (0.135) (0.120) (0.133)       
           
Constant 9.878** 0.0396 9.602** -0.285       
 (4.101) (3.491) (4.087) (3.480)       
Observations 339 339 339 339       
Fixed Effects - Time Dummies YES YES YES YES       
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 15.B – Lagged structure  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
VARIABLES HGG - 
GREY 
BGVR - 
GREY 
HGG - 
GREY 
BGVR - 
GREY 
HGG - 
GREY 
BGVR - 
GREY 
    
           
eps_market -0.00688 -0.0130         
 (0.0180) (0.0161)         
L.eps_market   -0.0255 -0.0301*       
   (0.0187) (0.0165)       
L2.eps_market     -0.00746 -0.0184     
     (0.0194) (0.0173)     
           
           
           
KS_greenenergy 0.0698** 0.00300 0.0748** 0.00887 0.101*** 0.00413     
 (0.0295) (0.0288) (0.0297) (0.0290) (0.0363) (0.0387)     
KS_othergreen -0.201** -0.145* -0.187** -0.131* -0.226*** -0.159**     
 (0.0834) (0.0753) (0.0835) (0.0752) (0.0859) (0.0767)     
KS_grey 0.891*** 0.858*** 0.855*** 0.815*** 0.890*** 0.851***     
 (0.116) (0.111) (0.116) (0.110) (0.120) (0.112)     
L1. FKS_greenenergy 1.626*** 0.296 1.635*** 0.338 1.779*** 0.313     
 (0.368) (0.347) (0.365) (0.341) (0.387) (0.364)     
L1.FKS_othergreen -1.073** -0.939*** -1.097** -0.921*** -0.993** -0.962***     
 (0.443) (0.357) (0.437) (0.353) (0.459) (0.369)     
L1.FKS_grey 0.0381 1.653*** -0.0471 1.531*** -0.0583 1.698***     
 (0.517) (0.448) (0.515) (0.445) (0.533) (0.462)     
PSMpatgrey  0.612***  0.613***  0.631***     
  (0.0805)  (0.0799)  (0.0843)     
etcr2_ele -
0.0303** 
-0.0209* -
0.0313*** 
-0.0226* -
0.0313*** 
-0.0241**     
 (0.0120) (0.0116) (0.0119) (0.0116) (0.0121) (0.0118)     
lgdp -1.106*** -1.332*** -1.094*** -1.306*** -1.132*** -1.386***     
 (0.120) (0.135) (0.119) (0.132) (0.120) (0.135)     
           
Constant 9.878** 0.0396 10.87*** 0.718 9.634** 0.509     
 (4.101) (3.491) (4.105) (3.490) (4.216) (3.527)     
           
Observations 339 339 339 339 323 323     
Fixed Effects - Time 
Dummies 
YES YES YES YES YES YES     
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 16.A – Forward structure 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
VARIABLES HGG - GREY BGVR - GREY HGG - GREY BGVR - GREY HGG - GREY BGVR - GREY HGG - GREY BGVR - GREY HGG - GREY BGVR - GREY 
           
eps_nonmarket -0.0275** -0.0321***         
 (0.0109) (0.00987)         
F.eps_nonmarket   -0.0204* -0.0216**       
   (0.0109) (0.00966)       
F2.eps_nonmarket     -0.0225** -0.0155*     
     (0.0110) (0.00879)     
F3.eps_nonmarket       -0.0200* -0.0129   
       (0.0116) (0.00868)   
F4.eps_nonmarket         -0.00494 -0.00859 
         (0.0118) (0.00835) 
           
KS_greenenergy 0.0708** -0.0352 0.0714** -0.0307 0.0838*** 0.00128 0.0899*** 0.0139 0.0895*** 0.0353 
 (0.0352) (0.0370) (0.0345) (0.0367) (0.0317) (0.0299) (0.0336) (0.0310) (0.0328) (0.0327) 
KS_othergreen -0.136 -0.0611 -0.162* -0.0997 -0.160* -0.0712 -0.161* -0.0997 -0.187* -0.146** 
 (0.0854) (0.0762) (0.0839) (0.0753) (0.0839) (0.0694) (0.0918) (0.0708) (0.0980) (0.0733) 
KS_grey 0.853*** 0.810*** 0.883*** 0.858*** 0.890*** 0.836*** 0.860*** 0.802*** 0.807*** 0.760*** 
 (0.109) (0.100) (0.109) (0.0992) (0.109) (0.0929) (0.119) (0.0940) (0.126) (0.0937) 
L1. FKS_greenenergy 1.794*** 0.303 1.759*** 0.298 1.555*** -0.292 1.620*** -0.742** 1.698*** -0.918*** 
 (0.373) (0.349) (0.373) (0.355) (0.387) (0.330) (0.413) (0.339) (0.428) (0.337) 
L1.FKS_othergreen -0.875** -0.797** -0.917** -0.840** -1.397*** -1.484*** -1.547*** -1.733*** -1.744*** -1.892*** 
 (0.433) (0.348) (0.436) (0.355) (0.433) (0.297) (0.459) (0.287) (0.494) (0.285) 
L1.FKS_grey -0.318 1.368*** -0.206 1.497*** 0.0395 2.006*** 0.229 2.471*** 0.349 2.692*** 
 (0.507) (0.448) (0.512) (0.458) (0.498) (0.381) (0.526) (0.373) (0.556) (0.363) 
PSMpatgrey  0.640***  0.628***  0.796***  0.904***  0.971*** 
  (0.0798)  (0.0809)  (0.0802)  (0.0833)  (0.0848) 
etcr2_ele -0.0287** -0.0215* -0.0293** -0.0227** -0.0292** -0.0129 -0.0346*** -0.0181* -0.0374*** -0.0196* 
 (0.0120) (0.0115) (0.0119) (0.0115) (0.0116) (0.0104) (0.0119) (0.0102) (0.0120) (0.0101) 
lgdp -1.105*** -1.337*** -1.121*** -1.368*** -1.092*** -1.231*** -1.024*** -1.127*** -0.964*** -1.037*** 
 (0.114) (0.123) (0.116) (0.125) (0.118) (0.116) (0.124) (0.111) (0.128) (0.109) 
           
Constant 10.63*** 1.608 10.21*** 1.046 12.43*** 1.707 10.69** 0.270 10.39** -0.606 
 (3.916) (3.284) (3.956) (3.382) (3.985) (3.128) (4.169) (2.973) (4.372) (2.846) 
           
Observations 337 337 338 338 323 323 307 307 291 291 
Fixed Effects - Time Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 16.B – Lagged structure  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
VARIABLES HGG - GREY BGVR - GREY HGG - GREY BGVR - GREY HGG - GREY BGVR - GREY HGG - GREY BGVR - 
GREY 
HGG - GREY BGVR - 
GREY 
           
eps_nonmarket -0.0275** -0.0321***         
 (0.0109) (0.00987)         
L.eps_nonmarket   -0.0268** -0.0425***       
   (0.0110) (0.0113)       
L2.eps_nonmarket     -0.0202* -0.0351***     
     (0.0113) (0.0119)     
L3.eps_nonmarket       -0.00868 -0.0216*   
       (0.0113) (0.0115)   
L4.eps_nonmarket         0.00233 -0.00670 
         (0.0117) (0.0119) 
           
KS_greenenergy 0.0708** -0.0352 0.0840** -0.0252 0.111*** 0.00390 0.153*** 0.0496 0.155*** 0.0694 
 (0.0352) (0.0370) (0.0348) (0.0381) (0.0360) (0.0400) (0.0363) (0.0406) (0.0385) (0.0423) 
KS_othergreen -0.136 -0.0611 -0.127 -0.000996 -0.149* -0.0256 -0.217** -0.129 -0.225** -0.185** 
 (0.0854) (0.0762) (0.0863) (0.0814) (0.0896) (0.0881) (0.0887) (0.0872) (0.0893) (0.0877) 
KS_grey 0.853*** 0.810*** 0.884*** 0.781*** 0.914*** 0.791*** 0.858*** 0.779*** 0.979*** 0.899*** 
 (0.109) (0.100) (0.109) (0.102) (0.115) (0.110) (0.122) (0.115) (0.132) (0.125) 
L1. FKS_greenenergy 1.794*** 0.303 1.529*** 0.203 1.544*** 0.354 1.748*** 0.564 1.568*** 0.635 
 (0.373) (0.349) (0.378) (0.344) (0.396) (0.361) (0.410) (0.386) (0.427) (0.403) 
L1.FKS_othergreen -0.875** -0.797** -1.018** -0.866** -0.957** -0.792** -0.773 -0.724* -0.769 -0.704* 
 (0.433) (0.348) (0.439) (0.341) (0.454) (0.363) (0.473) (0.396) (0.484) (0.427) 
L1.FKS_grey -0.318 1.368*** 0.0827 1.389*** 0.172 1.353*** -0.203 1.167** -0.0318 1.161** 
 (0.507) (0.448) (0.517) (0.426) (0.538) (0.451) (0.580) (0.504) (0.606) (0.551) 
PSMpatgrey  0.640***  0.613***  0.573***  0.553***  0.484*** 
  (0.0798)  (0.0816)  (0.0864)  (0.0915)  (0.0979) 
etcr2_ele -0.0287** -0.0215* -0.0278** -0.0166 -0.0275** -0.0174 -0.0312*** -0.0236** -0.0303** -0.0243* 
 (0.0120) (0.0115) (0.0120) (0.0118) (0.0121) (0.0121) (0.0119) (0.0120) (0.0124) (0.0125) 
lgdp -1.105*** -1.337*** -1.111*** -1.248*** -1.155*** -1.288*** -1.177*** -1.365*** -1.268*** -1.419*** 
 (0.114) (0.123) (0.113) (0.125) (0.115) (0.129) (0.118) (0.132) (0.129) (0.149) 
           
Constant 10.63*** 1.608 9.288** 1.408 8.272** 1.092 10.19** 2.807 10.00** 2.891 
 (3.916) (3.284) (3.877) (3.213) (3.987) (3.358) (4.220) (3.580) (4.522) (3.848) 
           
Observations 337 337 334 334 318 318 302 302 286 286 
Fixed Effects - Time Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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TABLE 17.A – Forward structure 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
VARIABLES HGG - GO BGVR - GO HGG - GO BGVR - GO       
           
eps -0.0120 -0.0938***         
 (0.0315) (0.0281)         
F.eps   0.00888 -0.0395       
   (0.0322) (0.0284)       
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
KS_greenenergy 0.204*** 0.0609 0.190*** 0.0496       
 (0.0697) (0.0680) (0.0689) (0.0690)       
KS_othergreen 0.422*** 0.626*** 0.386** 0.604***       
 (0.159) (0.135) (0.159) (0.140)       
KS_grey 0.0294 -0.456*** 0.0603 -0.391**       
 (0.191) (0.165) (0.193) (0.171)       
L1. FKS_greenenergy 1.277*** -0.0819 1.220*** 0.0232       
 (0.457) (0.302) (0.471) (0.337)       
L1.FKS_othergreen -1.436** -1.042** -1.492** -0.983**       
 (0.592) (0.437) (0.600) (0.461)       
L1.FKS_grey 0.187 1.107** 0.277 1.108**       
 (0.709) (0.510) (0.735) (0.560)       
PSMpatgo  0.587***  0.557***       
  (0.0817)  (0.0800)       
etcr2_ele 0.00956 0.00575 0.00857 0.00659       
 (0.0216) (0.0196) (0.0218) (0.0201)       
lgdp -0.558*** -0.104 -0.567*** -0.190       
 (0.145) (0.144) (0.146) (0.158)       
           
Constant 7.378 -1.537 7.463 -1.769       
 (5.183) (3.117) (5.209) (3.420)       
           
Observations 337 337 338 338       
Fixed Effects - Time Dummies YES YES YES YES       
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 17.B – Lagged structure 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
VARIABLES HGG - GO BGVR - GO HGG - GO BGVR - GO HGG - GO BGVR - GO HGG - GO BGVR - GO HGG - GO BGVR - GO 
           
eps -0.0120 -0.0938***         
 (0.0315) (0.0281)         
L.eps   0.000895 -0.0931***       
   (0.0318) (0.0293)       
L2.eps     -0.0232 -0.0972***     
     (0.0324) (0.0306)     
L3.eps       -0.0255 -0.126***   
       (0.0354) (0.0340)   
L4.eps         -0.0237 -0.102*** 
         (0.0369) (0.0348) 
           
KS_greenenergy 0.204*** 0.0609 0.222*** 0.0779 0.212*** 0.0709 0.239*** 0.0891 0.217*** 0.00270 
 (0.0697) (0.0680) (0.0687) (0.0684) (0.0712) (0.0712) (0.0759) (0.0756) (0.0824) (0.0661) 
KS_othergreen 0.422*** 0.626*** 0.420*** 0.644*** 0.421*** 0.643*** 0.419** 0.689*** 0.381** 0.705*** 
 (0.159) (0.135) (0.156) (0.134) (0.157) (0.142) (0.165) (0.146) (0.170) (0.115) 
KS_grey 0.0294 -0.456*** 0.0710 -0.433*** 0.132 -0.418** 0.111 -0.493*** 0.243 -0.0144 
 (0.191) (0.165) (0.187) (0.165) (0.193) (0.180) (0.205) (0.191) (0.215) (0.166) 
L1.FKS_greenenergy 1.277*** -0.0819 1.131** -0.139 0.906* -0.0823 1.108** -0.0288 0.931* -0.240** 
 (0.457) (0.302) (0.460) (0.303) (0.473) (0.334) (0.497) (0.340) (0.521) (0.112) 
L1.FKS_othergreen -1.436** -1.042** -1.546*** -1.130** -1.731*** -1.149** -1.724*** -1.183** -1.703*** -0.926*** 
 (0.592) (0.437) (0.592) (0.441) (0.603) (0.469) (0.620) (0.470) (0.638) (0.312) 
L1.FKS_grey 0.187 1.107** 0.665 1.307** 1.079 1.434** 1.059 1.383** 1.198 0.802*** 
 (0.709) (0.510) (0.724) (0.526) (0.744) (0.578) (0.761) (0.583) (0.781) (0.310) 
PSMpatgo  0.587***  0.567***  0.575***  0.587***  0.242*** 
  (0.0817)  (0.0872)  (0.0928)  (0.0986)  (0.0845) 
etcr2_ele 0.00956 0.00575 0.0100 0.00727 0.00488 0.00501 -0.00329 0.000257 0.00124 0.0192 
 (0.0216) (0.0196) (0.0216) (0.0196) (0.0216) (0.0199) (0.0218) (0.0199) (0.0225) (0.0192) 
Lgdp -0.558*** -0.104 -0.589*** -0.122 -0.646*** -0.223 -0.675*** -0.216 -0.698*** 0.0150 
 (0.145) (0.144) (0.144) (0.146) (0.144) (0.162) (0.149) (0.167) (0.150) (0.0526) 
           
Constant 7.378 -1.537 4.597 -2.435 3.958 -2.481 3.331 -1.924 2.462 -2.375* 
 (5.183) (3.117) (5.141) (3.043) (5.156) (3.355) (5.385) (3.390) (5.659) (1.404) 
Observations 337 337 334 334 318 318 302 302 286 286 
Fixed Effects - Time 
Dummies 
YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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TABLE 18.A – Forward structure 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
VARIABLES HGG - GO BGVR - GO HGG - GO BGVR - GO HGG - GO BGVR - GO HGG - GO BGVR - GO HGG - GO BGVR - GO 
           
eps_market -0.000234 -0.0440*         
 (0.0294) (0.0251)         
F.eps_market   -0.0123 -0.0416*       
   (0.0287) (0.0240)       
F2.eps_market     -0.0330 -0.0476**     
     (0.0281) (0.0236)     
F3.eps_market       -0.0469 -0.0694***   
       (0.0300) (0.0235)   
F4.eps_market         -0.0153 -0.0735*** 
         (0.0327) (0.0242) 
           
KS_greenenergy 0.148** 0.0522 0.151** 0.0489 0.128** 0.0440 0.130** 0.0619 0.146** 0.108* 
 (0.0639) (0.0561) (0.0636) (0.0559) (0.0587) (0.0525) (0.0612) (0.0542) (0.0662) (0.0618) 
KS_othergreen 0.374** 0.602*** 0.375** 0.605*** 0.482*** 0.656*** 0.486*** 0.640*** 0.493** 0.588*** 
 (0.159) (0.140) (0.160) (0.141) (0.162) (0.140) (0.180) (0.145) (0.200) (0.155) 
KS_grey 0.0822 -0.411** 0.0614 -0.416** -0.136 -0.549*** -0.184 -0.606*** -0.199 -0.614*** 
 (0.191) (0.173) (0.194) (0.174) (0.203) (0.178) (0.217) (0.177) (0.230) (0.178) 
L1.FKS_greenenergy 1.158** -0.0483 1.180*** 0.00613 1.578*** 0.246 1.455*** -0.158 1.585*** -0.332 
 (0.454) (0.328) (0.454) (0.331) (0.476) (0.364) (0.499) (0.336) (0.520) (0.319) 
L1.FKS_othergreen -1.565** -1.090** -1.594*** -1.052** -1.389** -0.945** -1.673** -1.344*** -1.546** -1.605*** 
 (0.612) (0.455) (0.604) (0.454) (0.612) (0.464) (0.687) (0.470) (0.770) (0.491) 
L1.FKS_grey 0.301 1.216** 0.254 1.121** -0.484 0.854 -0.175 1.305** -0.148 1.638*** 
 (0.721) (0.546) (0.725) (0.550) (0.762) (0.577) (0.809) (0.551) (0.889) (0.550) 
PSMpatgo  0.564***  0.556***  0.582***  0.626***  0.623*** 
  (0.0807)  (0.0799)  (0.0791)  (0.0826)  (0.0834) 
etcr2_ele 0.00628 0.00516 0.00673 0.00741 0.00296 0.000411 -0.00456 -0.00753 -0.0122 -0.0108 
 (0.0218) (0.0199) (0.0218) (0.0198) (0.0210) (0.0195) (0.0216) (0.0192) (0.0221) (0.0190) 
lgdp -0.557*** -0.169 -0.542*** -0.163 -0.534*** -0.191 -0.428*** -0.0223 -0.444** 0.104 
 (0.147) (0.157) (0.149) (0.157) (0.156) (0.153) (0.160) (0.137) (0.182) (0.121) 
           
Constant 8.159 -1.685 8.650 -1.426 12.73** -0.0391 11.70** -0.630 9.894* -2.139 
 (5.260) (3.408) (5.298) (3.429) (5.470) (3.723) (5.455) (3.307) (5.523) (3.013) 
           
Observations 339 339 339 339 323 323 307 307 291 291 
Fixed Effects - Time 
Dummies 
YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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TABLE 18.B – Lagged structure 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
VARIABLES HGG - GO BGVR - GO HGG - GO BGVR - GO       
           
eps_market -0.000234 -0.0440*         
 (0.0294) (0.0251)         
L.eps_market   0.00869 -0.0359       
   (0.0298) (0.0265)       
           
           
           
           
           
KS_greenenergy 0.148** 0.0522 0.146** 0.0546       
 (0.0639) (0.0561) (0.0639) (0.0565)       
KS_othergreen 0.374** 0.602*** 0.374** 0.586***       
 (0.159) (0.140) (0.159) (0.141)       
KS_grey 0.0822 -0.411** 0.0899 -0.379**       
 (0.191) (0.173) (0.190) (0.172)       
L1. FKS_greenenergy 1.158** -0.0483 1.167** -0.0849       
 (0.454) (0.328) (0.456) (0.339)       
L1.FKS_othergreen -1.565** -1.090** -1.538** -1.087**       
 (0.612) (0.455) (0.610) (0.461)       
L1.FKS_grey 0.301 1.216** 0.298 1.296**       
 (0.721) (0.546) (0.722) (0.559)       
PSMpatgo  0.564***  0.566***       
  (0.0807)  (0.0817)       
etcr2_ele 0.00628 0.00516 0.00684 0.00318       
 (0.0218) (0.0199) (0.0219) (0.0203)       
lgdp -0.557*** -0.169 -0.562*** -0.213       
 (0.147) (0.157) (0.145) (0.155)       
           
Constant 8.159 -1.685 7.919 -1.849       
 (5.260) (3.408) (5.233) (3.497)       
Observations 339 339 339 339       
Fixed Effects - Time Dummies YES YES YES YES       
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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TABLE 19.A – Forward structure 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
VARIABLES HGG - GO BGVR - GO HGG - GO BGVR - GO       
           
eps_nonmarket -0.0108 -0.0587***         
 (0.0210) (0.0191)         
F.eps_nonmarket   0.0141 -0.00871       
   (0.0209) (0.0183)       
           
           
           
           
KS_greenenergy 0.203*** 0.0563 0.191*** 0.0526       
 (0.0697) (0.0683) (0.0687) (0.0688)       
KS_othergreen 0.426*** 0.623*** 0.380** 0.589***       
 (0.159) (0.134) (0.160) (0.141)       
KS_grey 0.0333 -0.377** 0.0595 -0.335**       
 (0.188) (0.161) (0.191) (0.167)       
L1. FKS_greenenergy 1.288*** -0.110 1.186** -0.0395       
 (0.459) (0.312) (0.470) (0.349)       
L1.FKS_othergreen -1.405** -1.023** -1.541** -1.048**       
 (0.592) (0.442) (0.606) (0.470)       
L1.FKS_grey 0.176 1.180** 0.316 1.270**       
 (0.709) (0.520) (0.729) (0.569)       
PSMpatgo  0.569***  0.551***       
  (0.0816)  (0.0808)       
etcr2_ele 0.00955 0.00883 0.00934 0.00753       
 (0.0216) (0.0196) (0.0219) (0.0203)       
lgdp -0.561*** -0.169 -0.564*** -0.252       
 (0.143) (0.145) (0.144) (0.155)       
           
Constant 7.167 -1.909 7.658 -1.985       
 (5.154) (3.153) (5.172) (3.525)       
           
Observations 337 337 338 338       
Fixed Effects - Time Dummies YES YES YES YES       
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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TABLE 19.B – Lagged structure  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
VARIABLES HGG – GO BGVR - GO HGG - GO BGVR - GO HGG - GO BGVR - GO HGG - GO BGVR - GO HGG - GO BGVR - GO 
           
eps_nonmarket -0.0108 -0.0587***         
 (0.0210) (0.0191)         
L.eps_nonmarket   -0.00149 -0.0664***       
   (0.0215) (0.0203)       
L2.eps_nonmarket     -0.0263 -0.0854***     
     (0.0216) (0.0215)     
L3.eps_nonmarket       -0.0244 -0.109***   
       (0.0236) (0.0226)   
L4.eps_nonmarket         -0.0273 -0.0841*** 
         (0.0239) (0.0239) 
           
KS_greenenergy 0.203*** 0.0563 0.223*** 0.0703 0.211*** 0.0510 0.234*** 0.00892 0.212*** -0.0130 
 (0.0697) (0.0683) (0.0685) (0.0682) (0.0713) (0.0707) (0.0759) (0.0615) (0.0820) (0.0566) 
KS_othergreen 0.426*** 0.623*** 0.423*** 0.658*** 0.444*** 0.683*** 0.435*** 0.718*** 0.403** 0.712*** 
 (0.159) (0.134) (0.158) (0.131) (0.157) (0.136) (0.165) (0.108) (0.169) (0.0981) 
KS_grey 0.0333 -0.377** 0.0685 -0.377** 0.123 -0.379** 0.106 -0.0305 0.217 0.110 
 (0.188) (0.161) (0.186) (0.159) (0.189) (0.169) (0.200) (0.209) (0.213) (0.123) 
L1.FKS_greenenergy 1.288*** -0.110 1.133** -0.162 0.938** -0.145 1.134** -0.206* 1.026* -0.229*** 
 (0.459) (0.312) (0.461) (0.291) (0.476) (0.304) (0.501) (0.105) (0.531) (0.0798) 
L1.FKS_othergreen -1.405** -1.023** -1.543*** -1.107** -1.662*** -1.090** -1.651*** -0.992*** -1.567** -0.839*** 
 (0.592) (0.442) (0.593) (0.435) (0.604) (0.451) (0.626) (0.338) (0.651) (0.253) 
L1.FKS_grey 0.176 1.180** 0.660 1.290** 1.014 1.331** 0.987 0.842** 1.024 0.719*** 
 (0.709) (0.520) (0.725) (0.512) (0.740) (0.545) (0.763) (0.342) (0.800) (0.245) 
PSMpatgo  0.569***  0.543***  0.556***  0.249*  0.179*** 
  (0.0816)  (0.0877)  (0.0961)  (0.129)  (0.0550) 
etcr2_ele 0.00955 0.00883 0.0100 0.0145 0.00641 0.0148 -0.00123 0.0262 0.00430 0.0325* 
 (0.0216) (0.0196) (0.0215) (0.0195) (0.0214) (0.0195) (0.0218) (0.0195) (0.0226) (0.0186) 
lgdp -0.561*** -0.169 -0.586*** -0.133 -0.635*** -0.183 -0.662*** -0.0270 -0.683*** -0.0328 
 (0.143) (0.145) (0.144) (0.140) (0.143) (0.158) (0.148) (0.0533) (0.150) (0.0445) 
           
Constant 7.167 -1.909 4.573 -2.599 3.640 -2.501 3.076 -1.861 2.381 -2.435** 
 (5.154) (3.153) (5.146) (2.918) (5.104) (3.057) (5.345) (1.314) (5.619) (1.128) 
Observations 337 337 334 334 318 318 302 302 286 286 
Fixed Effects - Time 
Dummies 
YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
 115 
1. ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT IPC class 
1.1. AIR POLLUTION ABATEMENT All  classes  from   
1.1.1  to  1.1.3   
1.1.1. Emissions Abatement from stationary sources (e.g.  SOx,  NOx,  PM  emissions  from  combustion  plants)  
Post--combustion technologies  
Chemical  or  biological  purification  of  waste  gases  (  e.g.  engine  exhaust  gases,  smoke,  fumes,  flue  gases  or  aerosols;;  
removing  sulfur   
oxides,  nitrogen  oxides,  etc.)   
B01D53/34--72   
Incinerators  or  other  apparatus  specially  adapted  for  consuming  waste  gases  or  noxious  gases   F23g7/06   
Arrangements  of  devices  for  treating  smoke  or  fumes  of  purifiers,  e.g.  for  removing  noxious  material   F23J15   
Shaft  or  like  vertical  or  substantially  vertical  furnaces;;  Arrangements  of  dust  collectors     F27B1/18   
Integrated technologies  
Blast  furnaces;;  Dust  arresters   C21B7/22   
Manufacture  of  carbon  steel,  e.g.  plain  mild  steel,  medium  carbon  steel,  or  cast--steel;;  Removal  of  waste  gases  or  dust   C21C5/38   
Combustion  apparatus  characterised  by  means  for  returning  flue  gases  to  the  combustion  chamber  or  to  the  combustion  zone         F23B80   
Combustion  apparatus  characterised  by  arrangements  for  returning  combustion  products  or  flue  gases  to  the  combustion  
chamber   
F23C9   
Apparatus  in  which  combustion  takes  place  in  a  fluidised  bed  of  fuel  or  other  particles   F23C10   
1.1.2. Emissions Abatement from mobile sources (e.g.  NOx,  CO,  HC,  PM  emissions  from  motor  vehicles)  
Post--combustion technologies  
Processes,  apparatus  or  devices  specially  adapted  for  purification  of  engine  exhaust  gases B01D53/92   
 B01D53/94   
Regeneration,  reactivation  or  recycling  of  reactants B01D53/96   
Catalysts  comprising  metals  or  metal  oxides  or  hydroxides;;  of  noble  metals;;  of  the  platinum  group  metals B01J23/38--46   
Crankcase  ventilating  or  breathing   F01M13/02--04   
Methods  of  operating engines involving  adding  non--fuel  substances  including  exhaust  gas  to  combustion  air,  fuel,  or  fuel--air  
mixtures  of 
engines;;  the  substances  including  exhaust  gas   
F02B47/08--10   
Controlling engine  characterise   by  their  being  supplied  with  non--fuel  gas  added  to  combustion--air,  such  as  the  exhaust  gas  
of  engine,   
or  having  secondary  air  added  to  fuel--air  mixture   
F02D21/06--10   
Engine--pertinent apparatus for  adding  exhaust  gases  to  combustion--air,  main  fuel,  or  fuel--air  mixture   F02M25/07   
Testing  of  internal--combustion  engines  by  monitoring  exhaust  gases g01M15/10   
Integrated technologies  
Methods  of  operating engines involving  adding  non--fuel  substances  or  anti--knock  agents  to  combustion  air,  fuel,  or  fuel--air  
mixtures  of 
engines;;  the  substances  including  non--airborne  oxygen   
F02B47/06   
Electrical control  of  supply  of  combustible  mixture  or  its constituents     F02D41      
Conjoint  electrical  control  of  two  or  more  functions,  e.g.  ignition,  fuel--air  mixture,  recirculation,  supercharging,  exhaust--gas  
treatment     
F02D43   
Electrical  control  of  combustion  engines   F02D45   
Idling  devices  for  preventing  flow  of  idling  fuel   F02M3/02--055   
Apparatus  for  adding  secondary  air  to  fuel--air  mixture.   F02M23   
Engine--pertinent  apparatus  for  adding  non--fuel  substances  or  small  quantities  of  secondary  fuel  to  combustion--air,  main  fuel,  
or  fuel--air   
mixture.   
F02M25   
Appa atus  for  treating  combustion--air,  fuel,  or  fuel--air  mixture,  by  catalysts,  electric  means,  magnetism,  rays,  sonic  waves,  
etc.   
F02M27   
Apparatus  for  thermally  treating  combustion--air,  fuel,  or  fuel--air  mixture   F02M31/02--18   
Fuel--injection  apparatus   F02M39--71   
Advancing  or  retarding  ignition;; Control  therefore       F02P5   
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1.1.3. Not eLsewhere cLAssified 
 
Post--comBustion technoLogies  
Filters  or  filterinG  processes  specially  modified  for  separatinG  dispersed  particles  from  Gases  or  vapours   B01D46   
SeparatinG  dispersed  particles  from  Gases,  air  or  vapours  by  liquid  as  separatinG  aGent     B01D47   
SeparatinG  dispersed  particles  from  Gases,  air  or  vapours  by  other  methods   B01D49   
Combinations  of  devices  for  separatinG  particles  from  Gases  or  vapours   B01D50   
Auxiliary  pre--treatment  of  Gases  or  vapours  to  be  cleaned  from  dispersed  particles       B01D51   
SeparatinG  dispersed  particles  from  Gases  or  vapour,  e.G.  air,  by  electrostatic  effect     B03C3   
Exhaust  or  silencinG  apparatus  havinG  means  for  purifyinG  or  renderinG  innocuous     F01N3   
Exhaust  or  silencinG  apparatus  combined  or  associated  with  devices  profitinG  by  exhaust  enerGy   F01N5   
Exhaust  or  silencinG  apparatus,  or  parts  thereof   F01N7   
Exhaust  or  silencinG  apparatus  characterised  by  constructional  features   F01N13   
Electrical  control  of  exhaust  Gas  treatinG  apparatus     F01N9   
MonitorinG  or  diaGnostic  devices  for  exhaust--Gas  treatment  apparatus F01N11   
IntegrAted technoLogies  
Use  of  additives  to  fuels  or  fires  for  particular  purposes  for  reducinG  smoke  development   C10L10/02   
Use  of  additives  to  fuels  or  fires  for  particular  purposes  for  facilitatinG  soot  removal   C10L10/06   
   
1.2. WATER POLLUTION ABATEMENT 
All  classes  from   
1.2.1  to  1.2.3 
1.2.1. Water And wastewater treatment  
ArranGements  of  installations  for  treatinG  waste--water  or  sewaGe     B63J4   
Treatment  of  water,  waste  water,  sewaGe  or  sludGe   C02F     
Chemistry;;  Materials  for  treatinG  liquid  pollutants,  e.G.  oil,  Gasoline,  fat     C09K3/32   
PlumbinG  installations  for  waste  water   E03C1/12   
Sewers     Cesspools   E03F   
1.2.2. Fertilizers from wastewater  
Fertilisers  from  waste  water,  sewaGe  sludGe,  sea  slime,  ooze  or  similar  masses C05F7   
1.2.3. OiL spiLL cLeAnup  
Devices   for   cleaninG   or   keepinG   clear   the   surface  of   open  water   from  oil   or   like   floatinG   materials   by   separatinG  or   
removinG   these   
materials   
E02B15/04--10   
Vessels  or  like  floatinG  structures  adapted  for  special  purposes  --  for  collectinG  pollution  from  open  water   B63B35/32   
Materials  for  treatinG  liquid  pollutants,  e.G.  oil,  Gasoline  or  fat   C09K  3/32   
1.3. WASTE MANAGEMENT   
All  classes  from   
1.3.1  to  1.3.6 
1.3.1. Solid waste collection  
Street  cleaninG;;  RemovinG  undesirable  matter,  e.G.  rubbish,  from  the  land,  not  otherwise  provided  for     E01H15   
TransportinG;;  GatherinG  or  removal  of  domestic  or  like  refuse   B65F   
1.3.2. Material recovery, recycling and re--use  
Animal  feeding--stuffs  from  distillers'  or  brewers'  waste;;  waste  products  of  dairy  plant;;  meat,  fish,  or  bones;;  from  kitchen  
waste   
A23K1/06--10   
Footwear  made  of  rubber  waste   A43B1/12   
Heels  or  top--pieces  made  of  rubber  waste   A43B21/14   
Separating  solid  materials;;  General  arrangement  of  separating  plant  specially  adapted  for  refuse   B03B9/06   
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Manufacture  of  articles  from  scrap  or  waste  metal  particles     B22F8   
Preparing  material;;  Recycling  the  material   B29B7/66   
Recovery  of  plastics  or  other  constituents  of  waste  material  containing  plastics     B29B17   
Presses  specially  adapted  for  consolidating  scrap  metal  or  for  compacting  used  cars   B30B9/32   
Systematic  disassembly  of  vehicles  for  recovery  of  salvageable  components,  e.g.  for  recycling     B62D67   
Stripping  waste  material  from  cores  or  formers,  e.g.  to  permit  their  re--use   B65H73   
Applications  of  disintegrable,  dissolvable  or  edible  materials   B65D65/46   
Compacting  the  glass  batches,  e.g.  pelletizing       C03B1/02   
Glass  batch  composition  --  containing  silicates,  e.g.  cullet       C03C6/02   
Glass  batch  composition  --  containing  pellets  or  agglomerates     C03C6/08   
Hydraulic  cements  from  oil  shales,  residues  or  waste  other  than  slag       C04B7/24--30   
Calcium  sulfate  cements  starting  from  phosphogypsum  or  from  waste,  e.g.  purification  products  of  smoke     C04B11/26   
Use  of  agglomerated  or  waste  materials  or  refuse  as  fillers  for  mortars,  concrete  or  artificial  stone;;  Waste  materials  or  
Refuse       
C04B18/04--10   
Clay--wares;;  Waste  materials  or  Refuse     C04B33/132   
Recovery  or  working--up  of  waste  materials  (plastics)   C08J11   
Luminescent,  e.g.  electroluminescent,  chemiluminescent,  materials;;  Recovery  of  luminescent  materials   C09K11/01   
Working--up  used  lubricants  to  recover  useful  products     C10M175   
  Working--up  raw  materials  other  than  ores,  e.g.  scrap,  to  produce  non--ferrous  metals  or  compounds  thereof     C22B7   
Obtaining  zinc  or  zinc  oxide;;  From  muffle  furnace  residues;;  From  metallic  residues  or  scraps   C22B19/28--30   
Obtaining  tin;;  From  scrap,  especially  tin  scrap     C22B25/06   
Textiles;;  Disintegrating  fibre--containing  articles  to  obtain  fibres  for  re--use   D01g11   
Paper--making;;  Fibrous  raw  materials  or  their  mechanical  treatment  --  using  waste  paper   D21B1/08--10   
Paper--making;;  Fibrous  raw  materials  or  their  mechanical  treatment;;  Defibrating  by  other  means  --  of  waste  paper   D21B1/32   
Paper--making;;  Other  processes  for  obtaining  cellulose;;  Working--up  waste  paper     D21C5/02   
Paper--making;;  Pulping;;  Non--fibrous  material  added  to  the  pulp;;  Waste  products   D21H17/01   
Apparatus  or  processes  for  salvaging  material  from  electric  cables   H01B  15/00   
Recovery  of  material  from  discharge  tubes  or  lamps   H01J  9/52   
Reclaiming  serviceable  parts  of  waste  cells  or  batteries   H01M  6/52   
Reclaiming  serviceable  parts  of  waste  accumulators   H01M  10/54   
1.3.3. Fertilizers from waste  
Fertilisers  made  from  animal  corpses,  or  parts  thereof   C05F1   
Fertilisers  from  distillery  wastes,  molasses,  vinasses,  sugar  plant,  or  similar  wastes  or  residues   C05F5   
Fertilisers  from  waste  water,  sewage  sludge,  sea  slime,  ooze  or  similar  masses C05F7   
Fertilizers  from  household  or  town  refuse   C05F9   
Preparation  of  fertilizers  characterized  by  the  composting  step   C05F17   
1.3.4. Incineration and energy recoVery  
Solid   fuels   essentially   based  on   materials   of   non--mineral   origin;;  on   sewage,  house,   or   town   refuse;;  on   industrial   
residues   or   waste   
materials   
C10L5/46--48   
Cremation  furnaces;;  Incineration  of  waste;;  Incinerator  constructions;;  Details,  accessories  or  control  therefor       F23G5   
Cremation  furnaces;;    Incinerators  or  other  apparatus  specially  adapted  for  consuming  specific  waste  or  low  grade  fuels     F23G7   
1.3.5. Landfilling  
[Search  strategy  currently  not  available]   
   
Note:   Landfilling   patents   are   largely   covered   by   IPC   class   B09B.   However,   this   class   also   covers   many   aspects   of   
recycling   and inceneration. Therefore  B090B is used only to generate aggregate “waste management” counts 
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2. WATER--RELATED ADAPTATION TECHNOLOGIES IPC or CPC class 
2.1. DEMAND--SIDE TECHNOLOGIES (water conservation)  
2.1.1. Indoor water conservation    
Faucets and showers      
Self--closing  valves      
Self--closing  valves,  i.e.  closing  automatically  after  operation,  in  which  the  closing  movement,  either  retarded  or  not,  starts  
immediately   
after  opening   
F16K21/06--12   
Self--closing  valves,  i.e.  closing  automatically  after  operation,  closing  after  a  predetermined  quantity  of  fluid  has  been  delivered   F16K  21/16--20   
Aeration of water    
Arrangement  or  mounting  of  devices,  e.g.  valves,  for  venting  or  aerating  or  draining   F16L  55/07   
Jet  regulators  with  aerating  means   E03C  1/084   
Sanitation (dual--flush toilets, dry toilets, closed--circuit toilets)      
Flushing  devices  discharging  variable  quantities  of  water   E03D  3/12   
Cisterns  discharging  variable  quantities  of  water   E03D  1/14   
Urinals  without  flushing   A47K  11/12   
Dry  closets   A47K  11/02   
Waterless  or  low--flush  urinals   E03D13/007   
Special  constructions  of  flushing  devices  with  recirculation  of  bowl--cleaning  fluid   E03D5/016   
Greywater      
Greywater  supply  systems   E03B1/041   
Home appLiances      
Optimisation  of  water  quantity  (for  dishwashers)   Y02B  40/46   
Optimisation  of  water  quantity    (for  washing  machines)   Y02B  40/56   
2.1.2. Irrigation water conservation  
Drip irrigation      
Watering  arrangements  located  above  the  soil  which  make  use  of  perforated  pipe--lines  or  pipe--lines  with  dispensing  fittings,  
e.g.  for  drip   
irriGation   
A01G  25/02   
Watering  arrangements  making  use  of  perforated  pipe--lines  located  in  the  soil   A01G  25/06     
 
1.3.6. Waste management Not elsewhere classified  
Disposal  of  solid  waste   B09B   
Production  of  liquid  hydrocarbon  mixtures  from  rubber  or  rubber  waste   C10G1/10   
Medical  or  veterinary  science;;  Disinfection  or  sterilising  methods  specially  adapted  for  refuse   A61L11   
1.4. SOIL REMEDIATION  
Reclamation  of  contaminated  soil   B09C   
1.5. ENVIRONMENTAL MONITORING  
Monitoring  or  diagnostic  devices  for  exhaust--Gas  treatment  apparatus     F01N11   
Alarms  responsive  to  a  single  specified  undesired  or  abnormal  condition  and  not  otherwise  provided  for,  e.G.  pollution  alarms;;  
toxics   
G08B21/12--14   
    Note:  This  search  strategy  is  under  development,  the  counts  generated  are  most  likely  incomplete.      
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Control of watering      
Control  of  watering   A01G  25/16   
Drought--resistant crops      
Mutation  or  genetic  engineering;;  DNA  or  RNA  concerning  genetic  engineering,  vectors,  e.g.  plasmids,  or  their  isolation,  
preparation  or   
purification;;  for  drought,  cold,  salt  resistance   
C12N15/8273   
2.1.3. Water conservation in thermoelectric power production  
Combustion  heat  from  one  cycle  heating  the  fluid  in  another  cycle   F01K  23/08--10   
Non--positive--displacement  machines  or  engines,  e.g.  steam  turbines  /  Preventing  or  minimizing   internal  leakage  of  working  
fluid,  e.g.   
between  stages   
F01D  11   
2.1.4. Water distribution  
Piping reducing leakage and leakage monitoring      
Pipe--line  systems  /  Protection  or  supervision  of  installations  /  Preventing,  monitoring,  or  locating  loss   [F17D5/02  and  E03]     
Devices  for  covering  leaks  in  pipes  or  hoses,  e.g.  hose--menders   [F16L55/16  and   
E03]   
Investigating  fluid  tightness  of  structures,  by  detecting  the  presence  of  fluid  at  the  leakage  point   
[G01M  3/08  or   
G01M  3/14  or   
G01M  3/18  or   
G01M  3/22  or   
G01M  3/28]  and   
E03   
2.2. SUPPLY--SIDE TECHNOLOGIES (water availability)  
2.2.1. Water collection (rain, surface and ground--water)  
Underground water collection  
Use  of  pumping  plants  or  installations   E03B  5   
Methods  or  installations  for  obtaining  or  collecting  drinking  water  or  tap  water  from  underground   E03B  3/06--26   
Surface water collection  
Methods  or  installations  for  drawing--off  water   E03B  9   
Methods  or  installations  for  obtaining  or  collecting  drinking  water  or  tap  water  from  surface  water   E03B  3/04;;  28--38   
Rainwater water collection  
Methods  or  installations  for  obtaining  or  collecting  drinking  water  or  tap  water  from  rainwater     E03B  3/02   
Special  vessels  for  collecting  or  storing  rain--water  for  use  in  the  household,  e.g.  water--butts   E03B  3/03   
Not elsewhere classified  
Methods  or  installations  for  obtaining  or  collecting  drinking  water  or  tap  water;;  rainwater,  surface  water,  or  groundwater   E03B  3/00   
E03B  3/40   
2.2.2. Water storage  
Arrangements  or  adaptations  of  tanks  for  water  supply     E03B  11   
2.2.3. Desalination of sea water  
[Search  strategy  under  development]     
   
   
 
3. BIODIVERSITY PROTECTION AND ECOSYSTEM HEALTH IPC or CPC cLAss 
[Search  strategy  currently  not  available]   
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4. CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION technologies related to energy generation, transmission of distribution Y02E 
4.1. RENEWABLE ENERGY GENERATION Y02E10 
4.1.1.  Wind  energy   Y02E10/70   
Wind  turbines  with  rotation  axis  in  wind  direction:  blades  or  rotors,  components  or  gearbox,  control  of  turbines,  
generator,   
nacelles,  onshore  and  offshore  towers   
Wind  turbines  with  rotation  axis  perpendicular  to  the  wind  direction   
Power  conversion  electric  or  electronic  aspects;;  for  grid--connected  applications;;  concerning  power  management  
inside   
the  plant,  e.g.  battery  (dis)charginG,  operation,  hybridisation   
Y02E10/70--766   
4.1.2.  Solar  thermal  energy   Y02E10/40   
Tower  concentrators;;  Dish  collectors;;  Fresnel  lenses;;  Heat  exchange  systems;;  Trough  concentrators   
Conversion  of  thermal  power  into  mechanical  power,  e.g.  Rankine,  Stirling  solar  thermal  engines;;  Thermal  updraft   
Mountings  or  tracking       
Y02E10/40--47   
4.1.3.  Solar  photovoltaic  (PV)  energy   Y02E10/50   
PV  systems  with  concentrators       
Material  technologies:  CuInSe2  material  PV  cells;;  Dye  sensitized  solar  cells;;  Solar  cells  from  group  II--VI  
materials;;  Solar   
cells  from  group  III--V  materials;;  Microcrystalline  silicon  PV  cells;;  Polycrystalline  silicon  PV  cells;;  Monocrystalline  
silicon   
PV  cells;;  Amorphous  silicon  PV  cells;;  Organic  PV  cells   
Power  conversion  electric  or  electronic  aspects:  for  Grid--connected  applications;;  concerninG  power  management  
inside   
the  plant,  e.G.  battery  (dis)charGinG,  operation,  hybridisation;;  Maximum  power  point  trackinG  [MPPT]  systems       
Y02E10/50--58   
4.1.4.  Solar  thermal--PV  hybrids   Y02E10/60   
4.1.5.  Geothermal  energy   Y02E10/10   
Earth  coil  heat  exchangers;;  Compact  tube  assemblies,  e.g.  Geothermal  probes       
Systems  injecting  medium  directly  into  Ground,  e.g.  hot  dry  rock  system,  underground  water       
Systems  injecting  medium  into  a  closed  well       
Systems  exchanging  heat  with  fluids  in  pipes,  e.g.  fresh  water  or  waste  water       
Y02E10/10--18   
4.1.6.  Marine  energy   Y02E10/30   
Oscillating  water  column  [OWC]     
Ocean  thermal  energy  conversion  [OTEC]     
Salinity  gradient       
Wave  energy  or  tidal  swell,  e.g.  Pelamis--type       
Y02E10/30--38   
4.1.7.  Hydro  energy   Y02E10/20   
Conventional,  e.g.  with  dams,  turbines  and  waterwheels   
Tidal,  stream  or  damless  hydropower,  e.g.  sea  flood  and  ebb,  river,  stream       
Y02E10/20--28   
4.2. ENERGY GENERATION FROM FUELS OF NON--FOSSIL ORIGIN Y02E50 
4.2.1.  Biofuels   Y02E50/10   
CHP  turbines  for  biofeed;;  gas  turbines  for  biofeed   
Bio--diesel   
Bio--pyrolysis;;  Torrefaction  of  biomass   
Cellulosic  bio--ethanol;;  grain  bio--ethanol;;  Bio--alcohols  produced  by  other  means  than  fermentation       
Y02E50/10--18   
4.2.2.  Fuel  from  waste   Y02E50/30   
Synthesis  of  alcohols  or  diesel  from  waste  including  a  pyrolysis  and/or  gasification  step   
Methane  production  by  fermentation  of  organic  by--products,  e.g.  sludge;;  Methane  from  landfill  gas       
Y02E50/30--346   
4.3. COMBUSTION TECHNOLOGIES WITH MITIGATION POTENTIAL (e.g. using fossil fuels, BiomAss, wAste, etc.) Y02E20 
4.3.1.  Technologies  for  improved  output  efficiency  (Combined  heat  and  power,  combined  cycles,  etc.)   Y02E20/10--185     
Heat  utilisation  in  combustion  or  incineration  of  waste   Y02E20/12   
Combined  heat  and  power  generation  [CHP]   Y02E20/14   
Combined  cycle  power  plant  [CCPP],  or  combined  cycle  gas  turbine  [CCGT]     Y02E20/16   
Integrated  gasification  combined  cycle  [IGCC]       Y02E20/18     
combined  with  carbon  capture  and  storage  [CCS]     Y02E20/185     
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4.3.2.  Technologies  for  improved  input  efficiency  (Efficient  combustion  or  heat  usage)   Y02E20/30--366   
Direct  CO2  mitigation:  Use  of  synair,  i.e.  a  mixture  of  recycled  CO2  and  pure  O2;;  Use  of  reactants  before  or  
during   
combustion;;  Segregation  from  fumes,  including  use  of  reactants  downstream  from  combustion  or  deep  cooling;;  
Controls   
of  combustion  specifically  inferring  on  CO2  emissions     
Indirect  CO2  mitigation,  i.e.  by  acting  on  non  CO2  directly  related  matters  of  the  process,  e.g.  more  efficient  use  
of  fuels:   
Cold  flame;;  Oxyfuel  combustion;;  Unmixed  combustion;;  Air  pre--heatinG       
Heat  recovery  other  than  air  pre--heatinG:  at  fumes  level,  at  burner  level       
   
4.4. NUCLEAR ENERGY Y02E30 
4.4.1.  Nuclear  fusion  reactors      
Magnetic  plasma  confinement  [MPC]:  Tokamaks;;  Stellarators;;  Other  reactors  with  MPC;;  First  wall,  divertor,  
blanket   
Inertial  plasma  confinement:  Injection  systems  and  targets   
Low  temperature  fusion,  e.g.  "cold  fusion"   
Y02E  30/10--18     
4.4.2.  Nuclear  fission  reactors      
Boiling  water  reactors;;  Pressurized  water  reactors;;  gas  cooled  reactors;;  Fast  breeder  reactors;;  Liquid  metal  
reactors;;   
Pebble  bed  reactors;;  Accelerator  driven  reactors   
Fuel   
Control  of  nuclear  reactions   
Other  aspects  relatinG  to  nuclear  fission   
Y02E  30/30--40   
4.5. TECHNOLOGIES FOR AN EFFICIENT ELECTRICAL POWER GENERATION, TRANSMISSION OR DISTRIBUTION 
   
Y02E40 
   
4.5.1.  Superconducting  electric  elements  or  equipment   Y02E40/60--69   
Superconducting  generators:  Superconducting  synchronous  generators;;  Superconducting  homopolar  generators   
Superconducting  transmission  lines  or  power  lines  or  cables  or  installations  thereof   
Superconducting  transformers  or  inductors   
Superconducting  energy  storage  for  power  networks,  e.g.  SME,  superconducting  magnetic  storage   
Protective  or  switching  arrangements  for  superconducting  elements  or  equipment   
Current  limitation  using  superconducting  elements,  including  multifunctional  current  limiters   
   
4.5.2.  Not  elsewhere  classified      
Flexible  AC  transmission  systems  [FACTS]   
Static  VAR  compensators  [SVC],  static  VAR  generators  [SVG]  or  static  VAR  systems  [SVS],  including  thyristor-
-controlled   
reactors  [TCR],  thyristor--switched  reactors  [TSR]  or  thyristor--switched  capacitors  [TSC]   
Thyristor--controlled  series  capacitors  [TCSC]   
Static  synchronous  compensators  [STATCOM]   
Unified  power  flow  controllers  [UPF]  or  controlled  series  voltage  compensators   
Y02E40/10--18   
Active  power  f lt ring  [APF]   
Non--specified  or  voltage--fed  active  power  filters   
Current--fed  active  power  filters;;  using  a  multilevel  or  multicell  converter   
Y02E40/20--26   
Reactive  power  compensation   
Reactive  power  compensation;;  using  synchronous  generators;;  for  voltage  regulation   
Y02E40/30--34   
Arrangements  for  reducing  harmonics   Y02E40/40   
Arrangements  for  eliminating  or  reducing  asymmetry  in  polyphase  networks   Y02E40/50   
Smart  Grids   
Systems  characterised  by  the  monitoring,  control  or  operation  of  energy  generation  units,  e.g.  distributed  
generation   
[DER]  or  load--side  generation;;  Systems  characterised  by  the  monitoring,  control  or  operation  of  flexible  AC  
transmission   
systems  [FaCTS]  or  power  factor  or  reactive  power  compensatinG  or  correctinG  units;;  ComputinG  methods  or  
systems  for   
efficient  or  low  carbon  manaGement  or  operation  of  electric  power  systems   
Y02E40/70   
4.6. ENABLING TECHNOLOGIES (TechnoLogies with potentiaL or indirect contriBution to emissions mitigation) Y02E60 
4.6.1. Energy storage Y02E60/10--17   
4.6.1.1. Batteries   Y02E60/12     
Lithium--ion  batteries   
Alkaline  secondary  batteries,  e.g.  NiCd  or  NiMH   
Lead--acid  batteries   
Hybrid  cells       
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4.6.1.2.  Capacitors   Y02E60/13     
Ultracapacitors,  supercapacitors,  double--layer  capacitors      
4.6.1.3.  Thermal  storage   Y02E60/14   
Sensible  heat  storage,  latent  heat  storage,  Cold  storage      
4.6.1.4.  Pressurised  fluid  storage   Y02E60/15     
4.6.1.5.  Mechanical  storag   Y02E60/16     
Mechanical  energy  storage,  e.g.  flywheels          
4.6.1.6.  Pumped  storage   Y02E60/17     
4.6.2. Hydrogen technology Y02E60/30--368 
Hydrogen  storage:  Storage  of  liquefied,  solidified,  or  compressed  hydrogen  in  containers;;  Storage  in  caverns;;  
Reversible   
uptake  of  hydrogen  by  an  appropriate  medium  (e.g.  carbon,  metal,  rare  earth  metal,  metal  alloy,  organic  
compound)   
Hydrogen  distribution   
Hydrogen  production  from  non--carbon  containing  sources:  by  chemical  reaction  with  metal  hydrides,  e.g.  
hydrolysis  of  metal  borohydrides;;  by  decomposition  of  inorganic  compounds,  e.g.  splitting  of  water  other  than  
electrolysis,  ammonia   
borane;;  by  electrolysis  of  water;;  by  photo--electrolysis   
   
4.6.3. Fuel cells Y02E60/50--566 
Fuel  cells   
characterised  by  type  or  design:  Proton  Exchange  Membrane  Fuel  Cells  [PEMFC],  Direct  Alcohol  Fuel  Cells  
[DAFC],   
Direct  Methanol  Fuel  Cells  [DMFC];;  Solid  Oxide  Fuel  Cells  [SOFC];;  Molten  Carbonate  Fuel  Cells  [MCFC];;  Bio  
Fuel  Cells;;   
Regenerative  or  indirect  fuel  cells,  e.g.  redox  flow  type  batteries       
integrally  combined  with  other  energy  production  systems:  Cogeneration  of  mechanical  energy,  e.g.  integral  
combination   
of  fuel  cells  and  electric  motors;;  Production  of  chemical  products  inside  the  fuel  cell;;  incomplete  combustion       
   
4.6.4. SmArt grids in the energy sector Y02E60/70 
Systems  integrating  technol gie   related  to  power  network  operation  and  communi ation  or  informati n  
technologies   
mediating  in  the  improvement  of  the  carbon  footprint  of  electrical  power  generation,  transmission  or  distribution,  
i.e.  smart   
grids  as  enabling  technology  in  the  energy  generation  sector   
Y02E60/70--7892   
   
4.7. OTHER ENERGY CONVERSION OR MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS REDUCING GHG EMISSIONS 
   
Y02E70 
   
Hydrogen  from  electrolysis  with  energy  of  non--fossil  origin,  e.g.  PV,  wind  power,  nuclear     
Systems  combining  fuel  cells  with  production  of  fuel  of  non--fossil  origin     
Systems  combining  energy  storage  with  energy  generation  of  non--fossil  origin   
Energy  efficient  batteries,  ultracapacitors,  supercapacitors  or  double--layer  capacitors  charging  or  discharging  
systems  or  methods,  e.g.  auxiliary  power  consumption  reduction,  resonant  chargers  or  discharGers,  resistive  
losses  minimisation   
   
 
5. CAPTURE, STORAGE, SEQUESTRATION OR DISPOSAL OF GREENHOUSE GASES 
   
Y02C 
   
5.1. CO2 CAPTURE OR STORAGE (CCS) Y02C10 
Capture  by  biological  separation   
Capture  by  chemical  separation   
Capture  by  absorption   
Capture  by  adsorption   
Capture  by  membranes  or  diffusion   
Capture  by  rectification  and  condensation   
Subterranean  or  submarine  CO2  storage   
Y02C10/00--14     
5.2. CAPTURE OR DISPOSAL OF GREENHOUSE GASES OTHER THAN CO2 Y02C20 
of  nitrous  oxide  (N2O)   
of  methane   
of  perfluorocarbons  [PFC],  hydrofluorocarbons  [HFC]  or  sulfur  hexafluoride  [SF6]   
Y02C20/00--30     
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6. CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION technologies related to TRANSPORTATION Y02T 
6.1. ROAD TRANSPORT Y02T10 
6.1.1. Conventional Vehicles (Based on internal combustion engine) Y02T10/10--56 
Integrated approaches  
Technologies  for  the  improvement  of  indicated  efficiency  of  a  conventional  internal  combustion  engine  (ICE)   
o Adding  non  fuel  substances  to  fuel,  air  or  fuel/air  mixture   
o Fuel  injection   
o Combustion  chambers  and  charge  mixing  enhancing  inside  the  combustion  chamber   
o Treating  fuel,  air  or  air/fuel  mixture   
o Methods  of  operating,  e.g.  homogeneous  charge  compression  ignition  [HCCI],  premixed  charge  
compression   
ignition  [PCCI]   
Technologies  for  the  improvement  of  mechanical  efficiency  of  a  conventional  ICE   
o Methods  of  operating,  e.g.  Atkinson  cycle,  Ericsson   
o Non  naturally  aspirated  engines,  e.g.  turbocharging,  supercharging   
o Charge  mixing  enhancing  and  kinetic  or  wave  energy  of  charge  outside  the  combustion  chamber,  i.e.  
ICE  with   
external  or  indirect  fuel  injection   
o Downsizing  or  downspeeding   
Energy  recuperation  from  low  temperature  heat  sources  of  the  ICE  to  produce  additional  power   
o Turbocompound  engines   
o Waste  heat  recovering  cycles  or  thermoelectric  systems   
Non--reciprocating  piston  engines,  e.g.  rotating  motors   
Varying  inlet  or  exhaust  valve  operating  characteristics   
Engine  management  systems   
o controlling  air  supply;;  controlling  fuel  supply;;  controlling  ignition   
o Exhaust  feedback   
o Switching  off  the  internal  combustion  engine,  e.g.  stop  and  go   
Intelligent  control  systems  e.g.  conjoint  control   
o relating  to  internal  combustion  engine  fuel  consumption   
o relating  to  internal  combustion  engine  emissions   
o Optimising  drivetrain  operating  point   
Y02T10/12--18   
Y02T10/40--48   
Y02T10/50--56     
Post--combustion approaches  
Exhaust  after--treatment   
o Three  way  catalyst  technology,  i.e.  oxidation  or  reduction  at  stoichiometric  equivalence  ratio   
o Selective  Catalytic  Reactors  for  reduction  in  oxygen  rich  atmosphere   
o Thermal  conditioning  of  exhaust  after--treatment   
Y02T10/20--26   
Fuel substitution    
Use  of  alternative  fuels   
o Gaseous  fuels   
o Non--Gaseous  fuels   
o Multiple  fuels,  e.g.  multi  fuel  engines   
o Non--fossil  fuels   
Y02T10/30--38   
6.1.2. Hybrid Vehicles Y02T10/62 
using  ICE  and  mechanical  energy  storage,  e.g.  flywheel   
using  ICE  and  fluidic  energy  storage,  e.g.  pressure  accumulator   
using  ICE  and  electric  energy  storage,  i.e.  battery,  capacitor:  of  the  series  type  or  range  extenders;;  of  the  parallel  
type;;  of   
the  series--parallel  type;;  with  motor  integrated  into  gearbox;;  Driving  a  plurality  of  axles;;  provided  with  means  for  
plug--in   
Combining  different  types  of  energy  storage:  Battery  and  capacitor;;  Battery  and  mechanical  or  fluidic  energy  
storage   
Control  systems  for  power  distribution  between  ICE  and  other  motor  or  motors;;  Predicting  future  driving  conditions   
Other  types  of  combustion  engine   
Y02T10/62--6295   
6.1.3. Electric Vehicles  
Electric machine technologies for applications in electromobility    
Electric  machine  technologies  for  applications  in  electromobility     
o characterised  by  aspects  of  the  electric  machine   
o Control  strategies  of  electric  machines  for  automotive  applications   
o Control  strategies  for  ac  machines  other  than  vector  control   
o Control  strategies  for  dc  machines   
o Number  of  electric  drive  machines:  one,  two,  or  more   
Y02T10/64--649   
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Energy storage for electromobility    
Energy  storage  for  electromobility     
Batteries,  e.g.  lithium  ion  battery,  lead  acid  battery   
Capacitors,  supercapacitors  or  ultracapacitors   
Mechanical  energy  storage  devices,  e.g.  flywheels   
Energy  storage  management   
Electromobility--specific  charging  systems  or  methods  for  batteries,  ultracapacitors,  supercapacitors  or  double--layer   
capacitors   
Y02T10/70--7094   
Electric energy management in electromobility      
Electric  energy  management  in  electromobility   
Electric  power  conversion  within  the  vehicle   
Optimisation  of  vehicle  performance   
o automated  control   
o Desired  performance  achievement   
o Optimisation  of  energy  management   
o Route  optimisation   
Y02T10/72--7291   
6.1.4. Fuel efficiency--improVing Vehicle design (common to all road Vehicles)  
Technologies  aiming  to  reduce  greenhouse  gas  (GHG)  emissions  common  to  all  road  transportation  technologies   
Tools  or  systems  for  aerodynamic  design   
Data  processing  systems  or  methods,  management,  administration   
Optimisation  of  rolling  resistance:  Tyres,  e.g.  materials,  shape;;  Bearings;;  Others,  e.g.  wheel  construction   
Optimized  components  or  subsystems  e.g.  lighting,  actively  controlled  glasses   
Energy  harvesting  concepts  as  power  supply  for  auxiliaries'  energy  consumption  e.g.  photovoltaic  sun--roof   
Energy  efficient  charging  or  discharging  systems  for  batteries,  ultracapacitors,  supercapacitors  or  double--layer  
capacitors   
specially  adapted  for  vehicles   
Energy--efficient  charging  or  discharging  systems  for  batteries,  ultracapacitors,  supercapacitors  or  double--layer  
capacitors   
adapted  for  road  vehicles     
Y02T10/80--86   
Y02T10/90--92   
6.2. RAIL TRANSPORT 
   
Y02T30   
Transportation  of  goods  or  passengers  via  railways   
Energy  recovery  technologies  concerning  the  propulsion  system  in  locomotives  or  motor  railcars   
o In  electric  locomotives  or  motor  railcars  with  electric  accumulators,  e.g.  involving  regenerative  braking   
o In  locomotives  or  motor  railcars  with  pneumatic  accumulators   
o In  locomotives  or  motor  railcars  with  two  or  different  kinds  or  types  of  engine   
o Specific  power  storing  devices   
Other  technological  aspects  of  railway  vehicles   
o Reducing  air  resistance  by  modifying  contour   
o Composite;;  Lightweight  materials   
o Device  for  using  the  energy  of  the  movements  of  the  vehicle   
o Bogie  frames  comprising  parts  made  from  fiber--reinforced  matrix  material   
o Applications  of  solar  cells  or  heat  pipes,  e.g.  on  ski--lift  cabins  or  carriages  for  passengers  or  goods   
o concerning  heating,  ventilating  or  air  conditioning   
Y02T30/00--42   
6.3. AIR TRANSPORT 
   
Y02T50   
Aeronautics  or  air  transport   
Drag  reduction   
o Overall  configuration,  shape  or  profile  of  fuselage  or  wings   
o Adaptive  structures:  Morphing  wings  or  smart  wings   
o by  influencing  airflow:  Wing  tip  vortex  reduction;;  Winglets   
o by  influencing  the  boundary  layer   
Wing  lift  efficiency   
o Optimised  high  lift  wing  systems   
o Helicopter  rotor  blades  lift  efficiency   
Weight  reduction   
o Airframe:  Materials  (composites,  metallic  lightweight);;  Design  measures   
o Interior:  Materials;;  Design  measures   
On  board  measures  aiming  to  increase  energy  efficiency   
o concerning  the  electrical  systems:  Energy  recovery,  conversion  or  storage;;  Electric  actuators  or  motors   
o Thermal  management:  Reduction  of  energy  losses;;  Optimization  of  hot  and  cold  sources  on  board  an  
aircraft   
Efficient  propulsion  technologies   
o Electrical   
o Hybrid   
o Propellers   
o Relevant  aircraft  propulsion  technologies:  Measures  to  reduce  the  propulsor  weight  (e.g.  using  
composites);Improving  the  rotor  blades  aerodynamic;;  Enabling  an  increased  combustion  temperature  by  
cooling;;  Controlling  the  propulsor  to  control  the  emissions;;  using  fuels  of  non--fossil  origin   
Y02T50/00--90   
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o Solar  cells  as  on  board  power  source   
Enabling  use  of  sustainable  fuels   
o Synthetic  fuels   
o Bio  fuels   
Energy  efficient  operational  measures   
o Related  to  ground  operations:  aircraft  equipment,  e.g.  wheel  embedded;;  ground  equipment   
o Related  to  management  of  trajectory  and  mission   
Eco  design,  i.e.  taking  into  account  the  full  life  cycle  of  the  craft  including  re--use,  recyclability  and  disposal   
 
6.4. MARITIME OR WATERWAYS TRANSPORT 
   
Y02T  70   
Maritime  or  waterways  transport   
Measures  concerning  design  or  construction  of  watercraft  hulls   
o Improving  hydrodynamics  of  hull:  reducing  surface  friction  (air  lubrication,  air  cavity  systems;;  hull  
coatings,  e.g.   
biomimicry),  lower  wave  resistance  (bow  shape),  improving  wake  pattern  (reducing  the  interaction  
between  hull   
and  propeller)   
o Construction  of  hull:  materials  (e.g.  ultra  light  steels,  composites);;  energy  efficient  measures  related  to   
fabrication  or  assembly  of  hull   
Measures  at  the  maintenance  or  repair  stage  specially  aiming  at  gHg  emissions  reduction   
o Surface  or  tank  cleaning  and  treatment  operations   
o Improved  operation  of  fossil  fuel  transfer,  e.g.  ship--to--ship  oil  or  gas  transfer   
o Handling  waste   
Measures  to  reduce  GHG  emissions  related  to  the  propulsion  system   
o Propulsion  power  plant   
Relating  to  type  of  fuel:  Less  carbon--intensive  fuels  (e.g.  natural  gas,  biofuels);;  Non-
-conventional fuels  (e.g.  nuclear)   
Renewable  or  hybrid--electric  solutions  (e.g.  solar,  wind)   
Other  measures  to  increase  efficiency  of  the  power  plant:  Engine  monitoring  and  control;;  
Waste  heat  recovery;;  Reducing  auxiliary  power   
o Propeller   
Improved  propeller  design   
Recovery  of  rotational  energy   
Wake  equalizing  arrangements   
o Jets   
o Propulsion  by  direct  use  of  wind:  Energy--efficient  technologies  involving  sails;;  Kites   
o Other  propulsion  concepts  for  reducing  GHG  emissions,  e.g.  wave--powered   
Technologies  for  a  more  efficient  operation  of  the  waterborne  vessel  not  otherwise  provided  for   
o Related  to  heatinG,  ventilation,  air  conditioninG,  or  refriGeration  systems   
o InteGratinG  maritime  voyaGe  control:  Speed  reduction;;  Weather  routinG;;  Course  optimization   
Measures  concerninG  recyclinG,  retrofittinG  or  dismantlinG  of  waterborne  vessels   
Port  equipment  or  systems  reducinG  GHG  emissions   
Y02T  70/00--90   
6.5. ENABLING TECHNOLOGIES IN TRANSPORT 
   
Y02T90   
6.5.1. Electric Vehicle charging  
Electric  charging  stations   
o by  conductive  energy  transmission;;  by  inductive  energy  transmission   
o by  exchange  of  energy  storage  elements   
o alignment  between  the  vehicle  and  the  charging  station   
o Converters  or  inverters  for  charging   
Plug--in  electric  vehicles   
Information  or  communication  technologies  [ICT]  improving  the  operation  of  electric  vehicles   
o Navigation   
o ICT  for  charging  station  selection  (suitability,  location,  availability)   
o Smart  grids  as  interface  for  battery  charging  of  electric  and  hybrid  vehicles;;  Remote  or  cooperative  
charging   
operation;;  aspects  supporting  the  interoperability  of  electric  or  hybrid  vehicles,  e.g.  recognition,  
authentication,  identification  or  billing   
 
 
Y02T  90/10--169   
6.5.2. Application of fuel cell and hydrogen technology to transportation  
Application  of  fuel  cell  technology  to  transportation   
o Fuel  cells  specially  adapted  to  transport  applications,  e.g.  automobile,  bus,  ship   
o Fuel  cell  powered  electric  vehicles  [FCEV]   
o Fuel  cells  as  on--board  power  source  in  aeronautics   
o Fuel  cells  as  on--board  power  source  in  waterborne  transportation   
Application  of  hydrogen  technology  to  transportation   
o Hydrogen  as  fuel  for  road  transportation   
o Hydrogen  as  fuel  in  aeronautics   
o Hydrogen  as  fuel  in  waterborne  transportation   
Y02T  90/30--38   
Y02T  90/40--46   
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7. CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION technologies related to buildings  Y02B 
7.1. INTEGRATION OF RENEWABLE ENERGY SOURCES IN BUILDINGS Y02B10 
Photovoltaic  [PV]:  Roof  systems  for  PV  cells;;  PV  hubs   
Solar  thermal:  Evacuated  solar  collectors;;  Air  conditioning  or  refrigeration  systems   
Wind  power   
Geothermal  heat--pumps   
Hydropower  in  dwellings   
Use  of  biomass  for  heating   
Hybrid  systems;;  Uninterruptible  or  back--up  power  supplies  integrating  renewable  energies   
Y02B  10/00--72   
7.2. ENERGY EFFICIENCY IN BUILDINGS  
7.2.1.  Lighting   Y02B20   
Energy--efficient  lighting:   
Energy  saving  technologies  for  incandescent  lamps,  e.g.  halogen  lamps   
gas  discharge  lamps,  e.g.  fluorescent  lamps,  high--intensity  discharge  lamps  [HID],  or  molecular  radiators   
Semiconductor  lamps,  e.g.  solid  state  lamps  [SSL],  light  emitting  diodes  [LED],  or  organic  LED  [OLED]   
Control  techniques  providing  energy  savings,  e.g.  timing  or  schedule,    detection  of  the  user,  detection  of  the  
illumination  level   
Used  in  particular  applications  (e.g.  in  street  lighting)   
Y02B  20/00--72   
7.2.2.  Heating,  ventilation  or  air  conditioning  [HVAC]   Y02B30   
Energy--efficient  HVAC  systems:   
relating  to  domestic  heating,  space  heating  or  domestic  hot  water  heating  or  supply  systems  [DHW]     
o using  boilers  (condensing  boilers;;  modular  boilers)   
o Hot  water  central  heating  systems  using  heat  pumps   
o Central  heating  systems  having  more  than  one  heat  source   
o Central  heating  systems  using  steam  or  condensate  extracted  or  exhausted  from  steam  engine  plants   
o Domestic  hot--water  supply  systems  using  recuperated  or  waste  heat   
o Heat  consumers:  i.e.  devices  to  provide  the  end  user  with  heat  (e.g.  low--temperature  radiators  with  
increased  heat--exchange  surface;;  heating  arrangements  used  in  combination  with  water  central  heating  
system)     
Systems  profiting  of  external/internal  conditions   
o Heat  recovery  pumps,  i.e.  heat  pump  based  systems  or  units  able  to  transfer  the  thermal  energy  from  
one  area  of  the  premises  or  part  of  the  facilities  to  a  different  one,  improving  the  overall  efficiency   
o Free--cooling  systems  (e.g.  air  based,  using  dew  point  control,  "Canadian  well")   
o Heat  recovery  units  (air  to  air;;  water  to  water)   
Other  technologies  for  heating  or  cooling   
o Absorption  based  systems  (e.g.  integrating  CHP  generation  systems,  i.e.  trigeneration)   
o Adsorption  based  systems   
o Magnetic  cooling   
Efficient  control  or  regulation  technologies     
o Electric  or  electronic  refrigerant  flow  control   
o Technologies  based  on  motor  control  (e.g.  speed  regulation  of  the  compressor/pumps/fans;;  condensing  
pressure  control)   
o Centralised  control  (e.g.  of  heating  or  domestic  hot  water  [DHW]  systems;;  of  refrigeration  machines,  
plants  or  systems,  including  combined  heating  and  refrigeration  systems;;  of  air  distribution  systems)   
o Ventilation  adapted  to  air  quality   
                    Ultrasonic  humidifiers  Passive  houses;;  Double  facade  technology   
Y02B  30/00--94   
7.2.3.  Home  appliances   Y02B40   
Technologies  aiming  at  improving  the  efficiency  of  home  appliances   
Relating  to  domestic  cooking     
o Induction  cooking  in  kitchen  stoves  (e.g.  control  circuit,  coil)   
o Microwave  ovens  (e.g.  control  circuit,  magnetron)   
o Improved  cooking  stoves  (e.g.  fuel--efficient  biomass  cooking  stoves,  fuel--efficient  gas  cooking  stoves)   
o Solar  cooking  stoves  or  furnaces     
Relating  to  refrigerators  or  freezers  (e.g.  compressors,  fans,  thermal  insulation)     
Relating  to  dish--washers  (e.g.  pumps,  heat  recovery  of  washing  water,  optimisation  of  water  quantity  of  hot  water)   
Relating  to  washing  machines  (e.g.  drum  or  pumps,  heat  recovery,  optimisation  of  water  quantity,  solar  heating)   
Relating  to  laundry  dryers  (e.g.  drum  or  fans,  solar  heating)   
Related  to  vacuum  cleaners   
Energy  efficient  batteries,  ultracapacitors,  supercapacitors  or  double--layer  capacitors  charging  or  discharging  
systems  or  methods  specially  adapted  for  portable  applications   
Y02B  40/00--90   
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7.2.4.  Elevators,  escalators  and  moving  walkways   Y02B50   
Energy--efficient  elevators,  escalators  and  moving  walkways:   
in  elevators     
o Energy  saving  technologies  (e.g.  by  adapted  call  allocation,  by  adapting  the  motion  profile)   
o Energy  recuperation  technologies  (e.g.  with  electrical,  mechanical,  or  pressure  storage  or  by  delivering  
current  to  the  grid)  in  escalators  and  moving  walkways   
o Energy  saving  technologies  (e.g.  by  adapting  the  motion  profile)   
o Energy  recuperation  technologies   
Y02B  50/00--24   
7.2.5.  Information  and  communication  technologies   Y02B60   
Information  and  communication  technologies  [ICT]  technologies  aiming  at  the  reduction  of  own  energy  use:   
Energy  efficient  computing     
o Reducing  energy--consumption  at  the  single  machine  level,  e.g.  processors,  personal  computers,  
peripheral   
devices,  power  supply  (e.g.  low--power  processors,  performance  modes,  cooling  means,  power  mgmt)   
o Reducing  energy--consumption  by  means  of  multiprocessor  or  multiprocessing  based  techniques,  other  
than  acting  upon  the  power  supply  (e.g.  resource  allocation,  scheduling,  virtualisation,  consolidation,  load   
distribution)   
o Reducing  energy--consumption  in  distributed  systems  (e.g.  delegation  or  migration,    resource  sharing)   
o Reducing  energy  consumption  at  software  or  application  level  (e.g.  compilation;;  installation;;  feedback,   
prediction,  usage  patterns;;  suspending  or  hibernating,  performance  or  eco--modes;;  information  retrieval  
in  databases)   
Techniques  for  reducing  energy--consumption  in  wire--line  communication  networks   
o using  reduced  link  rate     
o using  subset  functionality   
o by  operating  in  low--power  or  sleep  mode   
High  level  techniques  for  reducing  energy--consumption  in  communication  networks   
o by  proxying     
o by  energy--aware  routing     
o by  signaling  and  coordination   
o green  peer--to--peer   
Techniques  for  reducing  energy--consumption  in  wireless  communication  networks   
Y02B  60/00--50   
7.2.6.  End--user  side   Y02B70   
Technologies  for  an  efficient  end--user  side  electric  power  management  and  consumption:   
Technologies  improving  the  efficiency  by  using  switched--mode  power  supplies,  i.e.  efficient  power  electronics  
conversion   
o Power  factor  correction  technologies  for  power  supplies   
o Reduction  of  losses  in  power  supplies   
o Efficient  standby  or  energy  saving  modes,  e.g.  detecting  absence  of  load  or  auto--off   
Systems  integrating  technologies  related  to  power  network  operation  and  ICT  for  improving  the  carbon  footprint,  i.e.  
smart  grids  supporting  the  management  or  operation  of  end--user  stationary  applications   
o End--user  application  control  systems  (e.g.  load  shedding,  peak  shaving,  other  demand  response  
systems;;  domotics  or  building  automation  systems)   
o Smart  metering  supporting  the  carbon  neutral  operation  of  end--user  applications  in  buildings   
Systems  which  determine  the  environmental  impact  of  user  behaviour   
Systems  which  monitor  performance  of  renewable  electricity  generating  systems,  e.G.  solar  
panels   
Y02B  70/00--346   
7.3. ARCHITECTURAL OR CONSTRUCTIONAL ELEMENTS IMPROVING THE THERMAL PERFORMANCE OF BUILDINGS Y02B80 
Architectural  or  constructional  elements  improving  the  thermal  performance  of  buildings:   
Insulation  (e.g.  slab  shaped  vacuum  insulation,  aerogel  insulation)     
Windows  or  doors  (e.g.  vacuum  glazing,  aerogel)   
Roofs  (e.g.  roof  garden  systems,  roof  coverings  with  high  solar  reflectance)   
Floors  specially  adapted  for  storing  heat  or  cold   
Light--dependent  control  systems  for  sun  shading   
Y02B  80/00--50   
7.4. ENABLING TECHNOLOGIES IN BUILDINGS Y02B90 
Enabling  technologies  or  technologies  with  a  potential  or  indirect  contribution  to  GHG  emissions  mitigation:   
Applications  of  fuel  cells  in  buildings     
o Cogeneration  of  electricity  with  other  electric  generators   
o Emergency,  uninterruptible  or  back--up  power  supplies  integrating  fuel  cells     
o Cogeneration  or  combined  heat  and  power  generation,  e.g.  for  domestic  hot  water   
o Fuel  cells  specially  adapted  to  portable  applications,  e.g.  mobile  phone,  laptop   
Systems  integrating  technologies  related  to  power  network  operation  and  ICT  mediating  in  the  improvement  of  the  
carbon  footprint  of  the  management  of  residential  or  tertiary  loads,  i.e.  smart  grids  as  enabling  technology  in  
buildings  sector  (e.g.  related  to  uninterruptible  power  supply  systems,  remote  reading  systems,  etc.)   
Y02B  90/00--2692   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Hascic and Migotto, 2015. 
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Abstract 
This paper aims at shedding some lights on how policy induced uncertainty affects the risk-
return sought by investors in renewable energy generation capacity. To this end, the paper 
focuses on auction design and the ongoing Brexit negotiations. The first section of the 
paper reviews the main characteristics of auction frameworks across Europe and their 
impact on project risk. Then, a stated preference approach is leveraged to investigate how 
policy design and the uncertainty regarding the future arrangements between the UK and 
the EU contributes to determine the cost of equity for renewable energy. The results show 
that improved auction design can help to lower the equity cost between 0.5% and 1.5%, 
while the evidence on Brexit is rather weak and - if anything - suggests only a higher 
relevance of these negotiations for English-based investors than for those based in EU27. 
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3. An experimental approach to climate finance: The impact of 
auction design and policy uncertainty on renewable energy equity 
costs 
3.1. Introduction: Transition models and new policy challenges 
after Paris  
 
The 21st Conference of the Parties (COP21) to the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) reiterated the pressing need to 
strengthen the global efforts to counteract the threat of climate change. To this 
end, a major shift in the way energy is produced is necessary in order to meet the 
ambitious target of limiting the global temperature rise to well below 2 degrees 
Celsius. However, the scale of the required transformation is challenging and the 
IEA/IRENA (2017) calculates that the share of primary energy demand met by 
fossil fuels would need to halve while low-carbon sources (including renewables 
but also nuclear and fossil fuel with carbon capture and storage) would need to 
increase to meet 70% of energy demand by 2050. 
 
Nevertheless, while the challenge is impressive, renewables have shown fast 
learning curves and, in some case, an exponential growth of deployed capacity. 
This rapid progress has been so far promoted through revenue-support policies 
like green certificates (or tradable portfolio standards certificates) and feed-in 
tariffs (FiT) in both developed and developing countries. However, as the 
technology matures and the total costs associated with supporting larger 
installed capacities increase, governments are progressively turning to tenders 
as the main mechanism to promote renewable energy deployment.   This 
preference is driven by several factors, including: the possibility to  more 
precisely plan both the capacity to be connected to the grid and the budget 
spending, reduction of d information asymmetry and increased competition 
among developers. IRENA and CEM (2015) note that at least 60 countries have 
adopted renewable energy auctions by 2015, up from 6 in 2005. This trend is 
likely to accelerate during next years due to the newly adopted “EU guidelines on 
state aid (2016) to the energy field” that established that European countries can 
provide state aid to renewable generators only through competitive bidding by 
2017. 
 
Our main working hypothesis is that, given risk-averse investors, the riskier or 
less well-design policy instruments would (all other things equal) require higher 
return on the investment. Therefore, given the State-supported nature of 
renewable energy investments, higher subsidies are required to keep the risk-
return profile of investments interesting. Within this framework, this paper 
focuses on how the policy planner could improve existing auction frameworks in 
order to expose investors to lower uncertainty and, consequently, decrease the 
subsidies paid. 
 
The paper is structured as it follows. First, the empirical literature on the link 
between policy design and investment decisions is reviewed. Then, the paper 
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discusses the key design options of auction frameworks currently implemented 
by the EU Member States and how these affect project risk. In addition to specific 
policy design options, this section highlights how the broader policy uncertainty 
and the fear of sudden policy shock represent a major road-block to private 
investment. The third section leverages a stated preference approach to shed 
some lights on the impact of selected features of the policy framework on the 
cost of equity for renewable energy by surveying around 40 managers of firms 
that are developers or pure financial investors in these technologies. The results 
show that auction design features can lead to a moderate improvement in 
financing costs by lowering the cost of equity between 0.5% and 1.5%. The 
evidence on Brexit is rather weak and, if anything, suggests the higher relevance 
of these negotiations for English-based investors rather than for those based in 
EU27.  
 
Overall, this paper brings three novel contributions to the literature. First of all, 
it is one of the first studies that tries to quantitatively estimate the impact of 
auction design on renewable energy cost. Secondly, this analysis focuses on the 
cost of capital for renewable energy project, an extremely important variable to 
smooth the low-carbon transition given the capital-intensive nature of these 
investments but rarely studied. Finally, this paper transfers an experimental 
approach that has proven successful in several studies to the field of climate 
finance. 
 
 
3.2. Literature review 
 
Notwithstanding the hypothesis originally put forward by Porter stated that 
“..properly designed environmental regulation can benefit firms [and lead to better 
environmental outcomes]” (Porter and van de Linde, 1995), few theoretical 
contributions examine what exactly a well-designed regulation is. Within these 
studies, the importance of limited policy uncertainty is often highlighted.  For 
instance, de Serres et al (2010) discuss how the chosen environmental policy 
instrument should vary according to the nature of the market failures as well as 
to the institutional capacities of implementing countries. To this end, they use 
five criteria to evaluate different policy instruments, including: cost-
effectiveness, adoption and compliance incentives, uncertainty and stimulus to 
innovation. Johnstone et al (2010) identify four key features that should 
characterize environmental policy aiming at promoting innovation and 
underline once more the importance of limited policy-induced uncertainty. More 
precisely, they list four main features for environmental regulations, including: 
Dynamic efficiency, Uncertainty, Flexibility (defined as the extent to which 
innovators are free to identify the best way to comply with the environmental 
regulation) and Incidence (Does the policy target the environmental objective as 
closely as possible?).   
 
The literature has been mainly conceptualized uncertainty in relation to 
environmental policies in the form of a sudden policy shocks or revenue 
uncertainty. The first stream of the literature underlines the negative impact 
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brought by sudden changes in regulation on firms’ investment and performance. 
The damaging impact of such changes is well-known and applies also to the field 
of environmental regulation (Luthi and Wustenhagen, 2012. IRENA, 2018). 
Instead, a second stream of literature underlines how policy mechanisms differ 
on the revenue certainty that they offer to investors. For example, a green 
trading scheme creates a higher level of variance on expected prices compared to 
fixed feed-in tariff (FiT). In fact, in the latter case, the investors can precisely 
predict the revenues that their project will generate once in operation given that 
the price for each kwh of renewable energy produced is fixed.   Instead, in the 
former case, the uncertainty generated by the normal fluctuation of electricity 
prices adds to the uncertainty linked to the value of the green energy certificates. 
 
In the empirical literature, revenue-uncertainty induced by environmental policy 
has been mainly studied through three strategies: option valuation, experimental 
models and excel based simulations. In the realm of option valuation, one of the 
first contributions is by Lonfreng (2008) who, following the work of Dixit and 
Pindyck (1994), derives the threshold condition for which a firm facing 
uncertainty on the price of a polluting production input will decide to invest in a 
new abatement technology. The link with environmental regulation lies in the 
presence of a tax on a polluting fuel. However, this tax is not subject to 
uncertainty. Kim and Lee (2012) set a constrained maximization model and 
analyze four different FiT structures (Fixed, min price guarantee and two premia 
linked to electricity price variations). Devine et al (2014) move from the 
consideration that different FiT designs do not eliminate market price risk but 
rather transfer this risk to a counterparty. Through a Constant Relative Risk 
Aversion (CRRA) utility function they specify the policymaker’s risk preferences 
and, using Stackelberg game theory and option pricing, identify the optimal FiT 
design.  The key assumption is that the optimal division of risk between 
investors and policymakers/consumers is analogous to the division of risk in the 
design of insurance contracts. Ritzenhofen (2014) uses a real options approach 
to analyze the timing and the likelihood of RES investments of a single investor 
under three different scenarios: (1) fixed FiT regime guaranteeing the investor a 
deterministic and fixed remuneration for every unit of electricity generated, (2) 
electricity is sold on the spot or futures market, (3) the investment decision is 
taken under fixed FIT but the regulator is expected to abolish this FiT regime at 
the certain point in the future. Since his work considers uncertainty as an 
unknown future policy change, it might also be included in the category of 
“sudden policy shock”. 
 
The second strategy used by scholars is based on the “stated preferences” 
approach through conjoint analysis. Importantly, this approach allows 
broadening the scope of analysis above the revenue certainty including other 
aspects of policy design that may affect investment risk. Luthi and Wustnhagen 
(2012) are among the first to introduce a conjoint analysis in the field of 
environmental policy. They leverage a choice experiment (conjoint analysis) to 
evaluate the trade-off for an investor in solar PV among five policy attributes. 
The attributes considered are: ‘Level of tariff’, ‘Duration of tariff’, ‘Existence of a 
cap’ (no cap, 4 years to be reached, 1 year to be reached), ‘Duration of the 
administrative process’ and ‘Policy instability’ (operationalized as the number of 
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significant unexpected policy changes in the last 5 years). Giebel (2011) 
performs a conjoint analysis among German wind onshore investors. They 
compute the “willingness-to-pay” (in terms of more/lower full load hours) to 
have a given policy feature. Then, they build a baseline model and add (or 
subtract) full load hours to determine how the IRR changes. This is interpreted 
as the increased return required to accept a riskier policy design. The attributes 
considered are: Type of FiT (Fixed, variable with cap& floor, premium), ‘Full load 
hours’, ‘shut down compensation’ (Yes or no) and ‘Quantity balancing’ (Yes or 
no). Chassot et al. (2014) leverages a small sample of VC investors to understand 
how their investment decision in renewable energy technologies are taken. The 
attributes considered are: Regulatory risk (“the risk that regulatory agencies will 
change policy decision defined as low, medium, etc.), Return potential, 
Technological maturity, Founder experience, Lead investor (names of famous 
VC), Deal source (Syndicate partner, fair, etc.). Adopting a behavioral approach, 
they introduce in their analysis three questions to capture “views on the world” 
retained by the surveyed investors8. Then, the authors regrouped respondents as 
more or less individualistic and observe how the average part-worth utilities per 
level of regulatory exposure for each sub-group of investors differ. Masini and 
Menichetti (2012) study how the investors’ a-priori beliefs, their preferences 
over policy instruments and their attitude toward technological risk affect the 
likelihood of investing in RE projects. The data are analysed by conjoint analysis 
and multivariate regressions. In this case, the authors consider the following 
attributes: type of Policy instruments  (tax incentives/investment grants, tender 
schemes, FiT, Greeen TS), level of support, duration (years), duration of 
administrative procedure (months), social acceptance of the technology in the 
region. Two questions capture a-priori believes of investors (“how much do you 
agree with…”). An innovative element of this study is that the average attribute 
utility, as estimated through the conjoint approach, is leveraged in an OLS 
regression to evaluate the factors that drive investment in renewable energy. 
Luthi and Prassler (2011) leverage a survey on US and EU developers to perform 
a conjoint analysis on a mix of regulatory elements that include: ‘Total time to 
obtain all permits (years)’, ‘Level of corruption’, ‘Guaranteed grid access (no, yet, 
priority dispatch)’, ‘total remuneration from incentives’, ‘terms of government 
soft loans (0.5% below market rates, 1% below market rate,..)’, ‘% of investment 
cash grants (0, 10%, ..)’. Lüdeke-Freund and Moritz Loock (2010) underline how 
debt ratio can be very high for renewable energy projects (80-90%) and leverage 
an ACBC conjoint on German bank managers, who are responsible for loan 
decisions for PV projects, in order to understand how debt capital providers 
evaluate loan applications. Attributes are: debt service coverage ratio, installed 
capacity, brand quality (low, high) for modules and inverters, initiator, equity. 
Policy induced uncertainty is not included in this study. 
 
                                                        
8 The degree of confidence in market efficiency was assessed by means of the 
following two items: How much do you agree (Likert Scale from 1 to 7) with the 
following statements: (a) Private enterprise is the best way to solve our country’s 
economic problems. (b) If there is no clear need for government, let them stay out of 
the way. (c) We would never invest in a firm that relies on government subsidies. 
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A third group of studies leverages Monte Carlo simulations. Kitzing et all (2014) 
compute mean and variance of returns to investors under a feed-in Tariff (FiT) 
and a feed-in premium (FiP) policies, then compute the Sharpe ratio under the 
two schemes. This way they show that payments have to be higher under the FiP 
scheme in order to achieve the same Sharpe ratio as under the FiT scheme. The 
analysis is carried through Monte Carlo simulations in excel. Falconett (2010) 
assess the effects of governmental grants, FiTs and renewable energy certificates 
on the distribution of NPV values of small-scale hydroelectric, wind energy and 
solar PV systems. The uncertain variables are the output of the renewable energy 
installation (PV and wind) and market prices while the analysis is carried out 
through Monte Carlo simulation in excel.  
 
Finally, a limited number of studies build on experimental or econometric 
methods. For instance, Taschini (2014), who conducts an experiment with 
students, focuses on firms’ investment decisions in abatement technologies 
when an emission-trading scheme is in place and both regulated and not-
regulated agents (eco-groups and speculators) operate in the market. The 
experiment is not meant to focus on uncertainty but the results show that the 
presence of non-regulated companies increases price but does not affect price 
variability. Fagiani et Hakvoort (2013) estimate the impact of both the 
announcement and the actual implementation of the integration of Swedish and 
Norwegian Green certificate markets on certificate prices through a GARCH 
model. The results show increased certificate price volatility contributing to 
exacerbated price risk.  Johnstone et al. (2010) show the negative impact of 
policy uncertainty on environmental innovation. The analysis utilises the WEF 
questionnaire over 2001-2006 on perceptions of the “stability and clarity” of 
policy and leverages a negative binomial model. Kalamova et al. (2013) measure 
uncertainty through a coefficient of variation of government R&D budget. 
 
The above literature review underlines three main gaps. First of all, previous 
studies focused on FiT since these have been the main mechanism to support the 
deployment of renewable technologies during past years. However, auctions are 
emerging as the main incentive to promote investment in renewable energy. The 
reason behind this shift are numerous, including: more precise planning in 
relation to both capacity to be connected to the grid and budget spending, 
reduction of government information asymmetry and increased competition 
among developers. This process is likely to accelerate during next years due to 
the newly adopted “EU guidelines on state aid (2016) to the energy field” that 
established that competitive bidding will be main mechanism through which 
provide state aid for renewable by 20179. Furthermore, while the EU State Aid 
guidelines contain a “de-minimis” rule stating that plants smaller than 1 MW may 
be excluded from tenders, some countries (e.g. France) has already conducted 
tenders for solar roof-top installations above 100 kWp (solar power Europe, 
2016).  
  
Figure 4. Number of governments with renewable energy policy, by type 
                                                        
9 Exceptions can be granted if there is (i) a limited number of project available, (ii) competitive bidding would lead to higher 
support levels and (iii) competitive procedures would results in low projects realization. 
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Note: Governments include countries/states/provinces. Source: REN21 (2016) 
 
Secondly, the literature is largely silent on the impact that the designed policy 
has on the returns required by the investors. This is a relatively surprising gap 
since, given the capital-intensive nature of Renewable Energy Technologies 
(RETs), lowering their financing costs lies at the heart of an efficient low carbon 
transition.  
 
Thirdly, most of contributions consider policy-induced “riskiness” only as 
steaming from the implied revenue variance with the exception of the above 
mentioned conjoint studies.  However, as often underlined in the litterature,  
while the revenue-support mechanism in place is the key driver of the expected 
revenues, several other elements of environmental (and not) regulations are 
likely to affect the project risk/return profile through higher or lower business 
uncertainty or complexity (Ang et al., 2017. OECD, 2015).  
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3.3. Methods 
  
Our main working hypothesis is that, given risk-averse investors, the riskier or 
less well-design policy instruments would (all other things equal) require higher 
return on the investment to compensate for the larger risk. Given the State-
supported nature of renewable energy investments, higher subsidies are 
required to keep the risk-return profile of investments interesting. Within this 
framework, this paper aims at investigating how existing auction frameworks 
can be improved in order to expose investors to lower policy uncertainty and, 
therefore, decrease both the required subsidies and the cost of supporting green 
technologies to the society10. 
 
As in previous studies, we assume that each policy framework (in our case 
auctions) is composed by different attributes, whose levels have an impact on 
investors’ preferences. The impact of these attributes is estimated leveraging an 
experimental approach, namely conjoint analysis. Briefly summarized, a conjoint 
analysis consists in showing the respondents several pairs of products (or policy 
packages) differing for a few attributes (e.g. level of the incentive paid and 
duration of the administrative process) and asking to select their favorite for 
each pair. This process is repeated until it is possible to estimate the respondent 
preference for each attribute. Conjoint analysis is based on the work done in the 
sixties by the mathematical psychologists and statisticians Luce and Turkey 
(1964) and it has been introduced into marketing research in the early 1970s 
(Green and Srinivasan, 1990; Orme, 2007) but it has spread over time to a wide 
array of research communities such as entrepreneurship (Lohrke et al., 2010), 
environmental economics (Ahn et al., 2008; Boxall et al., 1996; Casey et al., 2008; 
Chattopadhyay, 2009; Farber and Griner, 2000; Glenn et al., 2010; Roe et al., 
1996), transportation economics (Hensher,1994; Hensher, 2010; Train and 
Wilson, 2008) and energy efficiency research (Banfi et al., 2008; Moxnes, 2004; 
Poortinga et al., 2003).  
 
Among different methodologies, the adaptive choice-based conjoint analysis 
(ACBC) is the most used design in the literature on policy frameworks 
evaluation. In fact, this has been leveraged by virtually all studies surveyed 
(Chassot et all, 2014. Gamel et all, 2016, Luthi and Prassler, 2012. Masini et 
Menichetti, 2012) except for Luthi and Wüstenhagen (2012) where the authors 
prefer a simple adaptive conjoin analysis (ACA). The ACBC approach builds on 
two older methods for conjoint analysis: the Choice-Based Conjoint (CBC) and 
the Adaptive conjoint analysis (ACA). The CBC presents respondents with 
potential product choices and simply asks them which option they would choose. 
Instead, the ACA approach is based on the ranking - or rating – of different 
options by respondents. The CBC design has been among the most preferred by 
practioners given that it mimics in more detail real world decision-making 
processes, where respondents evaluate contemporaneously multiple 
characteristics (attributes) and directly choose the preferred one. However, the 
                                                        
10 In addition, the stock of capital willing to accept higher risk is limited compared to the stock of 
capital owned by less risk-prone investors (e.g. VC funds vs. Pension funds). This sets an upper 
limit to total possible investment, equal to the pool of funds managed by risk-prone investors, if 
the risk of the investment is too high. 
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choice tasks are less informative than ranking or rating of concepts given that 
the tasks reveal only which concept is preferred and nothing about strength of 
preference or about the relative ordering of the non-preferred concepts. To 
overcome such limitation, the ACBC methods builds on the work of Huber and 
Zwerina (1996) who show that choice tasks are more statistically efficient if the 
alternatives within each task are nearly equal in utility. To this end, the ACBC 
first includes a task where the respondent is asked to build his own favorite 
product based on the available attribute and to exclude concepts that she would 
not even consider investing. Then, the respondent’s part-worths are continually 
re-estimated as the interview progresses, and each next question is chosen, given 
what is already known about the respondent’s values, in order to provide the 
highest amount of additional information. For this reason, ACBC captures more 
information at the individual level than traditional, non- adaptive surveys and 
may be used even with small samples (Shepherd and Zacharakis, 1999; Orme, 
2010b). Additionally, the customized approach decreases the time required to 
complete the survey (Sawtooth Software, 2007). 
 
The ACBC interview is articulated into four steps. First, the respondents are 
asked to compose their most preferred investment opportunity by choosing 
their favorite option for each of the attributes included in the conjoint design out 
of a list of previously defined levels in the  “build your own” (or BYO) section 
(Table 2). Then, during the “screening section” the software generates a series of 
hypothetical investment opportunities by randomly combining the predefined 
attribute levels. The different developed product concepts are presented to the 
respondent in groups of three per screen. Respondents “are not asked to make 
final choices, but rather just indicate whether they would consider each one a 
possibility or not a possibility” (Figure 2) (Sawtooth Software, 2007, pag. 5). 
Finally, all selected investment opportunities enter the third section of the 
interviewing process (the “choice tournament”). In this last step, the investment 
options compete against each other in a series of choice tasks until the most 
preferred alternative is identified. In each choice task, the respondent needs to 
choose one out of a group of three investment options. Finally, the average part-
worth utilities are calculated from the individual part-worth utilities of each 
respondent, using the hierarchical Bayes (HB) estimation model (Rossi and 
Allenby, 2003; Orme, 2007a), which has become the standard estimation method 
for conjoint analysis (Lenk etal.,1996; Rossi and Allenby, 2003; Netzer et al., 
2008). 
 
From a theoretical perspective, conjoint analysis is grounded in the theories of 
discrete choice and random utility. In fact, it is assumed that respondents chose 
their preferred attribute combination based on maximization of their utility 
function.  At the same time, recognizing the impossibility of completely 
describing any option’s utility, as underlined by the Random Utility Theory 
(Mansky, 1977), conjoint analysis assumes that the utility function of a person 
can be broken down into observable (deterministic) and unobservable 
(stochastic) parts. Following Luthi and Wüstenhagen (2012), the utility of a 
policy framework can be described as: 
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𝑈 = ∑ 𝑢𝑖 + 𝑒
𝑛
𝑖=1
 
 
where U is the utility of the chosen auction design,  n the number of policy 
attributes, ui are the part-worth utilities of the attributes i, and e the unknown 
characteristic. Part-worth utilities are a measure the impact of the variation to 
one attribute level to another level on the overall utility. 
 
Figure 5. Screening section 
 
 
  
The probability that an investor j will chose the auction design k from choice set 
Ct is given by the following: 
 
𝑃𝑟𝑗𝑘 = Pr (𝑈𝑖𝑘 ≥ 𝑈𝑖𝑚) 
 
 
where Prjk is the probability that an investor chooses the auction framework k 
and m is the set of all the other alternatives. 
 
Given the part-worth utility estimates, equation 1 can be leveraged in order to 
compute the average attribute relevance. This “importance score” can be best 
interpreted as the degree to which a variation from the worst to best level of an 
attribute influences the overall utility of a concept (see eq 1). More precisely, if a 
given attribute shows a large discrepancy between the utility provided by its 
least and most preferred features, then its importance score is higher.  
Importantly, this is not a measure of absolute importance but relative to the 
attributes considered in the analysis. In interpreting this score, it is important to 
underline how the importance score can be driven by the design of the survey 
since the introduction of extreme levels for one attribute will lead to an higher 
(or lower) maximum (or minimum utilities) (Wittink et al.,1992; Orme, 2010c). 
For instance, a range from “no bid bonds”  to “ bid bonds equal to 50 % of project 
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costs” would result in a higher importance score because such extreme level 
would elicit strong variation in investors utilities. 
 
𝑒𝑞. 1           𝑅𝑒𝑙_𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑖 =
𝑈𝑖
𝑀𝑎𝑥 − 𝑈𝑖
𝑀𝑖𝑚
∑ (𝑈𝑖
𝑀𝑎𝑥 − 𝑈𝑖
𝑀𝑖𝑚)𝑛𝑖
 
 
where Rel_Impi is relative importance of attribute i,  𝑈𝑖
𝑀𝑎𝑥the maximum utility of 
attribute i, and 𝑈𝑖
𝑀𝑖𝑚the minimum utility of attribute i and n is the total number 
of considered attributes.  
 
In order to ensure that respondents faced meaningful choices of attribute and 
levels, the first stage of this research required mapping design options for 
Renewable Energy Technology (RET) auction framework and identifying the 
most relevant. To this end, we conducted first an in depth literature review 
collecting data from academic papers, companies’ and association reports, 
institutional publications and statistics collected by international organisations. 
This information has been complemented by ten interviews with investors and 
key European players in renewable energy industry (national associations, 
public authorities). Furthermore, before launching the survey, a pre-test was 
conducted in order to further validate the attributes and their relative levels (i.e. 
their design options) with a limited number of respondents. 
 
Finally, building on the approach of Orme (2010) and Lüthi and Wüstenhagen 
(2012), the investors’ willingness to accept certain policy features in exchange 
for lower expected returns can be computed as the following:  
 
𝑒𝑞. 2          𝑊𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑙 = −1(𝑈𝑙 − 𝑈𝑖
𝑀𝑎𝑥) ∗
∆𝑅𝑜𝐸
𝑈𝑅𝑜𝐸
𝑚𝑎𝑥 − 𝑈𝑅𝑜𝐸
𝑚𝑖𝑛
 
 
where WTAl is the implicit WTA of the attribute i and level l; Ui,l the partworth 
utility of the attribute i  at level l while 𝑈𝑖
𝑀𝑎𝑥 the maximum partworth utility of 
the attribute in question; ΔRoE the difference between  the maximum and lowest 
level of the attribute RoE (12% and 6%); and 𝑈𝑅𝑜𝐸
𝑚𝑎𝑥 is the maximum (minimum) 
utility of the attribute “Return on equity”.   
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3.4. Design options for renewable energy technology auctions 
 
Overall, project development under a tender can be viewed as a four steps 
process:  planning, winner selection, construction and operation (Figure 2). 
Within the next paragraph, given the limited space of this paper, only the main 
policy design options for each stage are reviewed11.  The policy features 
connected to the winner selection stage are discussed in more detail since they 
are the most novel and, to some extent, unique to renewable energy technologies 
(RET) support through auction.  
 
Figure 6. The four steps of RET development through auction 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration 
 
During the planning phase, as in the case of support provided by other policy 
instruments, developers need to secure numerous permits in order to move 
projects forward. In the case of auctions, these are often included among the 
documents that have to be submitted in order to participate in a specific auction 
round12. Multiple policy aspects can complicate the permitting procedures, 
including: unclear requirements and procedure, extremely strict obligations 
and/or the need to deal with multiple authorities. The latter case is often cited as 
one of the main difficulties faced by RET investors (Johnston et al., 2008). To 
mitigate this issue, some countries have introduced offices – so called “one-stop-
shops” (OSSs)13 - responsible for issuing all the permits required to develop a 
new plant, thus reducing the uncertainty in dealing with multiple authorities. 
However, OSSs are not a panacea and their implementation can hide numerous 
challenges (OECD, 2015). A novel approach - specific to auctions - to the 
decrease the administrative burden has been introduced in the Dutch systems. 
Here, the transmission system operator (TSO) is responsible for obtaining all 
                                                        
11 The interested reader can refer to del Rio et al. (2015) for a more detailed 
discussion.   
12 Even if these often need to be included in the bid offer, this paper distinguishes 
them from other “participation requirements” , which discussed below,  because of 
the role of government in issuing these documents 
13 Notably, one-stop-shops are a tool that can be applied to facilitate any permitting 
procedure and therefore they are not a unique feature of action design. 
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necessary permits and performs a general EIA for the sites that will be auctioned 
while the bidders have to submit only a project specific EIA. This design provides 
a particularly innovative mechanism to mitigate administrative risk by 
essentially transferring the permitting liability to the TSO who is be better 
positioned to manage the associated uncertainty and complexity. In fact, private 
developers face the risk that the costs relative to the administrative and scouting 
procedures became sunk in case of unsuccessful bids. Instead, from the point of 
view of the TSO, one project will eventually be built and therefore the sunk 
investment risk is virtually zero. Furthermore, the TSO should also be better 
equipped to complete the permitting procedure than a private actor given the 
likely more complete knowledge of the authorization procedures, thus leading to 
overall lower transaction costs. However, also this procedure - while very 
interesting  - presents also some drawbacks. First of all, it requires the State to 
select the sites where projects will be developed, thus limiting the role of the 
private sector. Secondly, it exhibits an inherent limit to capacity deployments 
equal to the Government resources dedicated to sites-selection.  
 
During the planning phase, the development of NIMBY syndrome can sensibly 
decrease the likelihood of a project to be developed. This behavior, generally 
defined as the recognition of the public value of a project by a person (or by a 
group) who however opposes to its realization in proximity of their own 
neighborhood, can be aggravated by poor administrative procedures like the 
absence of clear mechanism to inform and involve the local communities. In this 
regard, while most of EU States have requirements in place in order to facilitate 
the participation of local communities, Denmark distinguished itself for the 
introduction of an obligation to offer a certain percentage of project shares to 
local residents. While not exactly a risk mitigation measure, this mechanism 
results in a larger distribution of the financial gains connected to promotion of 
renewable and provides also insights onto the large support for renewable 
energy in Copenhagen (ENS, 2009). During the interviews, developers agreed 
that offering shares to residents might be an effective tool in reducing the risk of 
NIMBY but strongly underlined their preference for having the freedom to 
choose if (and to what extent) sales catered to residents should be designed. 
 
Auctions often introduce criteria to discriminate the technologies allowed to 
participate in a given auction round. The most commonly considered distinction 
is between technology neutral and technology specific auctions. In technology 
neutral auctions, different technologies compete for the deployment of the least-
cost option. For instance, Brazil has recently organized open auctions where 
renewables competed with natural gas. At the opposite side of the spectrum, 
technology specific auctions (or auctions with predefined bands for each 
technology) support the development of targeted technologies, as for instance in 
India. Importantly, the segmentation does not need be only between low- and 
high carbon technologies and numerous other criteria are possible. For instance, 
Californian schemes leverage generation profiles to group technologies (base-
load electricity, peaking electricity and non-peaking intermittent) (IRENA and 
CEM, 2015) while renewables are clustered according their level of maturity in 
the UK. Naturally, the segmentation of technologies reduces competition, thus 
lowering the cost effectiveness property of this mechanism. While “technological 
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neutrality” favours the “lowest bid” logic, some observers highlight how 
technology differentiated auctions promote a diversified energy mix that is an 
important feature of a reliably system (Cretì et al. 2016).  
 
The total capacity auctioned (and frequency of rounds) also can be used to 
regulate the competitiveness level of the tendering framework.  In fact, the larger 
is the pot offered on auction, the lower is the level of competition (and the 
business risk) faced by developers. Nevertheless, auction rounds that are too 
generous can severely undermine the price discovery mechanisms and the 
overall effectiveness of the auction process (i.e. consider the extreme case where 
the capacity to auctioned outstrips the capacity to build of developers). However, 
each round needs to be large enough to not undermine project specific 
economies of scale that, in turn, varies according to the technology considered 
(e.g. solar parks versus offshore wind farms). Furthermore, low frequency of 
rounds is likely to lead to underbidding because losing the auction would result 
in a long pause in project development with the risk of permits expiration, 
financial resources unproductively committed, etc.  
 
A long-term schedule is instrumental in improving the effectiveness of the 
scheme due to both learning effects and avoidance of a “cliff-edge”. In fact longer-
lived schemes allow investors building familiarity with the tendering process, 
thus possibly lowering investment risks. In this regard, the German Federal 
Network Agency (Bundesnetzagetur) pointed out that the rate of bid exclusions 
is declining as participants are becoming increasingly familiar with the auction 
scheme. Furthermore, as all start-and-stop policies, the development of a robust 
supply chain is likely to be impaired by a lack of visibility on future rounds. (Río 
& Linares, 2014). Finally, short-lived auction schemes (i.e. one-off) create a cliff 
edge structure where incentives to underbidding increase given the lack of 
future opportunities to recover initial investments.  
 
Speculative bidding, broadly defined as bids that are priced too low to be 
economically viable, can severely undermine investment attractiveness. These 
are often made either with the objective of undermining other players or to lock 
an incentive at time t while planning to actually develop the project at time t+1 
betting on further decrease in the technology costs. However, these behaviors 
can severely undermine the healthy development of the industry as the market is 
foreclosed to players truly willing to develop a project at the time of the auction. 
In addition, this process slows capacity deployment, thus jeopardizing domestic 
energy security. Furthermore, it can activate a vicious circle where slower 
deployment results in slower technology learning that, in turns, leads 
speculators to wait longer to install capacity.  
  
For this reason, bid bonds and pre-qualifications criteria are often introduced.  A 
bid-bond can be defined as a cash deposit subject to forfeiture if the winning 
contractor fails to build the project in the required time and quality. However, 
bid bonds have the detrimental effect of increasing the barriers to entry, 
especially for smaller players. Where these small developers have proven to be 
large capital contributors (e.g. Germany, where 50% of wind farms are owned by 
small actors), high financial bid bonds might have severe negative impact on 
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total capital available for project development. In addition, restricting the 
participation of smaller developers and cooperatives might undermine the 
mechanisms that decrease the diffusion of NIMBY syndromes. To overcome 
these challenges, some jurisdictions have introduced lower bonds for developers 
meeting specific criteria. For instance, in Germany cooperatives benefit from 
lower bid bonds than regular developers. Also, non-financial penalties are less 
likely to favour larger developers. For instance, the UK legislators opted for the 
exclusion of the same site to any subsequent auction round for 13 months as 
non-delivery incentive. Other qualification requirements introduced in order to 
avoid speculative bidding include a given track record in terms of project 
developed or international certification. These, as the financial bib-bonds, are 
likely to increase the costs of participation because prequalification costs are 
sunk costs (Moore and Newey 2013). Interestingly, in order to provide investors 
with an exit option if unforeseeable circumstances take place, the right to 
transfer the commitment to build in a secondary market may be a valid solution 
(solar power Europe, 2016). 
 
Once the incentive is awarded to the project, auction scheme may introduce a 
series of construction milestones with relative penalties in order to ensure the 
public interest of having the capacity installed in due time. In this regard, it is 
particularly interesting the UK CfD scheme where a number of milestones have 
been introduced, possibly to compensate for the lack of financial bid-bonds. 
Here, the first milestone is set 12 months after the contract award and the 
penalties for failing to prove of either having spent at least 10 per cent of the 
estimated total project pre-commissioning costs or providing clear evidence of 
progress towards timely commissioning can lead to project termination. Another 
common incentive to meet the project construction schedule is created by 
establishing that the payments window will start on the expected commissioned 
date, regardless of project completion 14 (Addleshaw Goddard, 2015). The design 
risk connected to such milestones lies in the possibility of setting too short or too 
long deadlines. In the former case, well-reputed developers may decide to not 
participate in the auctions, thus jeopardizing the overall efficiency of the scheme.  
At the same time, however, excessively long construction periods increase the 
risks of excessive remuneration (if the costs of technologies decrease more than 
expected) or underbidding (del Rio, 2017).  Importantly, following the example 
of the English CfD, winning projects should be given a penalty-free window (i.e.  
“Target Commissioning Window”) during which the bid capacity can be 
delivered and not a specific date. 
 
Also, auction frameworks introduce some rigidities during the construction 
phase. In fact, once a project has won the tender, developers cannot freely vary 
the project size to respond to new opportunities (or challenges) that may arise. 
To mitigate this issue, some schemes offer the possibility to modify the initial 
project capacity by a certain percentage15. For instance, the project capacity can 
                                                        
14 If a project has not been commissioned one year after the end of the commissioning window, then the CfD contract will be 
terminated (longstop date).    
 
15Within the UK CfD, this can be lowered up to 10% from initial bid without incourring into sanctions. 
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be decreased or increased up to 9% of the original submission  in the UK (ECCC; 
2016) while Dutch regulations allow only to increase the capacity of the project 
(interview). Nevertheless, during the interviews emerged that developers 
regarded these options as a simple “nice to have” and felt overall confident in 
their ability to deliver the project on time and to correctly size it before the 
auction. Importantly, low pre-qualification requirements and low penalty levels 
should not be introduced at the same time, as this might attract speculation and 
result in poor realisation rates  (Wigand et al., 2016).  
 
Once the plant is operative, price and quantity risks are the main uncertainty. 
The latter can be defined as the uncertainty regarding the possibility of selling all 
produced electricity while the former refers to the unknowns related to the 
actual selling price. Both uncertainties have been effectively mitigated in the past 
through feed-in tariffs (FiT), priority dispatching and the possibility to bank 
unused amount of generation hours due poor wind or solar conditions to next 
years. Building on the recognized importance role in FiT in driving investments, 
most of auctions currently in place offer the winner a fixed price per KWh 
guaranteed either through a PPA (power purchase agreement) or a traditional 
FiT. Instead, the legislations that have opted for a top-up on the market price, as 
for instance the UK or French CfD, have introduced an “off-taker of last resort” in 
order to ensure that generator will be always able to sell their output. More 
precisely, these systems require certain entities, identified as the “off-taker of 
last resorts” (OLR), to make periodic offers to buy the electricity generated 
under the CfD at a discount to the market reference price set by the law16  (ECC, 
2016). While this mechanism can offer generators some certainty on the 
presence of customers for generated renewable electricity, its design should 
ensure that is truly a “ last resort” option (generators should always prefer to sell 
on the market). Interestingly, several developers underlined that the discount 
needs to set at a reasonable level and argued that currently set levels are too 
high to offer any attractive fallback options. A similar mechanism is provided in 
Italy where renewable energy generators can opt for the “ritiro dedicato” instead 
of a traditional PPA. Through the “ritiro dedicato, the GSE purchase green 
electricity at prices set through a formula and takes the risk of selling it back to 
the wholesale market. The recently published proposal for the new clean energy 
Directive (the so called “winter package”), includes an obligation to remove 
priority grid dispatch for new renewables and therefore this option not 
considered here. 
 
IRENA and CEM (2015) underline how the bankability of the off-taker can also 
be a key driver in determining the attractiveness of the auction framework in 
several non-OECD countries. While this is not usually questioned in Europe, this 
has proven an important issue in determining the attractiveness of auctions 
across the world.  Useful mechanisms are the creation of specific funds to ensure 
the compliance with PPA agreements (e.g. Argentina). 
 
Finally, (a reputation for) an unstable policy framework – for instance because of 
sudden or, even worse, retroactive changes - is highly deleterious for private 
                                                        
16 The initial discount is set in the BPPA at £25/MWh adjusted by an inflation factor.  
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investments. In order to counteract this issue, governments can put in place firm 
“commitment devices”. In this regard, the UK CfD provides two interesting 
elements to consider. First, the CfD offers a protection to plants operators 
against changes in the taxation code that would decrease the profitability of the 
project stating that their fixed price can be increased (or lowered) to compensate 
for decrease in profitability due to new generation taxes (Addleshow-goddard, 
2015). This is important since the CfD operators, contrarily to other power 
plants, cannot pass increased costs on to the consumers because they are 
entitled to an overall (maximum) fixed price. Secondly, the CfD auction winners 
enter a private law contract with a purposively build private company (the Low 
Carbon Contract Company - LCCC17). This enshrines the rights of the auction 
winners within a private law contractual framework that may result in greater 
certainty given that future governments could not alter private contracts as 
easily as public laws.   
 
  
  
                                                        
17 The LCC manages the Supplier Obligation Levy that funds CFD payments (LCCC website, 2016). 
 145 
 
3.5. Attribute selection and survey design 
 
The number of attributes included in the conjoint analysis had to be restricted in 
order to design a survey that could meet the limited time availability of 
managers. Three main reasons led to the decision of focusing the experiment on 
the attributes characterizing the winner selection stage. First of all, compared to 
non-auction frameworks (e.g. FiT or renewable certificate markets), tenders 
create a cliff edge structure in the investment process. In fact, investors will have 
to incur in a number of costs (e.g. scouting, planning, engineering planning, 
permitting, etc.) before having a definitive knowledge about the level of incentive 
that (if any at all) will be disbursed to the project. Only once the auction is 
cleared, these unknowns disappear18. As such, both the planning stage and the 
winner selection stage are likely to generate the highest impact on project 
uncertainty. However, given that permitting - the central issue during the 
planning stage - has been a central focus of several studies and the uniqueness of 
the winner selection stage to auctions, the decision to focus on this latter stage 
was taken.  Among the features that characterize this step, three features have 
been included: the nature of bid bonds, duration of the announced auction 
schedule and type of auction (Table 2).  
 
In addition, the literature (and also the preliminary interviews) underlines how 
policy shocks - broadly defined as unexpected changes in existing regulation 
and/or regulatory uncertainty – remain a clear determinant of the attractiveness 
of an auction framework. However, policy uncertainty is an extremely difficult 
variable to articulate in a conjoint study because of a lack of a uniform scale of 
measurement. To overcome this challenge, previous studies have characterized 
this feature - obtaining highly significant results - as number of unexpected policy 
changes in the past N. years. To some extent, these studies evaluate how negative 
governments’ reputation weakens the attractiveness of policy framework in 
place. In fact, these leveraged information on previous (negative) events to 
evaluate how these “tarnish” government credibility to uphold policies.  
 
Within this study, a novel approach is undertaken exploiting the recent 
referendum on UK membership to the European Union. In fact, the referendum 
outcome creates uncertainty on the nature of future arrangements between EU 
and UK that may affect investments in renewable energy plants through various 
channels (e.g. disruption of supply chain, turmoil on financial markets, impact on 
interconnected electricity markets, expected prices of ETS allowances, upholding 
of English environmental policies emanating from EU regulations and targets, 
lower electricity demand because of lower GDP growth, etc.). Overall, the 
uncertainty on Brexit has been often debated in terms of whether the new 
arrangements will see a “hard” or “soft” Brexit. Nevertheless, the lack of a clear 
definition of what the two entail and of how they differ makes them not readily 
operationable for a conjoint study (i.e. respondents would not have a clear and 
                                                        
18 This not the case for other support scheme that provide the certainty to be entitled to a given revenue support scheme for 
all projects built within a certain date. In certain cases,  a degression scale for the incentive is provided, thus still providing 
developers with certainty about support level if specific deadlines are missed or certain capacities are reached. 
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common understanding of their difference). For this reason, this study attempts 
to capture uncertainty as the relation between the point in time where the 
investment decision is taken and when the negotiations on “Brexit” are expected 
to be concluded. Two main possible relations between the timing of negotiations 
and of the investment decision can be envisaged. One on side, investors may 
prefer to invest after a Brexit agreement has been reached since this would 
result in a better visibility on the future “state of world”. On the other hand, 
investors may prefer to invest as early as possible in order to lock-in their 
investment in current rules. Following this latter interpretation, also winning an 
auction close to the end of the negotiations may be a less preferred option since 
project procurement and construction would take place in an uncertain 
environment.  
 
 Finally, the expected return on the equity is a clear driver in driving investment 
decision and, therefore, it is included as the fifth attribute.  
 
The survey was fielded between February and July 2017. A link to the 
questionnaire was attached to the mailing list of two national renewable energy 
associations: the Italian wind energy association (ANEV) and the English 
Renewable energy association (REA). The latter association agreed to distribute 
the link to the survey through its mailing list directed only to investors in 
renewable energy projects. In addition, other 50 targeted invites have been sent 
to members of selected Linkedin groups and to email addresses identified 
through web research. Finally, additional responses were collected at three 
industry fairs that took place between February and June 2017. These were: the 
E-energy forum in Essen (February 07 – February 09  2017); the Intersolar 
Conference Fair in Munich ( May 31 - June 2,  2017) and the Wind Offshore Fair 
in London (6-8 June 2017). During these fairs, managers have been approached 
and asked if they might be interested in participating in the study either during 
the fair or if they could be reached over the phone at a better timing. In order to 
improve the accuracy of responses and avoid the risk of “self- assessment”, it was 
guaranteed that the collected information would remain confidential and it was 
promised to share the final results of the study with respondents (Huber and 
Power’s , 1985). 
 
Overall 56 questionnaires have been collected but 18 questionnaires could not 
be considered for the analysis because either incomplete or because the 
respondents indicated their main area of focus as outside the EU28 region. Eight  
questionnaires were answered directly at one of the above-mentioned fairs19.  
The distribution of the technological areas of expertise of the respondents (table 
12) is skewed towards wind (on-shore and off-shore) and solar technologies, 
which played an important role in the recent expansion of low-carbon 
generation. Our respondents also reported to be involved in relatively large 
projects (42% stated the average project size is above 31 MW), thus suggesting 
that our sample is composed of professionals employed by important players in 
the market.  In terms of countries, the sample is naturally skewed towards the 
                                                        
19 An additional questionnaire was completed but was excluded from the analysis as a sudden meeting led 
the respondent to first interrupt answering for a long time and ,then, to rush through the different sections.  
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States were our distribution channels were stronger, namely Germany (where 
most of the fairs were held), Italy and UK. In addition, the large majority 
reported to have been working within this industry longer than 6 years, thus 
suggesting that we are facing a pool of individuals that have a deep 
knowledgeable of the sector.   The job titles of respondents were not recorded, 
however, most of questionnaires that were collected during the fairs were 
answered by “Project Development Managers”.  
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Table 11. Final sample demographics 
Firm Type Count (N) Share (%) Years of experience Count (N) Share (%) 
Project developer 9 23.7% < 3 years 4 10.5% 
IPP 3 7.9% 3 - 5 years 6 15.8% 
Utility 9 23.7% 6 - 12 years 20 52.6% 
Cooperative 3 7.9% > 12 years 8 21.1% 
Venture Capital, private equity 
or hybrid 
3 7.9%    
Infrastructure fund, Pension 
fund and Insurance company 
7 18.4%    
Bank 1 2.6%    
Private investor 3 7.9%    
      
Average Project size Count (N) Share (%) Technology  
(multiple choice 
available)  
Count (N) Share (%) 
<2 Mw 4 10.5% Wind project (on-shore) 18 30.5% 
2 - 6 Mw 2 5.3% Wind project (off-shore) 12 20.3% 
6 -  15 Mw 10 26.3% Solar project 25 43.1% 
16 -  30 Mw 6 15.8% Geothermal project 1 1.7% 
31 - 100 Mw 16 42.1% Other 3 5.1% 
      
Country Count (N) Share (%) Cumulative investment  Count (N) Share (%) 
Austria 1 2.6% <15 mln euros 4 10.5% 
Belgium 1 2.6% 16-100 mln euros 9 23.7% 
Croatia 1 2.6% 101- 300 mln euros 7 18.4% 
Denmark 2 5.3% 301 - 1000 mln euros 5 13.2% 
Finland 1 2.6% > 1000 mln euros 13 34.2% 
France 2 5.3%    
Germany 5 13.2%    
Italy 11 28.9%    
Netherlands 1 2.6%    
Romania 1 2.6%    
Spain 2 7.9%    
United Kingdom 10 26.3%    
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Table 12. List of attributes included in the experimental study 
Attributes Description  Level  
Return on equity Expected return on the investment 6% 8% 10% 12% 
Differenziated / undifferentiated 
auction 
A tender is differentiated by technology if the total amount of 
MWs to be installed at each new auction round is defined by 
technology. (e.g. 100 MW of wind power, 50 MW of solar, etc). 
Otherwise, the auction is defined as “undifferentiated” . 
 Differentiated auctions 
 Undifferentiated auctions 
 
Auction Schedule (potential 
project pipelines) 
The schedule of next auctions is the following:   One auction for the same amount of installed capacity (e.g. MW) is 
scheduled for next year 
 Auctions for the same amount of installed capacity (e.g. MW) are 
schedule every year for next 3 years 
 Auctions for the same amount of installed capacity (e.g. MW) are 
schedule every year for next 5 years 
Bid Bonds If the bid is successful but the project is not realized, the 
following penalties apply 
 0.4% of budget costs (0.2% for cooperatives) 
 4% of budgeted costs (2% for cooperatives) 
 No project on the same land can be submitted for the next three auction 
rounds.  
Policy sudden shock ( 
transformed into “Timing of 
investment over Brexit)) 
Given the recent development, the policy sudden shock has 
been articulated as the resolution of BREXIT negotiations, i.e. “A 
definitive agreement on Brexit between EU and the UK will be 
reached..” 
 Negotiations have been concluded entirely and in full agreement 
between the parties before the auction 
 6 months after the auction 
 12 months after the auction 
 18 months after the auction 
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3.6. Results 
3.6.1. Part-worth utilities 
 
The following tables report the part-worth utilities estimates for our pooled 
model and, separately, for EU27- and UK-based respondents. The root likelihood 
(RHL), which ranges from zero to one and it is a measure of goodness of fit of the 
HB model underlying the utility estimations, suggests a good fit of the different 
models on the data. The utilities are zero-centered, as such, a negative value 
associated to one level should not be considered as decreasing overall utility but 
as less valuable than less negative levels. The zero-centering process also results 
in having some levels set close (or equal) to zero while others above (or below) 
this threshold. Therefore, the t-test on whether a given level is significantly 
different from zero is substituted with a t-test on whether the mean utility for 
each attribute is statistically higher the utility associated to the preceding (less 
preferred) level. As such, the number of t-test for each attribute is equal to the 
number of levels for that attribute less one.  
 
The estimations underline a homogenous direction (or ordering of preference) 
and relatively similar magnitude of coefficients across all the panels considered 
except for the attribute “timing of investment over Brexit”.  As such, a t-test has 
been applied to test if the coefficients are statistically different between UK-
based respondents and the other European investors included in the sample. The 
results lead to strongly reject the hypothesis of homogeneity for the attribute 
“timing over Brexit” and to accept it for all the other attributes considered in the 
analysis (table A.1). Therefore, the coefficients associated to this attribute should 
be analyzed bearing in mind the strong and statistically significant difference 
between the UK- and EU27-based investors. Notably, given the very small sample 
for UK, model 3 estimates should be considered - at best - indicative. 
 
According to estimations for the considered auction design options (nature of 
bid bonds, duration of the announced auction schedule and type of auction), the 
highest increase in utility is achieved shifting from non-monetary to moderately 
large bid-bonds. Interestingly, the bid-bond variable does not improve linearly 
with the level of financial commitments.  In fact, this would require having the 
preference sorted from the lowest (no financial bid-bonds) to highest bond (4% 
of budget costs), or vice-versa. Instead, the results suggest a u-shaped preference 
curve where investors appreciate the presence of financial bid bonds but up to 
certain threshold located between 0.4% and 4% of projects costs. Overall, the 
estimates suggest that investors value the presence of financial bid-bonds as an 
effective tool to discourage under-bidders but these need to be carefully 
introduced in order to not increase excessively the project costs.  
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Table 13. Part-worth utility estimations 
Attribute Attribute level Model 1: Full 
sample 
Model 2: EU27  Model 3: UK 
Expected Return 
on equity 
6% -134.79 
n.a.
 
(9.025) 
-131.01 
n.a.
 
(9.999) 
-125.59 
n.a.
 
(18.742) 
8% -18.51 *** 
(2.69) 
-19.51 *** 
(3.416) 
-19.69 *** 
(4.976) 
10% 45.09 *** 
(3.523) 
43.59 *** 
(4.506) 
50.28 *** 
(3.889) 
12% 108.21 *** 
(7.591) 
106.93 *** 
(8.124) 
94.99 *** 
(15.59) 
     
Type of auction Open to all R.E.T. -19.47 
n.a.
 
(3.805) 
-21.67 
n.a.
 
(5.124) 
-19.76 
n.a.
 
(6.694) 
Technology specific 19.47 *** 
(3.805) 
21.67 *** 
(5.124) 
19.76 *** 
(6.694) 
    
Auction schedule 1 year long schedule -24.62 
n.a.
 
(4.347) 
-31.00 
n.a.
 
(4.65) 
-13.57 
n.a.
 
(12.133) 
3 years long schedule 1.86 *** 
(2.605) 
3.86 *** 
(2.994) 
2.36 
(5.182) 
5 years long schedule 22.75 *** 
(3.448) 
27.14 *** 
(3.417) 
11.2 *** 
(11.763) 
     
Bid bond 4% of budgeted costs (2% 
for cooperatives).  
-35.85 
n.a.
 
(5.673) 
-35.39 
n.a.
 
(6.211) 
-28.55 
n.a.
 
(9.474) 
No project on the same 
land can be submitted for 
the next 3 auction rounds. 
       8.37 *** 
(3.7) 
5.85 *** 
(4.903) 
6.18 ** 
(3.773) 
0.4% of budget costs (0.2% 
for cooperatives).  
       27.48  *** 
(3.946) 
29.53 *** 
(4.113) 
22.36 ** 
(7.637) 
     
Timing over 
Brexit 
Negotiations 
(Negotiations 
will be 
concluded..) 
Negotiations concluded 24.02 *** 
(4.05) 
18.82 *** 
(4.966) 
37.29  ** 
(4.264) 
12 months after the 
auction 
3.83 *** 
(2.472) 
-1.97  
(3.008) 
17.47 *** 
(6.311) 
6 months after the 
auction 
-9.14 ** 
(2.873) 
-12.19 
n.a.
 
(3.051) 
-1.40 *** 
(5.655) 
18 months after the 
auction 
-18.71 
n.a.
 
(4.073) 
-4.66 * 
(4.884) 
-53.36 
n.a.
 
(8.637) 
     
Sample size  38 28 10 
RHL  0.771 0.764 0.818 
Note:  Standard errors in parenthesis. P-values refer to a t-test on whether the mean 
utility for each level is statistically higher than the mean of the preceding (less 
preferred) level. ***,**,* respectively means significant at 1%, 5% and 10%. The least 
preferred level for each attribute is marked as “n.a.”. 
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As often underlined in the literature, long-term visibility is a key element of a 
framework conductive to investment, and this seems to apply also to design of 
auction programs. However, the estimates underline that at least a medium-term 
schedule should be adopted to have a meaningful impact on the cost of equity. In 
fact, moving from a one-off auction to the introduction of a five years long 
program leads to an increase in utility equal to 46 points for the pooled model 
while the utility increase from one-off to three years is very limited. Finally, 
bearing in mind all the caveats mentioned for the UK-only model, we highlight 
how the utility associated to the highest (lowest) levels of this attribute seems to 
be lower for our UK sample than for model (1) and (2).  
 
The third largest increase is given by adopting technology-specific instead of 
technology-open auctions (+39 utility points in panel 1 and 3 and +43 according 
to estimates based on EU27-based respondents). Overall, shifting from open to 
technological specific auctions seems to be an effective tool in reducing 
investment risks. Importantly, policy makers should carefully consider the 
potential trade-off between least-cost and lower capital costs that this choice 
entails. In fact, while it is true that organizing  technology-specific auction is 
probably an effective tool to decreasie the business risk, and therefore the cost of 
capital, it may well be possible that the higher competition brought by an open 
auction may result in lower overall costs. By the same token, technology-specific 
auctions can be more effective from a dynamic perspective if the targeted 
technologies exhibit faster learning curves. 
 
The interpretation of the coefficients associated to the last attribute, “timing of 
investment over Brexit”, is affected by numerous issues. In fact, the pooled 
estimates (model 1) appear to be highly driven by the significantly higher impact 
on investment decision of the timing over Brexit for UK based investors. Overall, 
this segment of respondents may be seen almost as behaving as “outliers” 
inflating the pooled estimates (model 1). This is especially true for the utility 
associated to the level 18 months before Brexit.  By the same token, also the sub-
groups estimates appear to be not robust. In fact, the t-test performed does not 
allow to be statistically confident about the ordering of preference of EU 
investors. More precisely, while the level 12 months appears to be preferred to 
18 months and, in turn, this is preferred to 6 months, the lack of significance of 
these estimates suggest extreme caution in interpreting them (Table 2). Instead, 
as per the other attributes, model 3 estimates should be considered at best 
indicative the given the very small sample for UK. 
 
Given the need to cautiously interpret the coefficients associated this attribute, 
we limit this discussion to underline two key conclusions. First of all, as often 
discussed in the literature, investors’ utility function put a prize on an 
investment environment characterized by a lack of policy uncertainty. This 
nature emerges also in our analysis where a strong preference for having a 
policy environment characterized by an agreement on Brexit is confirmed across 
all panels. Secondly, estimations across all the samples underline how investors 
seem to consider the period closer to the end of the negotiations as highly 
turbulent and to agree on the higher utility provided by locking-in their 
investment during the central stage of this process (12 months). The extremely 
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limited number of respondents based in UK suggests caution in discussing 
further difference between the two groups and we limit this analysis to 
underlining the weak evidence of an inversion in ordering for the least preferred 
level between the two sub-panels.   
 
The average importance score, based on eq. 1, are shown in table 4. The overall 
range for each attribute is relatively similar, thus leading to an overall similar 
importance scores within each panel. The only exception is the expected return 
on the investment that naturally emerges as the leading driver of the investment 
decision. As for the single utility levels, the importance scores appear 
homogenous across the various panels, except for the Brexit attribute. Also in 
this case, a t-test strongly leads to reject the hypothesis of equality of the 
importance score between UK and EU27 respondents only for this attribute (i.e.“ 
Timing over from Brexit”) (table A2).  Overall, the importance score provides 
some weak evidence of a much higher relevance of the timing (setting aside the 
outcomes) of negotiations on Brexit for English investors rather than those 
based in EU27 
  
 
Table 14. Relative importance score 
Attribute Full-Panel EU27 UK 
Expected return on 
equity 
50.2% 48.8% 45.9% 
Type of auction 9.8% 11.1% 10.2% 
Auction schedule 12.2% 13.0% 13.4% 
Bid bond 15.0% 15.6% 11.4% 
Timing over Brexit 
negotiations 
12.8% 11.5% 19.1% 
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3.6.2. Investors implicit willingness-to-pay 
 
As a next step, in order to facilitate interpretation of our most robust results, the 
investors’ willingness-to-accept (WTA) certain auction framework design 
options is estimated using Eq. 2 following the approach discussed on Luthi and 
Wüstenhagen (2012) on energy economics. Results are presented in Fig. 2 and 
briefly discussed below. Note that the simulations below are based on the 
preference data estimated out of the entire sample to increase their robustness. 
However, as discussed before, the estimations are remarkably similar across all 
sub-panels for the considered auction design features. 
 
Figure 7. Willingness-to-accept certain policy risks. 
 
 
Overall, auction design can lead to improvement in financing costs by lowering 
the cost of equity between 0.5% and 1.5% (Figure 2). Mirroring previous 
discussion, the adoption of moderate financial bid-bonds leads to the highest 
improvement in overall financing costs (-1.5%). Instead, the adoption of non-
financial bid-bonds or requiring high(er) financial deposits will instead lead 
investors to seek higher return on their invested capital in order either to 
compensate for the higher financial cost or for the larger risk of under-bidding 
by competitors. Fig. 2 shows that every two-year increase in the duration of 
planned auctions can lead to half a percentage point decrease in the cost of 
equity. This improvement is probably driven by the possibility of participating 
and recalibrating bids for next auction rounds, if the first bid round is 
unsuccessful. Notably, as previously discussed, the adoption of longer schedule 
seems to have a lower utility, and therefore to lead to a lower decrease in equity 
cost, for UK-based developers compared to EU27. However, all the discussed 
caveats for this sample apply. Finally, the results suggest that adopting open 
auctions will lead to an increase in the cost of capital of less than one percentage 
point (0.9%). The calculations for the Brexit attribute are reported but not 
discussed here given the lack of significance of the estimated coefficients.  
0.96% 
0.52% 
1.17% 
0.47% 
1.56% 
0.50% 
0.82% 1.06% 
0.0%
0.5%
1.0%
1.5%
2.0%
2.5%
3.0%
Full Panel EU UK
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3.7. Conclusions  
 
Our main research question is how policy-induced uncertainty affects the risk-
return profile of investments in renewable energy. From this standpoint, this 
paper aims at complementing the existing literature by opening the “black-box” 
of auction design and at shedding some light on its impact on the cost of capital 
for renewable energy project. In addition, the effect of on-going Brexit 
negotiations, as a potential driver of policy induced uncertainty, is considered. As 
in previous studies, we assume that each policy framework is composed by 
different attributes, whose levels affect the uncertainty faced by investors. 
 
After an in-depth review of auction design options in Europe, three auction 
design features have been selected for our experiment. The results show that the 
three considered attributes can lead to a moderate improvement in financing 
costs by lowering the cost of equity between 0.5% and 1.5%. The largest 
decrease is provided by the adoption of moderate financial bid-bonds. 
Captivatingly, the estimates suggest an u-shaped preference curve where 
investors appreciate the presence of financial bid bonds but up to certain 
threshold located between 0.4% and 4% of projects costs.  The analysis also 
underlines how long-term auction programs strengthen the cost reduction 
effects typical of tendering competition. Interestingly, the results show that the 
adoption of a five year long auction schedule characterized by one auction round 
per year can already lead to meaningful capital cost reduction. Finally, the 
adoption of technology specific auction leads to lower business risks and, 
therefore, a willingness to accept lower returns on equity.  
 
Notably, auction design is likely to involve various trade-offs between different 
policy objectives and needs to be carefully assessed. For instance, while 
moderate financial bid-bonds emerge to be the favorite design option for the 
investors included in our sample, non-financial bid-bonds are likely to favor the 
participation of small players. As such, if the policy planner is interested in 
increasing the participation of local residents  (e.g. through cooperatives or 
SMEs) in the development of domestic resources, then accepting the higher costs 
delivered by non-financial bid-bonds may be an interesting option. By the same 
token, technology-specific auctions can sensibly decrease the investment risk 
faced by investors and promote technology learning with positive effect over 
time. However, a technology-neutral design promotes competition and therefore 
is more likely to meet the least overall cost criteria in a static context.  
 
In addition to policy design features, this study attempts to evaluate the impact 
of the uncertainty brought by the Brexit process on investment in renewables. 
However, given the need to cautiously interpret the coefficients associated to 
this attribute, we limit this discussion to underline how estimations across all 
the samples suggest that investors seem to consider the period closer to the end 
of the negotiations as highly turbulent and to agree on the higher utility provided 
by locking-in their investment during the central stage of the negotiation process 
(12 months) or once the negotiations are concluded. In addition, the estimates 
provide weak evidence of a higher relevance of the timing (setting aside the 
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outcome) of the negotiations on future relations between the UK and EU for 
English investors rather than for those based in EU27. The extremely limited 
number of respondents based in UK suggests caution in discussing further 
difference between the UK- and EU27-based respondents.   
 
Importantly, the conclusions of this paper are limited to the attributes 
considered in the experiment. However, numerous other auction features may 
have a positive (or negative) impact on equity costs. For instance, frequency of 
auctions or penalties for delays, as discussed in the review section, may help 
further lowering the cost of investment and be the object of further studies. 
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Table A1. T-test on equality of level utility estimates. 
 
Average Utilities 
(Zero-Centered Diffs) 
EU27 UK P-value 
Ho: 𝛽𝐸𝑈,𝑙 = 𝛽𝑈𝐾,𝑙 
6% -131.01 
(9.999) 
-125.59  
(18.742) 0.80 
8% -19.51  
(3.416) 
-19.69  
(4.976) 0.98 
10% 43.59  
(4.506) 
50.28  
(3.889) 0.27 
12% 106.93  
(8.124) 
94.99  
(15.59) 0.51 
Technology specific -21.67  
(5.124) 
-19.76 
(6.694) 0.82 
Open to all renewable 
energy technologies 
21.67  
(5.124) 
19.76  
(6.694) 0.82 
1 year long schedule -31.00  
(4.65) 
-13.57  
(12.133) 0.21 
3 years long schedule 3.86  
(2.994) 
2.36 
(5.182) 0.81 
5 year long schedule 27.14  
(3.417) 
11.2  
(11.763) 0.22 
4% of budgeted costs (2% 
for cooperatives). 
-35.39  
(6.211) 
-28.55  
(9.474) 0.55 
No project on the same 
land can be submitted for 
the next 3 auction 
rounds. 
5.85  
(4.903) 
6.18  
(3.773) 
0.96 
0.4% of budget costs 
(0.2% for cooperatives).  
29.53  
(4.113) 
22.36  
(7.637) 0.42 
BREXIT1 18.82  
(4.966) 
37.29   
(4.264) 0.01 
6 months after the 
auction 
-1.97  
(3.008) 
17.47  
(6.311) 0.11 
12 months after the 
auction 
-12.19  
(3.051) 
-1.40  
(5.655) 0.02 
18 months after the 
auction 
-4.66 
(4.884) 
-53.36 
(8.637) 0.00 
 
 
Table A2. T-test on equality of average importance scores estimates. 
Attribute EU27 UK 
P-value 
Ho: 𝛽𝐸𝑈,𝑙 = 𝛽𝑈𝐾,𝑙 
Expected return on equity 48.8% 45.9% 0.66 
Type of Auction 11.1% 10.2% 0.69 
Auction schedule 13.0% 13.4% 0.89 
Bid Bonds 15.6% 11.4% 0.23 
Distance from Brexit 
agreement 
11.5% 19.1% 0.01 
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